https://wikidemocracy.us/index.php?action=history&feed=atom&title=Ranked_Choice_Voting 2026-09-17T14:08:22Z Revision history for this page on the wiki MediaWiki 1.46.0 https://wikidemocracy.us/index.php?title=Ranked_Choice_Voting&diff=8760&oldid=prev 2025-08-24T15:51:05Z

<p><span class="autocomment">News about Ranked Choice Voting</span></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw-interface=""> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 15:51, 24 August 2025</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l15">Line 15:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 15:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>  STV is a family of multi-winner proportional representation electoral systems. The proportionality of its results and the proportion of votes actually used to elect someone are equivalent to those produced by proportional representation election systems based on lists. STV systems can be thought of as a variation on the largest remainders method that uses candidate-based solid coalitions, rather than party lists.[clarification needed][1] Surplus votes belonging to winning candidates (those in excess of an electoral quota) may be thought of as remainder votes. Surplus votes may be transferred from a successful candidate to another candidate and then possibly used to elect that candidate.</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>  STV is a family of multi-winner proportional representation electoral systems. The proportionality of its results and the proportion of votes actually used to elect someone are equivalent to those produced by proportional representation election systems based on lists. STV systems can be thought of as a variation on the largest remainders method that uses candidate-based solid coalitions, rather than party lists.[clarification needed][1] Surplus votes belonging to winning candidates (those in excess of an electoral quota) may be thought of as remainder votes. Surplus votes may be transferred from a successful candidate to another candidate and then possibly used to elect that candidate.</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">=== News about Ranked Choice Voting ===</del></div></td><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-added"></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>[http://www.fairvote.org/ranked_choice_voting_is_a_victory_for_san_francisco_voters FairVote.org SF Mayoral Article]</div></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">=====Ranking Candidates Is More Accurate Than Voting=====</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">[https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ranking-candidates-more-accurate/ Scientific American Article on RCV 2004]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"> Thus, true majority rule and rank-order voting result in dramatically different outcomes. Considering this sharp contrast, it may seem hard to say which method is better at capturing the essence of voters’ views. But we propose to do just that. We can evaluate these two systems—and any other—according to some fundamental principles that any electoral method should satisfy. Kenneth J. Arrow of Stanford University originated this axiomatic approach to voting theory in a 1951 monograph, a work that has profoundly shaped the voting literature.</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div> </div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">=====Ranked choice voting is a victory for San Francisco voters=====</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>[http://www.fairvote.org/ranked_choice_voting_is_a_victory_for_san_francisco_voters FairVote.org SF Mayoral Article]  </div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"> Ranked choice voting offers a proven solution for voters. RCV played a key role in last year’s exciting high turnout mayoral and city council wins in Minneapolis and St. Paul by people of color, LGBTQ candidates, and other underrepresented communities. Bay Area’s four cities with RCV have seen significant increases in representation of women and people of color. When San Franciscan first adopted RCV, it led the nation on a plethora of social issues, and voting in a fair, inclusive process is part of that progress.</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div> </div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">[https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ranking-candidates-more-accurate/ Scientific American Article on RCV 2004]</del></div></td><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-added"></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>=====Maine ranked-choice voting as a case of electoral-system change=====</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>=====Maine ranked-choice voting as a case of electoral-system change=====</div></td></tr> </table>

Kirk https://wikidemocracy.us/index.php?title=Ranked_Choice_Voting&diff=8759&oldid=prev 2025-08-24T13:15:42Z

<p></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw-interface=""> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 13:15, 24 August 2025</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l196">Line 196:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 196:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>[https://www.sierraclub.org/oregon/blog/2018/10/instant-runoff-voting-rethinking-oregon-s-voting-system by Elizabeth Wilson 3/10/18 SIERRA CLUB]</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>[https://www.sierraclub.org/oregon/blog/2018/10/instant-runoff-voting-rethinking-oregon-s-voting-system by Elizabeth Wilson 3/10/18 SIERRA CLUB]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>  As a voter, I am constantly torn between wanting to support the candidates who I find the most inspiring and feeling like I will be wasting my vote if I do. The United States is a two-party system, and we as voters have been held hostage by both the GOP and the democratic party. We are forced to vote for the candidate we think has a chance at winning, the lesser of two evils. It forces us to vote our fears, not our hopes.</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>  As a voter, I am constantly torn between wanting to support the candidates who I find the most inspiring and feeling like I will be wasting my vote if I do. The United States is a two-party system, and we as voters have been held hostage by both the GOP and the democratic party. We are forced to vote for the candidate we think has a chance at winning, the lesser of two evils. It forces us to vote our fears, not our hopes.</div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">=====Social Choice Theory and Voting Mechanisms=====</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">[https://www.nature.com/research-intelligence/nri-topic-summaries/social-choice-theory-and-voting-mechanisms-micro-105838 by nature]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"> Social choice theory provides a foundational framework for analysing collective decision‐making, where diverse individual preferences are aggregated into a single, socially endorsed outcome. This field investigates the theoretical underpinnings of voting mechanisms, which range from simple plurality systems to more sophisticated, strategy‐proof procedures designed to elicit and merge ordinal preferences. Voting mechanisms are not only essential for ensuring fair representation in political elections, but also find applications in distributed systems, resource allocation, and various multiagent scenarios. Recent studies have increasingly focused on the balance between fairness, efficiency and strategic incentives, striving to achieve outcomes that minimise social cost while preserving individual rationality.</ins></div></td></tr> </table>

Lilly https://wikidemocracy.us/index.php?title=Ranked_Choice_Voting&diff=8758&oldid=prev 2025-08-24T13:14:14Z

<p></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw-interface=""> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 13:14, 24 August 2025</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l192">Line 192:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 192:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>[https://www.sierraclub.org/dc/sierra-club-endorses-dc-ballot-measure-ranked-choice-voting by Mark Rodeffer 30/9/24 SIERRA CLUB]</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>[https://www.sierraclub.org/dc/sierra-club-endorses-dc-ballot-measure-ranked-choice-voting by Mark Rodeffer 30/9/24 SIERRA CLUB]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>  The Sierra Club endorses Initiative 83 to improve DC’s local democracy with ranked choice voting, which requires that candidates earn a majority of votes to be elected. Under ranked choice voting, voters cast a ballot for their top candidate and rank other candidates. If a voter’s top candidate does not win, their vote moves to their next choice, with the process continuing until a candidate wins more than 50% of votes.</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>  The Sierra Club endorses Initiative 83 to improve DC’s local democracy with ranked choice voting, which requires that candidates earn a majority of votes to be elected. Under ranked choice voting, voters cast a ballot for their top candidate and rank other candidates. If a voter’s top candidate does not win, their vote moves to their next choice, with the process continuing until a candidate wins more than 50% of votes.</div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">=====Instant Runoff Voting: Rethinking Oregon’s Voting System=====</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">[https://www.sierraclub.org/oregon/blog/2018/10/instant-runoff-voting-rethinking-oregon-s-voting-system by Elizabeth Wilson 3/10/18 SIERRA CLUB]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"> As a voter, I am constantly torn between wanting to support the candidates who I find the most inspiring and feeling like I will be wasting my vote if I do. The United States is a two-party system, and we as voters have been held hostage by both the GOP and the democratic party. We are forced to vote for the candidate we think has a chance at winning, the lesser of two evils. It forces us to vote our fears, not our hopes.</ins></div></td></tr> </table>

Lilly https://wikidemocracy.us/index.php?title=Ranked_Choice_Voting&diff=8757&oldid=prev 2025-08-24T13:12:07Z

<p></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw-interface=""> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 13:12, 24 August 2025</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l188">Line 188:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 188:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>[https://www.sierraclub.org/idaho/blog/2024/10/learn-about-ranked-choice-voting by SIERRA CLUB 16/10/24]</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>[https://www.sierraclub.org/idaho/blog/2024/10/learn-about-ranked-choice-voting by SIERRA CLUB 16/10/24]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>  With Proposition 1 on the ballot this fall, you&#039;ve probably been hearing a lot about &quot;Ranked Choice Voting&quot; lately.</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>  With Proposition 1 on the ballot this fall, you&#039;ve probably been hearing a lot about &quot;Ranked Choice Voting&quot; lately.</div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">=====Sierra Club Endorses DC Ballot Measure for Ranked Choice Voting=====</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">[https://www.sierraclub.org/dc/sierra-club-endorses-dc-ballot-measure-ranked-choice-voting by Mark Rodeffer 30/9/24 SIERRA CLUB]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"> The Sierra Club endorses Initiative 83 to improve DC’s local democracy with ranked choice voting, which requires that candidates earn a majority of votes to be elected. Under ranked choice voting, voters cast a ballot for their top candidate and rank other candidates. If a voter’s top candidate does not win, their vote moves to their next choice, with the process continuing until a candidate wins more than 50% of votes.</ins></div></td></tr> </table>

Lilly https://wikidemocracy.us/index.php?title=Ranked_Choice_Voting&diff=8756&oldid=prev 2025-08-24T13:10:12Z

<p></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw-interface=""> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 13:10, 24 August 2025</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l184">Line 184:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 184:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0176268015000245 by Paul Redmond  6/15 ScienceDirect]</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0176268015000245 by Paul Redmond  6/15 ScienceDirect]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>  The existence of a large incumbency advantage in the winner-takes-all plurality system of the United States is well documented. It is unclear whether incumbents in proportional systems should enjoy such a large advantage.</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>  The existence of a large incumbency advantage in the winner-takes-all plurality system of the United States is well documented. It is unclear whether incumbents in proportional systems should enjoy such a large advantage.</div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">=====Learn About Ranked Choice Voting=====</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">[https://www.sierraclub.org/idaho/blog/2024/10/learn-about-ranked-choice-voting by SIERRA CLUB 16/10/24]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"> With Proposition 1 on the ballot this fall, you've probably been hearing a lot about "Ranked Choice Voting" lately.</ins></div></td></tr> </table>

Lilly https://wikidemocracy.us/index.php?title=Ranked_Choice_Voting&diff=8755&oldid=prev 2025-08-24T13:08:12Z

<p></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw-interface=""> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 13:08, 24 August 2025</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l180">Line 180:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 180:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>Moshé Machover 6/1995 ScienceDirect]</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>Moshé Machover 6/1995 ScienceDirect]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>  Three voting procedures—Borda&#039;s Count (BR), Plurality Voting (PV), and the Single Transferable Vote (STV)—are compared with one another in relation to the outcomes of 92 real elections conducted in Britain by various trade unions, professional associations, and non-profit organizations.</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>  Three voting procedures—Borda&#039;s Count (BR), Plurality Voting (PV), and the Single Transferable Vote (STV)—are compared with one another in relation to the outcomes of 92 real elections conducted in Britain by various trade unions, professional associations, and non-profit organizations.</div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">=====Incumbency advantage in a proportional electoral system: A regression discontinuity analysis of Irish elections=====</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0176268015000245 by Paul Redmond  6/15 ScienceDirect]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"> The existence of a large incumbency advantage in the winner-takes-all plurality system of the United States is well documented. It is unclear whether incumbents in proportional systems should enjoy such a large advantage.</ins></div></td></tr> </table>

Lilly https://wikidemocracy.us/index.php?title=Ranked_Choice_Voting&diff=8754&oldid=prev 2025-08-24T13:06:20Z

<p></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw-interface=""> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 13:06, 24 August 2025</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l175">Line 175:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 175:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0176268097000189 by Stefano Vannucci  9/1977 ScienceDirect]</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0176268097000189 by Stefano Vannucci  9/1977 ScienceDirect]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>  I investigate direct electoral choice of the governing coalition in a multiparty parliamentary system and analyse some double-ballot electoral systems for inducing winning coalitional agreements among parties before the last round. The effectiveness of such electoral systems is shown to depend heavily on both the actual vote allocation and rules for the allotment of power among the parties of the governing coalition. Some alternative single-ballot coalition-selecting procedures based upon proportional representation are also described and discussed.</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>  I investigate direct electoral choice of the governing coalition in a multiparty parliamentary system and analyse some double-ballot electoral systems for inducing winning coalitional agreements among parties before the last round. The effectiveness of such electoral systems is shown to depend heavily on both the actual vote allocation and rules for the allotment of power among the parties of the governing coalition. Some alternative single-ballot coalition-selecting procedures based upon proportional representation are also described and discussed.</div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">=====Who ought to be elected and who is actually elected? An empirical investigation of 92 elections under three procedures=====</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/0261379494000196 by Dan S Felsenthal, </ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">Moshé Machover 6/1995 ScienceDirect]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"> Three voting procedures—Borda's Count (BR), Plurality Voting (PV), and the Single Transferable Vote (STV)—are compared with one another in relation to the outcomes of 92 real elections conducted in Britain by various trade unions, professional associations, and non-profit organizations.</ins></div></td></tr> </table>

Lilly https://wikidemocracy.us/index.php?title=Ranked_Choice_Voting&diff=8753&oldid=prev 2025-08-24T13:04:36Z

<p></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw-interface=""> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 13:04, 24 August 2025</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l171">Line 171:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 171:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825622000574 by Haris Aziz 5/22 ScienceDirect]</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825622000574 by Haris Aziz 5/22 ScienceDirect]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>  In multiwinner elections, a central concern is proportional representation of voters. Around the world, prominent electoral reform movements advocate for electoral systems that guarantee proportional representation. For example, the Electoral Reform Society in the United Kingdom has the goal of having “public authorities in the UK elected by proportional representation,”1 and the FairVote organization in the United States is “committed to finding practical ways to advance […] American forms of proportional representation.</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>  In multiwinner elections, a central concern is proportional representation of voters. Around the world, prominent electoral reform movements advocate for electoral systems that guarantee proportional representation. For example, the Electoral Reform Society in the United Kingdom has the goal of having “public authorities in the UK elected by proportional representation,”1 and the FairVote organization in the United States is “committed to finding practical ways to advance […] American forms of proportional representation.</div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">=====Voting for a coalition government: A game-theoretic view=====</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0176268097000189 by Stefano Vannucci  9/1977 ScienceDirect]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"> I investigate direct electoral choice of the governing coalition in a multiparty parliamentary system and analyse some double-ballot electoral systems for inducing winning coalitional agreements among parties before the last round. The effectiveness of such electoral systems is shown to depend heavily on both the actual vote allocation and rules for the allotment of power among the parties of the governing coalition. Some alternative single-ballot coalition-selecting procedures based upon proportional representation are also described and discussed.</ins></div></td></tr> </table>

Lilly https://wikidemocracy.us/index.php?title=Ranked_Choice_Voting&diff=8752&oldid=prev 2025-08-24T13:02:49Z

<p></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw-interface=""> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 13:02, 24 August 2025</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l167">Line 167:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 167:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0261379499000268 by Margaret McKean 12/2000 ScienceDirect]</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0261379499000268 by Margaret McKean 12/2000 ScienceDirect]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>  We examine the impact on parties and candidates of Japan&#039;s new electoral rules, first used in the 1996 House of Representatives election. We argue that the Japanese rules, which not only permit dual candidacy but also allow votes cast in the single member district (SMD) portion of the race to allocate proportional representation (PR) seats to dual candidates, effectively defeat the purposes of electoral reform.</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>  We examine the impact on parties and candidates of Japan&#039;s new electoral rules, first used in the 1996 House of Representatives election. We argue that the Japanese rules, which not only permit dual candidacy but also allow votes cast in the single member district (SMD) portion of the race to allocate proportional representation (PR) seats to dual candidates, effectively defeat the purposes of electoral reform.</div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">=====A characterization of proportionally representative committees=====</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825622000574 by Haris Aziz 5/22 ScienceDirect]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"> In multiwinner elections, a central concern is proportional representation of voters. Around the world, prominent electoral reform movements advocate for electoral systems that guarantee proportional representation. For example, the Electoral Reform Society in the United Kingdom has the goal of having “public authorities in the UK elected by proportional representation,”1 and the FairVote organization in the United States is “committed to finding practical ways to advance […] American forms of proportional representation.</ins></div></td></tr> </table>

Lilly https://wikidemocracy.us/index.php?title=Ranked_Choice_Voting&diff=8751&oldid=prev 2025-08-24T13:01:08Z

<p></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw-interface=""> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 13:01, 24 August 2025</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l163">Line 163:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 163:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-923X.2008.00925.x by ALISTAIR CLARK, LYNN BENNIE 22/5/08 WILEY]</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-923X.2008.00925.x by ALISTAIR CLARK, LYNN BENNIE 22/5/08 WILEY]</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>  The 2007 Scottish Local Government Elections saw the first large scale use of the Single Transferable Vote (STV) in a mainland election in Britain. This presented a range of challenges for Scotland&#039;s political parties, more familiar with campaigning under first-past-the-post or the Scottish parliament&#039;s semi-proportional Additional Member System (AMS). Most crucially, STV meant the parties had to come to terms with multi-member wards and the transferral of votes between parties. Following a short discussion of the results of the STV elections, this article assesses evidence on how the parties adapted to the new electoral system, focussing particularly on candidate and campaign strategies.</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>  The 2007 Scottish Local Government Elections saw the first large scale use of the Single Transferable Vote (STV) in a mainland election in Britain. This presented a range of challenges for Scotland&#039;s political parties, more familiar with campaigning under first-past-the-post or the Scottish parliament&#039;s semi-proportional Additional Member System (AMS). Most crucially, STV meant the parties had to come to terms with multi-member wards and the transferral of votes between parties. Following a short discussion of the results of the STV elections, this article assesses evidence on how the parties adapted to the new electoral system, focussing particularly on candidate and campaign strategies.</div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">=====Japan's new electoral system:: la plus ça change =====</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0261379499000268 by Margaret McKean 12/2000 ScienceDirect]</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"> We examine the impact on parties and candidates of Japan's new electoral rules, first used in the 1996 House of Representatives election. We argue that the Japanese rules, which not only permit dual candidacy but also allow votes cast in the single member district (SMD) portion of the race to allocate proportional representation (PR) seats to dual candidates, effectively defeat the purposes of electoral reform.</ins></div></td></tr> </table>

Lilly