View source for Why People Remain Loyal to Failed or Repressive Ideologies

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|title=Why People Remain Loyal to Failed or Repressive Ideologies

|description=An overview of the psychological, political, and social mechanisms that explain why individuals and societies remain loyal to failed or repressive ideologies. Topics include authoritarian nostalgia, identity, motivated reasoning, propaganda, system justification, fear, patronage, and authoritarian legitimacy.

|keywords=authoritarianism, authoritarian nostalgia, ideology, political psychology, motivated reasoning, propaganda, system justification, identity politics, political loyalty, dictatorship, autocracy, authoritarian legitimacy, nationalism, personality cult, censorship, surveillance, repression, democracy, political polarization

|image=File:Placeholder.png

|image_width=300

|image_height=200

|type=article}}

[[Category:Political Psychology]]
[[Category:Authoritarianism]]
[[Category:Political Ideologies]]
[[Category:Political Science]]
[[Category:Propaganda]]
[[Category:Democracy]]
[[Category:Political Behavior]]

__NOTOC__

== Why People Remain Loyal to Failed or Repressive Ideologies ==

Many political movements continue attracting loyal supporters despite economic failure, repression, corruption, or historical evidence of abuse. Research from political science, psychology, sociology, and history shows that this persistence rarely has a single explanation. Instead, ideological loyalty develops through the interaction of identity, emotion, social belonging, historical memory, propaganda, institutional incentives, and cognitive biases. These factors can reinforce one another, making it psychologically and socially difficult for individuals to abandon long-held political commitments.

=== Authoritarian Nostalgia ===

One recurring explanation is authoritarian nostalgia. Former authoritarian governments are often remembered selectively, emphasizing order, prosperity, national pride, or stability while minimizing repression, corruption, or violence. When democratic governments perform poorly or appear ineffective, these idealized memories become especially attractive. Political leaders frequently reinforce nostalgic narratives by presenting themselves as heirs to a supposedly better past.

=== Identity, Group Loyalty, and Belonging ===

Political beliefs frequently become part of personal identity rather than remaining simple policy preferences. Loyalty to an ideological movement can become intertwined with friendships, family relationships, religion, ethnicity, or national identity. Under these conditions, criticism of an ideology is often experienced as criticism of one's community or personal character, making ideological change emotionally costly.

=== Motivated Reasoning and Resistance to Evidence ===

People commonly interpret new information in ways that protect existing beliefs. Motivated reasoning encourages individuals to accept evidence supporting their preferred worldview while dismissing contradictory information as biased or politically motivated. Greater education or reasoning ability does not necessarily eliminate this tendency and may instead strengthen people's ability to defend prior beliefs.

=== System Justification and Acceptance of Existing Institutions ===

Many individuals prefer familiar political arrangements even when those systems produce inequality or oppression. System justification theory argues that existing institutions provide predictability, stability, and psychological comfort. As a result, reforms that challenge established systems can provoke resistance because they create uncertainty rather than because existing institutions necessarily perform well.

=== Sunk Costs and Escalating Commitment ===

Long-term commitment to a political cause often creates powerful psychological barriers to abandoning it. Individuals who have invested years of activism, reputation, financial resources, or personal relationships may continue supporting unsuccessful movements because admitting failure would require acknowledging that those sacrifices were made in vain.

=== Fear, Crisis, and the Desire for Order ===

Periods of economic instability, war, terrorism, cultural change, or political uncertainty often increase public demand for decisive leadership. Authoritarian movements frequently portray themselves as the only force capable of restoring order while blaming opponents or outside enemies for ongoing crises. Fear can therefore reinforce loyalty even when governments perform poorly.

=== Propaganda, Historical Memory, and Personality Cults ===

Authoritarian systems rarely depend on coercion alone. Governments frequently employ education, media, historical narratives, symbolism, censorship, and personality cults to legitimize political authority. By controlling historical memory and shaping public narratives, regimes encourage citizens to view political alternatives as dangerous or illegitimate.

=== Manufactured Legitimacy and Ideological Narratives ===

Many authoritarian governments justify their rule through claims of economic development, national sovereignty, security, cultural authenticity, or efficient governance. These narratives present concentrated political power as a practical solution to democratic dysfunction and help supporters interpret repression as necessary rather than abusive.

=== Surveillance, Repression, and Preference Falsification ===

Public expressions of ideological loyalty do not always reflect genuine belief. Surveillance, censorship, legal penalties, and fear of retaliation may encourage citizens to conceal disagreement while publicly demonstrating loyalty. Apparent political consensus can therefore mask widespread private dissatisfaction.

=== Patronage, Material Interests, and Elite Survival ===

Political loyalty is often reinforced through material incentives. Authoritarian governments distribute jobs, promotions, financial benefits, contracts, and political influence to loyal supporters. Elites whose careers depend upon the continuation of a regime have strong incentives to defend the existing political system despite recognizing its shortcomings.

=== Controlled Information and Censorship ===

Governments that control media and restrict independent journalism reduce citizens' access to competing interpretations of events. Propaganda, censorship, online surveillance, and information manipulation limit opportunities for individuals to recognize policy failures or coordinate opposition, making ideological persistence more likely.

=== Historical Examples and Comparative Evidence ===

The collected research draws upon examples from numerous regions including East Asia, Russia, China, Turkey, Belarus, Latin America, Europe, and other authoritarian and democratic societies. Rather than attributing loyalty to one ideology alone, these studies examine recurring political, psychological, and institutional mechanisms that appear across many different historical contexts.

=== Conclusion ===

Research suggests that enduring loyalty to failed or repressive ideologies emerges from a combination of psychological tendencies, social identity, institutional incentives, historical narratives, propaganda, fear, and material interests. While individual circumstances differ across countries and political movements, many of the underlying mechanisms are remarkably consistent. Understanding these patterns helps explain why political loyalty often persists long after evidence of failure has accumulated and why ideological change is frequently far more difficult than simply presenting new facts.

__TOC__



=== Authoritarian Nostalgia and the Appeal of the Past ===
=====Why We Elect Former Dictators and Their Children=====
[https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/why-we-elect-former-dictators-and-their-children/ | James Loxton | Journal of Democracy | April 2025]
=====If I Could Turn Back Time: The Authoritarian Connection to Nostalgia=====
[https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/20531680251334048 | Researchers in Political Research Quarterly | Political Research Quarterly | 2025]
=====Political Ideologies Shape Perceptions of History=====
[https://www.psypost.org/political-ideologies-shape-perceptions-of-history/ | Eric W. Dolan | PsyPost | March 24, 2024]
=====Personality Traits, Democratic Support, and Authoritarian Nostalgia=====
[https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/socsci/v104y2023i4p619-635.html | Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell | Social Science Quarterly | October 2023]
=====Authoritarian Nostalgia in Asia=====
[https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-democracy-barometers-part-i-authoritarian-nostalgia-in-asia/ | Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan and Doh Chull Shin | Journal of Democracy | July 2013]

=== Identity, Loyalty, and Group Belonging ===
=====Cognitive–Motivational Mechanisms of Political Polarization in Social-Communicative Contexts=====
[https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9342595/ | Magdalena Wojcieszak and colleagues | Nature Reviews Psychology | July 21, 2022]
=====How Do Climate-Change Skeptics Engage with Opposing Views?=====
[https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.06516 | Lisa Oswald and Jonathan Bright | New Media & Society / arXiv | February 12, 2021]
=====Politics Is Personal=====
[https://www.apa.org/monitor/2019/11/cover-politics | Kirsten Weir | American Psychological Association | November 2019]
=====Can Empathy Bridge Political Divides?=====
[https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/can_empathy_bridge_political_divides | Rodolfo Mendoza-Denton and Robb Willer | Greater Good Science Center | January 30, 2017]
=====All Power to Our Great Leader: Political Leadership Under Uncertainty=====
[https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/power-politics-and-paranoia/all-power-to-our-great-leader-political-leadership-under-uncertainty/EE1C8975457BA643CB90EA4785FCF0F5 | M. M. Hogg | Cambridge University Press | 2014]

=== Motivated Reasoning and Resistance to Evidence ===
=====A Leader I Can—not—Trust: From Epistemic Trust to Political-Leader Choices via Dogmatism=====
[https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-the-life-sciences/article/leader-i-cannot-trust-understanding-the-path-from-epistemic-trust-to-political-leader-choices-via-dogmatism/531327157384AE34C8DAB7E250EB8E09 | Mariana von Mohr and colleagues | Politics and the Life Sciences | 2025]
=====Motivated Political Reasoning: Testing the Emotion-Regulation Account=====
[https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-the-life-sciences/article/motivated-political-reasoning-testing-the-emotion-regulation-account-in-the-case-of-perceptual-divides-over-politically-relevant-facts/FB5618BF653CB2F7BF669922BB634B6E | Researchers in Politics and the Life Sciences | Politics and the Life Sciences | 2025]
=====The Supply of Motivated Beliefs=====
[https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.06062 | Michael Thaler | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics / arXiv | November 11, 2021]
=====The Fake News Effect: Experimentally Identifying Motivated Reasoning Using Trust in News=====
[https://arxiv.org/abs/2012.01663 | Michael Thaler | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics / arXiv | December 3, 2020]
=====Politics Is Personal: Why People See Political Facts So Differently=====
[https://www.apa.org/monitor/2019/11/cover-politics | Kirsten Weir | American Psychological Association | November 2019]
=====Why We Believe Alternative Facts=====
[https://www.apa.org/monitor/2017/05/alternative-facts | Kirsten Weir | American Psychological Association | May 2017]
=====Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection=====
[https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/judgment-and-decision-making/article/ideology-motivated-reasoning-and-cognitive-reflection/F8A6A74C9022363D672B0FD14DD8B89F | Dan M. Kahan | Judgment and Decision Making | July 2013]

=== System Justification and Acceptance of Oppression ===
=====System Justification, Subjective Well-Being, and Mental Health=====
[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0272735824001533 | Researchers in Clinical Psychology Review | Clinical Psychology Review | 2024]
=====System-Justification Motivation as a Source of Backlash Against Equality-Promoting Policies=====
[https://spssi.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sipr.12093 | Ruthie Pliskin and colleagues | Social Issues and Policy Review | December 2022]
=====A Quarter Century of System Justification Theory=====
[https://as.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu-as/psychology/documents/facultypublications/johnjost/A%20Quarter%20Century%20of%20System%20Justification%20Theory.pdf | John T. Jost | Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences | 2019]
=====Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition=====
[https://gspp.berkeley.edu/archived/files/research/pdf/jost.glaser.political-conservatism-as-motivated-social-cog.pdf | John T. Jost, Jack Glaser, Arie W. Kruglanski and Frank J. Sulloway | Psychological Bulletin | May 2003]
=====System Justification Theory=====
[https://thedecisionlab.com/reference-guide/sociology/system-justification-theory | The Decision Lab | The Decision Lab | Undated]

=== Sunk Costs, Sacrifice, and Escalating Commitment ===
=====Sunk Costs and Political Decision Making=====
[https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/62239/chapter-abstract/550700114 | Political-science researchers | Oxford University Press | 2019]
=====Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action=====
[https://www.jstor.org/stable/2392269 | Barry M. Staw | Academy of Management Review | October 1976]
=====The Sunk-Cost Fallacy=====
[https://thedecisionlab.com/biases/the-sunk-cost-fallacy | The Decision Lab | The Decision Lab | Undated]

=== Fear, Crisis, and the Promise of Order ===
=====How Autocrats Weaponize Chaos=====
[https://time.com/6985760/autocrats-weaponize-chaos-essay/ | Ruth Ben-Ghiat | Time | June 12, 2024]
=====The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy=====
[https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-populist-challenge-to-liberal-democracy/ | William A. Galston | Journal of Democracy | April 2018]
=====How Much Can One Strongman Change a Country?=====
[https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-much-can-one-strongman-change-a-country/ | Shadi Hamid | Brookings Institution | May 24, 2017]
=====The Politics of Authoritarian Rule=====
[https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/politics-of-authoritarian-rule/7F78A8828A5714F0BE74E44A90A44868 | Milan W. Svolik | Cambridge University Press | 2012]

=== Propaganda, Historical Memory, and Leader Worship ===
=====The Authoritarian Argument=====
[https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-authoritarian-argument/ | Madhav Khosla | Journal of Democracy | April 2025]
=====Authoritarian Legacies and Partisan Bias in Corruption Voting=====
[https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-east-asian-studies/article/authoritarian-legacies-and-partisan-bias-in-corruption-voting/8DFBD8F1A74ACC76257A063EAAA1FFD7 | Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell | Journal of East Asian Studies | 2023]
=====Thin-Skinned Leaders: Regime Legitimation, Protest Issues, and Repression in Autocracies=====
[https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/political-science-research-and-methods/article/thinskinned-leaders-regime-legitimation-protest-issues-and-repression-in-autocracies/146ADA79CAFEB3C31743472215AA15F7 | Eda Keremoğlu and Nils B. Weidmann | Political Science Research and Methods | August 11, 2022]
=====China in Xi’s “New Era”: The Return to Personalistic Rule=====
[https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/china-in-xis-new-era-the-return-to-personalistic-rule/ | Susan L. Shirk | Journal of Democracy | April 2018]
=====The Ideology of Dictatorships=====
[https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/bringing-down-the-educational-wall/ideology-of-dictatorships/F898C6185192B35BD359BD325B99ED4B | Jeffrey A. G. K. and collaborators | Cambridge University Press | June 22, 2017]

=== Why Loyalty Persists Despite Failure ===
=====People Say Democracy Isn’t Working=====
[https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/online-exclusive/people-say-democracy-isnt-working/ | Eve Sampson | Journal of Democracy | 2024]
=====In Europe, Democracy Erodes from the Right=====
[https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/in-europe-democracy-erodes-from-the-right/ | Milan W. Svolik, Elena Avramovska, Johanna Lutz and Filip Milačić | Journal of Democracy | October 2022]
=====How Science Can Heal a Divided Electorate=====
[https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/how_science_can_heal_a_divided_electorate | Jason Marsh and Jonathan Haidt | Greater Good Science Center | November 7, 2012]
=====Challenge and Change in East Asia: Is Democracy the Only Game in Town?=====
[https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/challenge-and-change-in-east-asia-is-democracy-the-only-game-in-town/ | Jason Wells and Doh Chull Shin | Journal of Democracy | April 2005]
=====The Unpolitical Animal=====
[https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/08/30/the-unpolitical-animal | Louis Menand | The New Yorker | August 23, 2004]

=== Identity-Based Loyalty and Moral Double Standards ===
=====Teflon Leadership: Crossing Moral Boundaries With Impunity=====
[https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/political-science/articles/10.3389/fpos.2025.1606466/full | Researchers in Frontiers in Political Science | Frontiers in Political Science | 2025]
=====(Don’t) Fear the Bad Leader: Three Influential Myths About Bad Leadership=====
[https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/political-science/articles/10.3389/fpos.2025.1589496/full | Researchers in Frontiers in Political Science | Frontiers in Political Science | 2025]
=====Majoritarianism Without Majorities=====
[https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/majoritarianism-without-majorities/ | Kanchan Chandra | Journal of Democracy | October 2024]
=====The Power of Liberal Nationalism=====
[https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-power-of-liberal-nationalism/ | Yascha Mounk | Journal of Democracy | July 2024]
=====Eroding Consolidation: Putin’s Regime Ahead of the 2024 “Election”=====
[https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/03/eroding-consolidation-putins-regime-ahead-of-the-2024-election | Andrei Kolesnikov | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | March 2024]

=== Manufactured Legitimacy and Ideological Narratives ===
=====The Rise of Authoritarian Middle Powers=====
[https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-rise-of-authoritarian-middle-powers/ | Oliver Stuenkel | Journal of Democracy | 2025]
=====U.S.-China Relations for the 2030s: Toward a Realistic Scenario for Coexistence=====
[https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/us-china-relations-for-the-2030s-toward-a-realistic-scenario-for-coexistence | Christopher S. Chivvis and colleagues | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | October 2024]
=====Power, Performance, and Legitimacy=====
[https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/power-performance-and-legitimacy/ | Francis Fukuyama | Journal of Democracy | July 2024]
=====The World Has Become Flatter for Authoritarian Regimes=====
[https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/online-exclusive/the-world-has-become-flatter-for-authoritarian-regimes/ | Christopher Walker | Journal of Democracy | December 2023]
=====Formal Models of Authoritarian Regimes: A Critique=====
[https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/formal-models-of-authoritarian-regimes-a-critique/AED030168CCBB46CAB879D4A380954AA | Adam Przeworski | Perspectives on Politics | 2023]

=== Fear, Surveillance, and Preference Falsification ===
=====The Growing Shadow of Autocracy=====
[https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2026/growing-shadow-autocracy | Freedom House | Freedom House | 2026]
=====The Limits of Authoritarian AI=====
[https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-limits-of-authoritarian-ai/ | Steven Feldstein | Journal of Democracy | 2025]
=====Russia: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report=====
[https://freedomhouse.org/country/russia/freedom-world/2025 | Freedom House | Freedom House | 2025]
=====How Autocrats Weaponize AI—and How to Fight Back=====
[https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/online-exclusive/how-autocrats-weaponize-ai-and-how-to-fight-back/ | Steven Feldstein | Journal of Democracy | 2024]
=====The Legitimation of Repression in Autocracies=====
[https://oxfordre.com/politics/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1988 | Christian von Soest and colleagues | Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics | 2023]
=====How Dictators Use Financial Repression Against Their Opponents=====
[https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/online-exclusive/how-dictators-use-financial-repression-against-their-opponents/ | Casey Michel | Journal of Democracy | 2023]
=====The Repressive Power of Artificial Intelligence=====
[https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2023/repressive-power-artificial-intelligence | Freedom House | Freedom House | 2023]

=== Patronage, Material Benefits, and Elite Survival ===
=====Personalization of Power and Mass Uprisings in Dictatorships=====
[https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/personalization-of-power-and-mass-uprisings-in-dictatorships/A11DEDDE02FA94FDAC990EF4AD9B27B4 | John Chin and colleagues | British Journal of Political Science | 2023]
=====Rivals Within: Political Factions, Loyalty, and Elite Competition Under Authoritarianism=====
[https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/political-science-research-and-methods/article/rivals-within-political-factions-loyalty-and-elite-competition-under-authoritarianism/7DF3438BFB654D2145A067FCFD3AF603 | Tingting Chen | Political Science Research and Methods | 2021]
=====Oil Income and the Personalization of Autocratic Politics=====
[https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/political-science-research-and-methods/article/oil-income-and-the-personalization-of-autocratic-politics/55DC4E21E3206EF09EEB69E63BF298D1 | Matthew D. Fails | Political Science Research and Methods | 2020]
=====Party Institutions and Authoritarian Power-Sharing=====
[https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/japanese-journal-of-political-science/article/party-institutions-and-authoritarian-powersharing-evidence-from-chinas-provincial-leader-appointment/64D7AB2A98F097C0D2A17243EE6F14D1 | Qingjie Zeng | Japanese Journal of Political Science | 2018]
=====Authoritarian Institutions and Regime Survival=====
[https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/authoritarian-institutions-and-regime-survival-transitions-to-democracy-and-subsequent-autocracy/EDFEE7BF3688E60231749376706D3780 | Joseph Wright and Abel Escribà-Folch | British Journal of Political Science | 2012]
=====Belarus: Nations in Transit=====
[https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Belarus_final.pdf | Freedom House | Freedom House | 2012]

=== Propaganda, Censorship, and Controlled Information ===
=====The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism=====
[https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2018/rise-digital-authoritarianism | Freedom House | Freedom House | October 2018]
=====Understanding Authoritarian Regionalism=====
[https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/understanding-authoritarian-regionalism/ | Alexander Libman and Anastassia V. Obydenkova | Journal of Democracy | July 2018]
=====Frozen Landscape: The Russian Political System Ahead of the 2018 Presidential Election=====
[https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2017/12/frozen-landscape-the-russian-political-system-ahead-of-the-2018-presidential-election | Andrei Kolesnikov | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | December 2017]
=====Breaking Down Democracy=====
[https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2017/breaking-down-democracy | Arch Puddington and Tyler Roylance | Freedom House | June 2017]
=====The Burden of Predictability: Russia’s 2018 Presidential Election=====
[https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2017/04/the-burden-of-predictability-russias-2018-presidential-election | Andrei Kolesnikov | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | April 2017]
=====Russian Ideology After Crimea=====
[https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2015/07/russian-ideology-after-crimea | Andrei Kolesnikov | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | September 22, 2015]

=== Historical Propaganda and Cults of Personality ===
=====The Estado Novo: Politics and Political Propaganda in Brazil, 1937–1945=====
[https://oxfordre.com/latinamericanhistory/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.001.0001/acrefore-9780199366439-e-705 | Maria Helena Capelato | Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin American History | January 22, 2021]
=====The Strongmen Strike Back=====
[https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FP_20190318_strongmen_kagan.pdf | Robert Kagan | Brookings Institution | March 2019]
=====Mexican Politics, Economy, and Society, 1946–1982=====
[https://oxfordre.com/latinamericanhistory/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.001.0001/acrefore-9780199366439-e-261 | Stephen R. Niblo | Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin American History | 2019]
=====Rule of the Rigid Compromiser=====
[https://www.brookings.edu/articles/rule-of-the-rigid-compromiser/ | Cheng Li and Diana Liang | Brookings Institution | October 2018]

=== Crisis, Enemies, and Defensive Loyalty ===
=====The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule=====
[https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule | Sarah Repucci and Amy Slipowitz | Freedom House | February 2022]
=====The Global Echo of Moscow’s Repressive Human Rights Practices=====
[https://freedomhouse.org/article/global-echo-moscows-repressive-human-rights-practices | Robert Herman | Freedom House | January 2017]
=====Information and Civil Unrest in Dictatorships=====
[https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-35 | Jennifer Pan | Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics | 2016]
=====The End of the CCP’s Resilient Authoritarianism?=====
[https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/shifting-power-china-lic.pdf | Cheng Li | Brookings Institution | 2012]