Foreign Policy and U.S. Global Standing: Difference between revisions
Created page with "=====The NATO Summit Exposed the Real Source of Trump’s Power===== [https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/jul/10/nato-summit-trump-power | Robert Reich | The Guardian | July 10, 2026] The article argues that President Trump’s willingness to disregard diplomatic conventions gives him unusual leverage but damages NATO, international institutions, and trust in American leadership. =====Once Again Trump Brought His Wrecking Ball to the NATO Summit===== [http..." |
No edit summary |
||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
=====The NATO | ```wiki | ||
{{#seo: | |||
|title=Foreign Policy and U.S. Global Standing – WikiDemocracy | |||
|description=An overview of changing American foreign policy, NATO and transatlantic relations, declining global trust, great-power competition, economic statecraft, military power, foreign aid, and the emerging multipolar international order. | |||
|keywords=U.S. foreign policy, American global standing, NATO, transatlantic relations, global order, soft power, China, great power competition, multilateralism, foreign aid, diplomacy, American leadership | |||
|image=File:Placeholder.png | |||
|image_width=300 | |||
|image_height=200 | |||
|type=article}} | |||
[[Category:Foreign Policy]] | |||
[[Category:United States Foreign Relations]] | |||
[[Category:International Relations]] | |||
[[Category:NATO]] | |||
[[Category:Global Politics]] | |||
__NOTOC__ | |||
== Foreign Policy and U.S. Global Standing == | |||
=== Alliances, NATO, and Transatlantic Relations === | |||
The traditional alliance system built around American military, economic, and political leadership is undergoing a significant period of uncertainty. NATO remains broadly supported in many member countries, but disputes over defense spending, trade, Greenland, Iran, Ukraine, and American commitments have raised questions about the reliability of the United States as a long-term security partner. | |||
President Donald Trump's confrontational and transactional approach to diplomacy has increased pressure on NATO members to spend more on defense and accept greater responsibility for European security. Supporters argue that this pressure has produced stronger military commitments and forced European governments to confront longstanding weaknesses in their defense capabilities. Critics contend that threats, public disputes, and uncertainty about American commitments undermine the trust required for collective defense. | |||
European countries are increasingly discussing strategic autonomy. Governments are investing in domestic defense industries, artificial intelligence, space technology, critical infrastructure, and independent military capabilities. Canada and European states are also reconsidering their reliance on American technology and supply networks. | |||
This shift does not necessarily mean the end of NATO. Some analysts envision a rebalanced alliance in which Europe assumes greater responsibility while the United States remains an important military and strategic partner. The future of the transatlantic relationship may therefore depend on whether greater European independence strengthens the alliance or accelerates political and industrial separation. | |||
=== American Global Standing, Reputation, and Soft Power === | |||
International perceptions of the United States have become an increasingly important measure of American power. Surveys indicate that many people outside the United States are skeptical that American foreign policy promotes peace or adequately considers the interests of other nations. | |||
Confidence in American leadership has declined in numerous countries. Many international respondents view the United States as less reliable, while opinions of American political leadership have become more negative. These changes affect diplomatic relationships and may encourage allies and middle powers to develop alternative partnerships. | |||
American influence, however, extends beyond military power. Universities, culture, technology, democratic institutions, international education, foreign assistance, and public diplomacy have historically contributed to U.S. soft power. Reductions in cultural programs, development assistance, and international engagement may weaken these sources of influence. | |||
The United States continues to possess enormous cultural, economic, technological, and military influence. Global soft-power assessments still rank the country among the world's most influential nations. The central concern is whether declining trust and reputation will make that influence more difficult to translate into diplomatic cooperation. | |||
=== Global Order, Multilateralism, and Middle Powers === | |||
The international system is becoming less centered on a single dominant power. The post-World War II order created under strong American leadership faces pressure from nationalism, geopolitical rivalry, technological competition, economic fragmentation, and changing power relationships. | |||
The United States has withdrawn from, challenged, or attempted to reshape some international institutions. Rather than relying exclusively on traditional multilateral organizations, American policy increasingly emphasizes bilateral negotiations, temporary coalitions, and transactional arrangements. | |||
Other countries are responding by diversifying their diplomatic relationships. Middle powers such as India, Brazil, Turkey, Canada, and Australia have greater opportunities to maneuver between major powers. These governments often seek strategic flexibility rather than permanent alignment with Washington, Beijing, or Moscow. | |||
The emerging system may not produce a single replacement for the U.S.-led international order. Instead, competing regional systems, economic networks, security coalitions, and diplomatic partnerships may operate simultaneously. | |||
Middle powers could play an important role in maintaining international cooperation. However, their ability to constrain major powers remains uncertain, particularly when powerful states are willing to use military or economic pressure unilaterally. | |||
=== U.S. Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy === | |||
American foreign policy is increasingly divided between competing visions of the country's role in the world. Liberal internationalists generally favor alliances, international institutions, diplomacy, and sustained global engagement. Nationalist and America First approaches emphasize sovereignty, economic protection, military strength, and transactional relationships. | |||
Advocates of restraint argue that the United States should reduce military commitments, limit overseas deployments, and establish a higher threshold for intervention. Other strategists support selective engagement focused on major threats and areas of direct national interest. | |||
The Trump administration's foreign policy has emphasized unpredictability, coercive bargaining, tariffs, military pressure, and demands that allies assume greater responsibility. Supporters view this strategy as a necessary response to countries that benefited from American protection without contributing enough to collective security. | |||
Critics argue that deliberate disruption may reduce American influence by encouraging allies and adversaries to develop alternatives to U.S.-controlled financial, technological, and security networks. | |||
Public opinion remains complex. Although Americans frequently express concerns about foreign interventions and international burdens, surveys indicate continued support for alliances, trade, and some forms of international leadership. | |||
The long-term direction of American grand strategy may depend on whether policymakers can develop an approach between unrestricted global intervention and complete withdrawal from international leadership. | |||
=== China, Technology, and Great-Power Competition === | |||
Competition between the United States and China is a central feature of the changing international system. The two countries are competing over military power, artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing, critical minerals, scientific research, trade, and influence in global institutions. | |||
China is expanding its diplomatic and institutional influence as the United States reduces its involvement in some international organizations. American withdrawal from institutions such as UNESCO may create opportunities for Beijing to shape international standards involving education, culture, science, and technology. | |||
Technology restrictions are another major source of competition. The United States has attempted to limit China's access to advanced technologies and critical components. Some researchers question whether increasingly strict controls will slow Chinese development or encourage greater technological self-reliance. | |||
Critical minerals are also becoming a strategic concern. Washington is working with partners to reduce dependence on Chinese-controlled supply chains for minerals used in defense systems, batteries, electronics, and advanced manufacturing. | |||
Military competition remains particularly sensitive around Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific. Diplomacy, deterrence, and crisis communication are essential because miscalculation could produce a direct confrontation between two nuclear-armed powers. | |||
The | The future of U.S.-China relations could range from managed competition to deeper economic and technological separation. Much will depend on whether both governments can protect national interests while creating mechanisms to prevent accidental escalation. | ||
=== | === Economic Statecraft, Trade, and Strategic Resources === | ||
Economic policy and national security are increasingly interconnected. Tariffs, sanctions, export controls, industrial subsidies, supply-chain policies, and critical-mineral strategies are now frequently treated as instruments of geopolitical power. | |||
The United States has used access to its markets, financial system, technology, and international networks to influence other governments. Aggressive economic coercion, however, can encourage countries to reduce their dependence on American-controlled systems. | |||
Strategic autonomy has therefore become an economic as well as a military objective. Governments are investing in domestic manufacturing, alternative payment systems, energy security, critical minerals, and regional supply chains. | |||
Legal and constitutional disputes also affect economic statecraft. Debates over presidential tariff authority illustrate tensions between executive power, congressional authority, international commerce, and national-security policy. | |||
A major question is whether the United States must choose between America First economic policies and rules-based global economic cooperation. Some analysts argue that national economic interests can be protected while maintaining international institutions and predictable trade rules. | |||
=== | === Military Power, Nuclear Strategy, and Defense === | ||
Military power remains one of the strongest foundations of American international influence. The United States maintains extensive alliances, overseas forces, advanced military technology, and a large nuclear arsenal. | |||
Changing defense priorities increasingly emphasize homeland security, regional defense, China, and strategic competition rather than the counterterrorism operations that dominated the early twenty-first century. | |||
Questions about the reliability of American security guarantees are also influencing nuclear strategy. Some analysts warn that allies could eventually consider developing independent nuclear capabilities if they lose confidence in U.S. protection. | |||
The weakening of international arms-control systems presents additional risks. Renewed nuclear competition could increase the danger of arms races and strategic miscalculation. | |||
Despite these dangers, arms-control negotiations remain possible. Historical experience suggests that geopolitical crises sometimes create political opportunities for renewed diplomatic agreements. | |||
American military power is substantial but not unlimited. Simultaneous commitments in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East can place pressure on defense resources, weapons inventories, military personnel, and political attention. | |||
=== Foreign Aid, Democracy Support, and Development === | |||
Foreign assistance has historically been an important component of American influence. Development programs, democracy assistance, humanitarian aid, and educational initiatives create relationships that may last for generations. | |||
Reductions in American foreign assistance are changing the international development system. Governments, foundations, and private organizations are attempting to replace some lost programs, but the emerging network remains fragmented and often underfunded. | |||
Some policymakers favor a more transactional approach to development assistance. Under this model, aid is closely connected to commercial agreements, access to strategic resources, migration policy, or diplomatic cooperation. | |||
Others argue that long-term development partnerships produce greater strategic benefits. Investments in health, infrastructure, education, accountable government, and economic growth can strengthen relationships without requiring immediate political concessions. | |||
Debates over democracy and development are particularly important in Africa and other rapidly growing regions. Commercial engagement and support for accountable institutions do not necessarily have to be competing objectives. | |||
Foreign aid therefore represents more than humanitarian spending. It can also serve as an instrument of diplomacy, reputation, economic partnership, and long-term strategic influence. | |||
=== Artificial Intelligence and Geopolitical Power === | |||
Artificial intelligence is emerging as a new source of international power. Advanced AI could affect scientific research, economic productivity, military planning, intelligence, diplomacy, and national competitiveness. | |||
Countries that develop powerful AI systems may gain significant advantages in innovation and strategic decision-making. The distribution of computing resources, advanced chips, energy, scientific expertise, and data could therefore influence the future balance of power. | |||
Research also indicates that artificial-intelligence systems may produce different recommendations when evaluating military escalation, alliances, intervention, and diplomatic cooperation. The use of AI in foreign-policy decision-making raises important questions about accountability and strategic risk. | |||
Alliances may become increasingly important in the AI era. Shared standards, interoperable systems, scientific cooperation, and technology partnerships could help democratic countries maintain influence. | |||
The competition over artificial intelligence is not limited to the United States and China. Countries able to build research institutions, attract talent, and create unexpected interdisciplinary innovations may influence the direction of future technological development. | |||
=== Changing Global Power and International Relations === | |||
The distribution of global power is changing. Many Americans believe the influence of the United States is declining while China and other countries are gaining international weight. | |||
The United States is responding in several ways. American policy increasingly emphasizes strategic competition, the Western Hemisphere, critical resources, economic security, and demands for greater contributions from allies. | |||
A renewed focus on the Western Hemisphere reflects concerns about migration, narcotics trafficking, regional political instability, and China's growing economic influence in Latin America. | |||
At the same time, countries around the world are questioning whether Washington remains a predictable partner. Declining confidence in American institutions and political leadership may accelerate efforts to diversify defense, trade, and diplomatic relationships. | |||
These developments do not necessarily mean the immediate end of American global power. The United States retains military alliances, technological capabilities, major financial institutions, leading universities, cultural influence, and an enormous economy. | |||
The | The more significant question is how these sources of power will be used. Coercive strategies may produce rapid concessions but also encourage long-term resistance. Alliances and multilateral cooperation can increase American influence but require compromise and sustained commitments. | ||
=== | === Conclusion === | ||
American foreign policy and global standing are entering a period of profound transformation. NATO and other alliances remain important, but partners are preparing for a world in which U.S. commitments may be less predictable and American dominance less complete. | |||
Declining trust in American leadership is encouraging European governments, middle powers, and developing nations to diversify their relationships. China is seeking greater influence in technology, global institutions, trade, and diplomacy, while other states pursue strategic autonomy. | |||
Military strength remains central to American power, but economic networks, alliances, scientific leadership, cultural influence, foreign assistance, and international legitimacy are equally important. Overreliance on military or economic coercion could weaken the networks that have historically expanded American influence. | |||
The emerging international system is likely to be more multipolar, competitive, and fragmented. The central debate for the United States is no longer simply whether to lead or withdraw. It is how to exercise power effectively in a world where allies demand greater independence, competitors possess growing capabilities, and international cooperation remains necessary to address shared challenges. | |||
The future of American global standing will depend on whether the United States can combine national strength with diplomacy, credible alliances, technological leadership, and the ability to maintain international trust. | |||
__TOC__ | |||
``` | |||
=== Alliances, NATO, and Transatlantic Relations === | |||
===== | =====The NATO Summit Exposed the Real Source of Trump’s Power===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/jul/10/nato-summit-trump-power | Robert Reich | The Guardian | July 10, 2026] | ||
The article argues that President Trump’s willingness to disregard diplomatic conventions gives him unusual leverage but damages NATO, international institutions, and trust in American leadership. | |||
===== | =====Once Again Trump Brought His Wrecking Ball to the NATO Summit===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/jul/10/trump-wrecking-ball-nato-summit-alliance-survived | Simon Tisdall | The Guardian | July 10, 2026] | ||
NATO survived another turbulent summit, but uncertainty about American reliability is encouraging European governments to prepare for greater strategic independence. | |||
===== | =====Trump Tackles FIFA, NATO, and Iran===== | ||
[https:// | [https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-tackles-fifa-nato-iran-2026-07-09/ | Reuters Staff | Reuters | July 10, 2026] | ||
The | The report examines how disputes involving NATO, Iran, Greenland, Spain, and even the World Cup reflected the confrontational style of contemporary American foreign policy. | ||
===== | =====Despite Trump’s Europe-Baiting, the NATO Summit Went Rather Well===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.thetimes.com/comment/the-times-view/article/despite-trumps-europe-baiting-the-nato-summit-went-rather-well-3c6x0m9n7 | Editorial Board | The Times | July 10, 2026] | ||
Despite inflammatory rhetoric, the summit produced new defense commitments and demonstrated that Europe continues to depend heavily on American weapons and military technology. | |||
===== | =====Five Takeaways From Europe’s Rupture With the United States===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.wsj.com/world/five-takeaways-from-the-wsjs-behind-the-scenes-reporting-on-europes-crisis-with-the-u-s-a7b916a1 | Wall Street Journal Staff | The Wall Street Journal | July 10, 2026] | ||
European and Canadian leaders are investing in independent defense, space, artificial-intelligence, and technological capabilities as they reconsider their reliance on Washington. | |||
===== | =====NATO’s Rutte Says Alliance Reunited After Trump Quarrel===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/natos-rutte-brushes-off-disputes-between-trump-allies-2026-07-08/ | Reuters Staff | Reuters | July 9, 2026] | ||
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte argued that the alliance’s ability to reconcile public disagreements demonstrated resilience rather than permanent division. | |||
===== | =====Trump Tells NATO Leaders He Wants the United States to Remain===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/trump-told-nato-leaders-he-wants-keep-us-alliance-source-says-2026-07-08/ | Reuters Staff | Reuters | July 8, 2026] | ||
Trump reportedly reassured NATO leaders that the United States intended to remain in the alliance after months of threats and uncertainty. | |||
===== | =====Network and Structural Power: Four Trends Weakening U.S. Leverage===== | ||
[https:// | [https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/07/network-and-structural-power-the-four-trend-lines-weakening-us-leverage | Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | July 7, 2026] | ||
The authors contend that increasingly aggressive American economic coercion is producing fewer concessions while encouraging allies to reduce their dependence on U.S.-controlled networks. | |||
===== | =====Will American Power in Europe Run Out?===== | ||
[https:// | [https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/07/will-american-power-in-europe-run-out | Stephen Wertheim | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | July 7, 2026] | ||
The traditional transatlantic bargain is changing, but American power in Europe may evolve into a more balanced partnership rather than disappear completely. | |||
===== | =====NATO Gets High Marks From Member States===== | ||
[https:// | [https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/07/06/nato-gets-high-marks-from-member-states/ | Richard Wike and Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | July 6, 2026] | ||
Surveys show that NATO remains broadly popular in many member countries even as doubts persist about U.S. leadership and the alliance’s future direction. | |||
===== | =====Trump Won Spending Promises From NATO—Now He Wants Enforcement===== | ||
[https:// | [https://apnews.com/article/8d994efb518c6a8538cbe3c6ac539147 | Associated Press Staff | Associated Press | July 6, 2026] | ||
The | The United States is pressing NATO governments to fulfill ambitious defense-spending promises while shifting more responsibility for European security to Europe. | ||
===== | =====NATO Chief Faces Challenge as Trump Demands Loyalty===== | ||
[https:// | [https://apnews.com/article/f8379b038dfbbf7afde80bb50a0bd96e | Lorne Cook | Associated Press | July 5, 2026] | ||
NATO leaders face the challenge of satisfying demands for higher military spending while protecting the alliance from disputes over Iran, Greenland, Ukraine, and trade. | |||
===== | =====Europe’s No-Panic Playbook for a Radically Different U.S. Foreign Policy===== | ||
[https:// | [https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/europes-no-panic-playbook-for-a-radically-different-us-foreign-policy/ | Atlantic Council Staff | Atlantic Council | July 2, 2026] | ||
European governments are advised to expand their independent capabilities without abandoning NATO or unnecessarily accelerating a break with Washington. | |||
===== | =====Europe Should Take the Long Bet on the United States===== | ||
[https:// | [https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/europe-should-take-the-long-bet-on-the-us-and-the-transatlantic-security-relationship/ | Atlantic Council Staff | Atlantic Council | July 2, 2026] | ||
The article argues that substantial American public support for NATO and global engagement provides a foundation for repairing the transatlantic relationship. | |||
===== | =====European Views of Trump and the United States Are Especially Negative===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/06/23/european-views-of-trump-and-the-u-s-are-especially-negative/ | Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | June 23, 2026] | ||
Confidence in American leadership has fallen sharply across numerous European countries, reinforcing concerns about the future of transatlantic cooperation. | |||
===== | =====The End of Trans-Atlanticism===== | ||
[https:// | [https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/06/15/trans-atlanticism-europe-united-states-mark-carney-davos-nato/ | Foreign Policy Staff | Foreign Policy | June 15, 2026] | ||
The article argues that the political, economic, and ideological conditions that sustained the postwar transatlantic partnership have largely disappeared. | |||
=====The NATO Ankara Summit: “NATO 3.0” in Practice===== | =====The NATO Ankara Summit: “NATO 3.0” in Practice===== | ||
| Line 196: | Line 274: | ||
Greater European burden-sharing could strengthen NATO, but continued perceptions of U.S. unreliability may encourage strategic and industrial separation. | Greater European burden-sharing could strengthen NATO, but continued perceptions of U.S. unreliability may encourage strategic and industrial separation. | ||
=====The Transatlantic Crucible===== | =====The Transatlantic Crucible===== | ||
| Line 220: | Line 292: | ||
The United States is asking Indo-Pacific partners to assume more responsibility for deterring China while Washington expands its own military investments. | The United States is asking Indo-Pacific partners to assume more responsibility for deterring China while Washington expands its own military investments. | ||
=====Fighting Without Friends===== | =====Fighting Without Friends===== | ||
| Line 244: | Line 304: | ||
NATO and other alliances must adapt to declining American predominance rather than being treated as either permanent assets or obsolete liabilities. | NATO and other alliances must adapt to declining American predominance rather than being treated as either permanent assets or obsolete liabilities. | ||
=====Trump’s Feuds With Allies May Outlast the Iran War===== | =====Trump’s Feuds With Allies May Outlast the Iran War===== | ||
| Line 262: | Line 316: | ||
A multinational survey found a dramatic decline in views of the United States following disputes over tariffs, alliances, Iran, Ukraine, and Greenland. | A multinational survey found a dramatic decline in views of the United States following disputes over tariffs, alliances, Iran, Ukraine, and Greenland. | ||
=====The Iran War Shows the Limits of U.S. Power===== | =====The Iran War Shows the Limits of U.S. Power===== | ||
| Line 292: | Line 328: | ||
Survey evidence indicates that alliances, trade, and international engagement retain broad public support despite partisan conflict over specific policies. | Survey evidence indicates that alliances, trade, and international engagement retain broad public support despite partisan conflict over specific policies. | ||
=====Deepening Strategic Alignment in the U.S.-Japan Alliance===== | =====Deepening Strategic Alignment in the U.S.-Japan Alliance===== | ||
| Line 311: | Line 341: | ||
Renewed threats to leave NATO intensified concerns about the durability of American security commitments and the future of collective defense. | Renewed threats to leave NATO intensified concerns about the durability of American security commitments and the future of collective defense. | ||
===== | =====The Postliberal Superpower===== | ||
[https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/postliberal-superpower | Foreign Affairs Staff | Foreign Affairs | March 9, 2026] | |||
The article analyzes how nationalist and postliberal ideas are reshaping American defense strategy, alliances, values, and the definition of national interest. | |||
=====U.S. Policy Shifts and the Future of the Transatlantic Alliance===== | |||
[https:// | [https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/us-policy-shifts-and-future-transatlantic-alliance | Rice University Baker Institute Staff | Baker Institute for Public Policy | March 3, 2026] | ||
Pressure over Greenland, tariffs, NATO, and regional priorities could permanently damage the alliance while benefiting Russia and China. | |||
===== | =====China Leads Scientific Trends While the West Launches New Ones===== | ||
[https:// | [https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.01117 | Jeffrey W. Lockhart, Jamshid Sourati, Feng Shi, and James Evans | arXiv | March 1, 2026] | ||
China increasingly leads research in rapidly emerging fields, while the United States and Europe retain strength in creating unexpected interdisciplinary directions. | |||
===== | =====Trump’s 2026 State of the Union: Foreign Policy Issue Guide===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.cfr.org/articles/trumps-2026-state-of-the-union-foreign-policy-issue-guide | Council on Foreign Relations Staff | Council on Foreign Relations | February 23, 2026] | ||
The guide reviews major changes in trade, immigration, national security, alliances, China policy, and the administration’s broader America First agenda. | |||
===== | =====Testing Assumptions About U.S. Foreign Policy in 2026===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.stimson.org/2026/testing-assumptions-about-us-foreign-policy-in-2026/ | Stimson Center Staff | Stimson Center | February 12, 2026] | ||
Experts examine uncertain assumptions surrounding alliances, China, Ukraine, Iran, military power, and the future direction of American grand strategy. | |||
===== | =====Is Trump Reshaping the World Order?===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-trump-reshaping-the-world-order/ | Brookings Institution Scholars | Brookings Institution | February 2, 2026] | ||
Brookings scholars assess how tariffs, institutional withdrawals, pressure on allies, reduced foreign aid, and unilateral actions are changing the international system. | |||
===== | =====How the World Is Seeing the United States as 2026 Begins===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.cfr.org/articles/how-the-world-is-seeing-the-united-states-as-2026-begins | Council on Foreign Relations Experts | Council on Foreign Relations | January 23, 2026] | ||
Experts describe how governments are reacting to rapid American policy changes involving trade, territory, alliances, international institutions, and military commitments. | |||
===== | =====Trump’s European Threats Could Cause Lasting Damage===== | ||
[https:// | [https://apnews.com/article/trump-nato-europe-greenland-denmark-627268004024f111097d7e1c5c2da357 | Associated Press Staff | Associated Press | January 22, 2026] | ||
Threats involving Greenland, tariffs, and NATO have encouraged European countries and Canada to question Washington’s reliability and seek alternative partnerships. | |||
===== | =====America Revived===== | ||
[https://www.cfr.org/ | [https://www.cfr.org/reports/america-revived | Robert Blackwill and Richard Fontaine | Council on Foreign Relations | January 20, 2026] | ||
The | The report proposes a grand strategy combining military strength, diplomacy, economic leadership, alliances, and renewed legitimacy in international institutions. | ||
===== | =====Greenland, Davos, and a Week That Could Redefine the Alliance===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/greenland-davos-and-a-week-that-could-redefine-the-transatlantic-alliance/ | Atlantic Council Staff | Atlantic Council | January 19, 2026] | ||
European leaders confronted difficult choices between accommodation and resistance as American territorial and tariff threats intensified. | |||
=====Trump’s | =====Trump’s Quest for Greenland Could Be NATO’s Darkest Hour===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/trumps-quest-for-greenland-could-be-natos-darkest-hour/ | Atlantic Council Staff | Atlantic Council | January 7, 2026] | ||
Pressure on Denmark over Greenland threatened to turn a territorial dispute into an unprecedented internal crisis for NATO. | |||
===== | =====The Most Significant Question for Trump’s America in 2026===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/inflection-points/the-most-significant-question-for-trumps-america-in-2026-what-sticks/ | Frederick Kempe | Atlantic Council | January 5, 2026] | ||
Trump’s policies have pushed allies toward higher military spending while simultaneously encouraging them to hedge against American unpredictability. | |||
===== | =====America and the World: Trump 2.0 Foreign Policy===== | ||
[https:// | [https://fpa.org/topics/america-and-the-world-trump-2-0-foreign-policy/ | Foreign Policy Association Staff | Foreign Policy Association | 2026] | ||
This resource collection covers American grand strategy, international institutions, alliances, military power, economic policy, and alternative approaches to global leadership. | |||
===== | =====America Revived: A Grand Strategy of Resolute Global Leadership===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.cfr.org/event/council-special-report-launch-america-revived-grand-strategy-resolute-global-leadership | Council on Foreign Relations Staff | Council on Foreign Relations | 2026] | ||
Panelists debate a proposed strategy combining credible military power with alliances, diplomacy, economic influence, and international legitimacy. | |||
=====The | =====The Future of American Leadership and the International Order===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.brookings.edu/projects/project-on-international-order-and-strategy/about/ | Brookings Institution Staff | Brookings Institution | 2026] | ||
The | The Brookings project studies changing power relationships, U.S. strategy, institutional competition, alliances, and opportunities for international cooperation. | ||
===== | =====Security Alliances and Partnerships===== | ||
[https:// | [https://www.brookings.edu/topics/security-alliances-partnerships/ | Brookings Institution Staff | Brookings Institution | 2026] | ||
This research collection examines NATO, Asian alliances, military assistance, burden-sharing, crisis management, and the role of partnerships in U.S. strategy. | |||
===== | =====Munich Security Conference 2026===== | ||
[https:// | [https://foreignpolicy.com/projects/munich-security-conference/ | Foreign Policy Staff | Foreign Policy | 2026] | ||
Reporting from the conference covers transatlantic tensions, Ukraine, China, defense spending, nuclear security, and international reactions to U.S. policy. | |||
===== | =====American Views on Global Leadership===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sqPdF7NDO9o | Council on Foreign Relations | YouTube | 2026] | ||
Panelists discuss public opinion on alliances, trade, military engagement, national security, and America’s role in international affairs. | |||
===== | =====Six Trump Lessons for Global Leaders in 2026===== | ||
[https:// | [https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/12/29/trump-lessons-2026-china-india-europe-middle-east/ | Foreign Policy Contributors | Foreign Policy | December 29, 2025] | ||
International leaders learned to prepare for tariffs, transactional bargaining, downgraded alliances, sudden policy changes, and possible accommodation with American adversaries. | |||
===== | =====The 2025 National Security Strategy===== | ||
[https:// | [https://missilethreat.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/National-Security-Strategy-2025.pdf | Executive Office of the President | United States Government | December 2025] | ||
The official strategy emphasizes American primacy in the Western Hemisphere, economic security, reduced burdens in Europe and the Middle East, and competition with China. | |||
===== | =====A Year in Review: Foreign Policy in 2025===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DAbYMUBPQYo | One Decision | YouTube | December 2025] | ||
Former officials and analysts review the year’s major developments involving alliances, China, Russia, Europe, the Middle East, and American global leadership. | |||
===== | =====Increasing the Value of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance===== | ||
[https:// | [https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/10/increasing-the-value-of-the-linchpin-alliance-between.html | RAND Corporation Staff | RAND Corporation | October 16, 2025] | ||
The alliance faces growing pressure to modernize its military, political, and economic foundations in response to North Korea, China, and doubts about American commitments. | |||
===== | =====Transitioning Transatlantic Ties===== | ||
[https:// | [https://www.iiss.org/events/2025/10/transitioning-transatlantic-ties/ | International Institute for Strategic Studies Staff | IISS | October 9, 2025] | ||
The | The discussion considers how European security and U.S. foreign policy are changing as both sides reconsider the traditional distribution of responsibilities. | ||
===== | =====Navigating Disruption: Allied Responses to U.S. Foreign Policy===== | ||
[https:// | [https://features.csis.org/responses-to-US-foreign-policy/ | CSIS Contributors | Center for Strategic and International Studies | October 6, 2025] | ||
Eight case studies examine how allies and partners are coping with American tariffs, security demands, diplomatic unpredictability, and changing strategic priorities. | |||
===== | =====Transatlantic Relations Under Trump: An Uneasy Peace===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.csis.org/analysis/transatlantic-relations-under-trump-uneasy-peace | Max Bergmann | Center for Strategic and International Studies | October 6, 2025] | ||
Europe has attempted to accommodate transactional American demands while gradually reducing its economic, technological, and military dependence on Washington. | |||
===== | =====How NATO Allies Might Respond to a U.S. Withdrawal===== | ||
[https:// | [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA2800/RRA2807-2/RAND_RRA2807-2.pdf | RAND Corporation Researchers | RAND Corporation | June 18, 2025] | ||
The report explores possible military, diplomatic, and institutional responses if Washington substantially reduces or ends its role in NATO. | |||
===== | =====Consequences of the Russia-Ukraine War===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RBA3141-1.html | RAND Corporation Staff | RAND Corporation | May 22, 2025] | ||
The | The war has changed NATO, European defense spending, Russian military power, global energy markets, and Washington’s strategic calculations. | ||
===== | =====The Realists’ Grand Experiment===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/04/the-realists-grand-experiment.html | RAND Corporation Staff | RAND Corporation | April 11, 2025] | ||
A more restrained and transactional U.S. foreign policy could encourage allies to assume greater responsibility but might also reduce American influence over their actions. | |||
===== | =====The U.S.-Japan Alliance Under New Political Leadership===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.rand.org/events/2025/03/the-us-japan-alliance.html | RAND Corporation Staff | RAND Corporation | March 10, 2025] | ||
American and Japanese experts discuss how leadership changes, regional security threats, trade, and technology may reshape the bilateral alliance. | |||
===== | =====Critical Foreign-Policy Decisions and Artificial Intelligence===== | ||
[https:// | [https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.06263 | Benjamin Jensen and Others | arXiv | March 8, 2025] | ||
The study finds that artificial-intelligence systems differ significantly in recommendations involving escalation, intervention, cooperation, and alliance management. | |||
===== | =====Foreign-Policy Priorities for the Incoming Administration===== | ||
[https:// | [https://perryworldhouse.upenn.edu/events/foreign-policy-priorities-for-the-incoming-u-s-administration/ | Perry World House Staff | University of Pennsylvania | January 15, 2025] | ||
Experts review the conflicts, alliances, democratic challenges, climate problems, and strategic competition awaiting the new administration. | |||
=== American Global Standing, Reputation, and Soft Power === | |||
===== | =====Comparing How Americans and Others View the U.S. Global Role===== | ||
[https:// | [https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/06/23/comparing-how-americans-and-others-around-the-world-view-the-united-states-global-role/ | Richard Wike, Laura Silver, Moira Fagan, and Jonathan Schulman | Pew Research Center | June 23, 2026] | ||
International | International respondents are much less likely than Americans to believe that the United States promotes peace or considers the interests of other nations. | ||
===== | =====In Middle-Income Nations, Most Say the U.S. Interferes Abroad===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/06/23/in-middle-income-nations-most-say-the-u-s-interferes-in-other-countries-affairs/ | Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | June 23, 2026] | ||
Many respondents in middle-income countries believe Washington interferes in other nations’ affairs and does not adequately consider their interests. | |||
===== | =====How Do Views of Trump Compare With Other Global Leaders?===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/06/23/how-do-views-of-trump-compare-with-other-global-leaders/ | Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | June 23, 2026] | ||
International confidence in the American president trails that of several other major global leaders, although opinions vary substantially by country. | |||
===== | =====Don’t Give Up on Global Order===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/dont-give-global-order | Robert Kagan | Foreign Affairs | June 9, 2026] | ||
The | The essay defends sustained American leadership and argues that abandoning the international order would impose larger costs than maintaining it. | ||
===== | =====Middle Powers Take Center Stage===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.cfr.org/articles/middle-powers-take-center-stage | Council on Foreign Relations Staff | Council on Foreign Relations | June 2026] | ||
Canada, India, Brazil, Turkey, and other middle powers are gaining room to maneuver as confidence in American leadership declines. | |||
===== | =====Global Soft Power Index 2026: A Global Mood Shift===== | ||
[https:// | [https://brandfinance.com/insights/global-soft-power-index-2026-executive-summary | Brand Finance Staff | Brand Finance | January 20, 2026] | ||
The United States remained the world’s most influential soft-power country but experienced significant declines across reputation, governance, relations, and trust measurements. | |||
===== | =====The Strategic Importance of U.S. Values-Based Soft Power===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.bushcenter.org/publications/the-strategic-importance-of-u-s-values-based-soft-power | George W. Bush Presidential Center Staff | George W. Bush Presidential Center | January 16, 2026] | ||
International education, democratic values, culture, development assistance, and open institutions remain important sources of American influence beyond military power. | |||
=====The | =====The United States External Cultural-Policy Report===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.ifa.de/en/publications/results/usa-ecp-country-report-2026/ | Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations Staff | ifa | 2026] | ||
Cuts to foreign aid, public diplomacy, education, and cultural programs signal a shift from soft power toward military and economic coercion. | |||
===== | =====Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index 2026===== | ||
[https:// | [https://static.brandirectory.com/reports/brand-finance-soft-power-index-2026-digital.pdf | Brand Finance Staff | Brand Finance | January 2026] | ||
The full index compares countries on familiarity, reputation, governance, culture, diplomacy, education, business, media, and international influence. | |||
=====Three Summer Deadlines That Will Reveal Trump’s View of U.S. Power===== | =====Three Summer Deadlines That Will Reveal Trump’s View of U.S. Power===== | ||
| Line 563: | Line 597: | ||
Surveys across 24 nations found falling confidence in American leadership and widespread doubts about Trump’s handling of international affairs. | Surveys across 24 nations found falling confidence in American leadership and widespread doubts about Trump’s handling of international affairs. | ||
The report explores | === Global Order, Multilateralism, and Middle Powers === | ||
=====Retreat, Rebel, Replace, or Reform? Multilateralism Under Trump===== | |||
[https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/06/retreat-rebel-replace-or-reform-making-sense-of-multilateralism-under-trump-20 | Stewart Patrick | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | June 16, 2026] | |||
The administration’s approach combines withdrawal from some institutions with efforts to reshape, bypass, or replace others through more personalized arrangements. | |||
=====Global Governance in the Twenty-First Century===== | |||
[https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/06/global-governance-in-the-twenty-first-century-sustain-reform-transform | Stewart Patrick and Carnegie Endowment Staff | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | June 11, 2026] | |||
The report explores how multilateral institutions can be maintained, reformed, or transformed amid nationalism, geopolitical competition, inequality, technology, and climate change. | |||
=====What Comes After Global Order===== | |||
[https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/06/10/global-order-china-united-states-ordering/ | Foreign Policy Staff | Foreign Policy | June 10, 2026] | |||
Rather than replacing one fixed international order with another, the world may be entering a continuous struggle among competing systems and coalitions. | |||
=====After the Rupture: The Reordering of the World===== | |||
[https://www.cfr.org/event/after-the-rupture-the-reordering-of-the-world | Council on Foreign Relations Staff | Council on Foreign Relations | May 19, 2026] | |||
Foreign-policy leaders discuss middle powers, transactional diplomacy, institutional fragmentation, and the redistribution of influence in a less U.S.-centered world. | |||
=====Trump’s War Exposes the Weakness of Middle Powers===== | |||
[https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/05/04/middle-powers-geopolitics-global-order-trump-war-iran-china/ | Foreign Policy Staff | Foreign Policy | May 4, 2026] | |||
The article questions whether middle powers can collectively shape international outcomes when major powers remain willing to act unilaterally. | |||
=====India and a Changing Global Order===== | |||
[https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/03/india-and-a-changing-global-order-foreign-policy-in-the-trump-2-0-era | Carnegie Endowment Staff | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | March 25, 2026] | |||
India is balancing cooperation with Washington against trade disputes, Russian ties, strategic autonomy, and an increasingly multipolar international environment. | |||
=====The World After Trump===== | |||
[https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/23/introducing-the-spring-2026-print-issue/ | Ravi Agrawal | Foreign Policy | March 23, 2026] | |||
The issue examines how countries, institutions, and political movements are preparing for an international system transformed by Trump’s foreign policy. | |||
=====Embracing “Cuspness” in an Emerging Multipolar World===== | |||
[https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2026/03/embracing-cuspness-australian-strategy-in-an-emerging.html | RAND Corporation Staff | RAND Corporation | March 5, 2026] | |||
Australia may respond to intensifying great-power competition by maintaining flexibility between regions and pursuing a more transactional form of strategic autonomy. | |||
=====Trump Is Demolishing the Global Order—What Might Replace It?===== | |||
[https://carnegieendowment.org/diversify-their-diplomatic-portfolios | Carnegie Endowment Staff | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | January 27, 2026] | |||
Countries are responding to American unpredictability by diversifying trade, defense relationships, diplomatic partnerships, and supply chains. | |||
===== | =====The Middle Power Moment===== | ||
[https:// | [https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/01/the-middle-power-moment | Stewart Patrick | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | January 20, 2026] | ||
Middle powers could help preserve international cooperation as American dominance recedes and the global system becomes more multipolar. | |||
=====International | =====Alternative Options for U.S. Policy Toward the International Order===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.rand.org/pubs/authors/m/mazarr_michael_j.html | Michael J. Mazarr and RAND Researchers | RAND Corporation | Updated 2026] | ||
RAND research compares American primacy, selective engagement, restraint, institutional reform, and other possible strategies for managing the international system. | |||
=====The | =====The Decline of the West and the Rise of “the Rest”===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2025-09/decline-west-and-rise-rest-will-lead-new-world-order | Amitav Acharya | Chatham House | September 15, 2025] | ||
American withdrawal may produce a decentralized global order led increasingly by Asian and Global South countries rather than simple international collapse. | |||
=====The Fracturing of the U.S.-Led Liberal International Order===== | =====The Fracturing of the U.S.-Led Liberal International Order===== | ||
| Line 592: | Line 678: | ||
The report traces the weakening of the postwar system as American commitment declines and other powers pursue competing regional and global arrangements. | The report traces the weakening of the postwar system as American commitment declines and other powers pursue competing regional and global arrangements. | ||
=====Germany’s Internationalist Vision in Crisis===== | =====Germany’s Internationalist Vision in Crisis===== | ||
| Line 611: | Line 691: | ||
The final chapter considers possible futures ranging from renewed cooperation to fragmented regional blocs and intensified great-power competition. | The final chapter considers possible futures ranging from renewed cooperation to fragmented regional blocs and intensified great-power competition. | ||
=== U.S. Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy === | |||
=====Most Americans Say U.S. Foreign Policy Ignores Other Countries===== | |||
[https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/04/28/most-americans-now-say-u-s-foreign-policy-ignores-the-interests-of-other-countries/ | Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | April 28, 2026] | |||
A growing share of Americans believes foreign policy does not adequately account for other countries’ interests or the requirements of international cooperation. | |||
=====Trump’s New 2026 Shock Doctrine===== | |||
[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/400900268_Trump%27s_New_2026_Shock_Doctrine_War_Deals_and_Global_Chaos | ResearchGate Contributor | ResearchGate | February 19, 2026] | |||
The paper characterizes unpredictability, coercive bargaining, military pressure, and deliberate disruption as central features of the administration’s international strategy. | |||
=====How Diplomacy Reshapes Online Discourse===== | |||
[https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.09942 | Hunjun Shin, Hoonbae Moon, and Mohit Singhal | arXiv | January 14, 2026] | |||
Research on U.S.-North Korea diplomacy suggests that high-level negotiations can produce lasting changes in how foreign adversaries are discussed, even when talks later fail. | |||
=====The | =====The Fate of “America First”===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/americas/fate-america-first | Reid Smith | Foreign Affairs | January 9, 2026] | ||
American | The article examines whether military intervention and regime-change ambitions are compatible with promises to limit American involvement in foreign conflicts. | ||
===== | =====The Foreign Policy of the United States===== | ||
[https:// | [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_policy_of_the_United_States | Wikipedia Contributors | Wikipedia | Updated 2026] | ||
The | The overview traces American foreign policy from early neutrality through global primacy, liberal internationalism, the war on terrorism, great-power competition, and America First. | ||
=====Foreign | =====A Middle Way for American Foreign Policy===== | ||
[https:// | [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/middle-way-american-foreign-policy | Foreign Affairs Staff | Foreign Affairs | December 31, 2025] | ||
The article proposes an approach between expansive liberal internationalism and unilateral America First nationalism. | |||
=====Competing Visions of Restraint for U.S. Foreign Policy===== | =====Competing Visions of Restraint for U.S. Foreign Policy===== | ||
| Line 647: | Line 743: | ||
The discussion examines the administration’s rapid turn toward transactional diplomacy, unilateral action, protectionism, and reduced support for collective institutions. | The discussion examines the administration’s rapid turn toward transactional diplomacy, unilateral action, protectionism, and reduced support for collective institutions. | ||
=== China, Technology, and Great-Power Competition === | |||
=====As the United States Steps Out of UNESCO, China Steps Up===== | |||
[https://www.brookings.edu/articles/as-the-us-steps-out-of-unesco-china-steps-up/ | Brookings Staff | Brookings Institution | July 7, 2026] | |||
America’s withdrawal from UNESCO could create additional opportunities for China to influence international education, culture, science, and technology policy. | |||
=====Why America Cannot Remain a Global Power===== | |||
[https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/07/03/why-america-cannot-remain-a-global-power-the-choice-coming-after-2027/ | Modern Diplomacy Staff | Modern Diplomacy | July 3, 2026] | |||
The essay argues that simultaneous challenges involving China, Russia, Europe, and the Middle East could exceed America’s political and military capacity. | |||
=====China Sets Out Its Vision for a New Global Order===== | |||
[https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/06/china-sets-out-its-vision-new-global-order-will-it-commit-resources-match-its-ambition | Chatham House Staff | Chatham House | June 24, 2026] | |||
China is presenting an alternative vision of global governance as the United States retreats from or challenges parts of the existing international system. | |||
=====U.S. Power Is Wrung Out===== | |||
[https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/06/09/iran-war-trump-china-united-states-military-defense-weapons-geopolitics-strategy-taiwan/ | Foreign Policy Staff | Foreign Policy | June 9, 2026] | |||
Military commitments in the Middle East could deplete American resources needed to deter China and manage other strategic challenges. | |||
=====Strategic Stalemates in the U.S.-China Artificial-Intelligence Race===== | |||
[https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.23475 | Jingwen Liu and Jyh-An Lee | arXiv | May 22, 2026] | |||
The paper questions whether increasingly strict American technology controls will slow China or instead accelerate Chinese self-reliance and innovation. | |||
=====In Diplomacy, Pomp Matters—Especially When Trump Goes to China===== | |||
[https://apnews.com/article/trump-china-xi-ceremony-diplomacy-4e90fbc4bac7db9285f04d23b9321ff7 | Associated Press Staff | Associated Press | May 12, 2026] | |||
China’s ceremonial treatment of American leaders illustrates how symbolism, prestige, and carefully staged public events can influence high-level diplomacy. | |||
=====Which Countries Do Americans Think Are Gaining Influence?===== | |||
[https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/04/28/what-countries-do-americans-think-are-gaining-and-losing-influence-in-todays-world/ | Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | April 28, 2026] | |||
Americans increasingly perceive their country’s influence as weakening while China and several other powers gain greater international weight. | |||
=====The Role of Diplomacy in Managing Cross-Strait Relations===== | |||
[https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-role-of-diplomacy-in-us-management-of-cross-strait-relations/ | Brookings Institution Staff | Brookings Institution | March 20, 2026] | |||
Careful diplomacy can strengthen deterrence around Taiwan while reducing miscalculation, escalation, and the risk of a direct U.S.-China conflict. | |||
=====U.S. Critical-Minerals Trade Bloc Aims to Counter China===== | |||
[https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-hosts-countries-talks-weaken-chinas-grip-critical-minerals-2026-02-04/ | Reuters Staff | Reuters | February 4, 2026] | |||
Washington is seeking coordinated trade rules and price protections to reduce China’s control over minerals essential to defense and advanced manufacturing. | |||
=====Three Possible Pathways for U.S.-China Relations===== | |||
[https://www.brookings.edu/articles/three-potential-pathways-for-us-china-relations-under-trump/ | Brookings Institution Staff | Brookings Institution | January 26, 2026] | |||
The report outlines possibilities ranging from a managed accommodation to a hard strategic split or a prolonged effort by both sides to reduce vulnerability. | |||
=====Surveying Experts on the State of U.S.-China Relations===== | |||
[https://chinapower.csis.org/survey-experts-us-china-relations-2026/ | ChinaPower Project Staff | Center for Strategic and International Studies | January 13, 2026] | |||
Experts assess the likelihood of cooperation, confrontation, economic separation, military crisis, and diplomatic stabilization between Washington and Beijing. | |||
=====Greenland, Rare Earths, and Arctic Security===== | |||
[https://www.csis.org/analysis/greenland-rare-earths-and-arctic-security | CSIS Staff | Center for Strategic and International Studies | January 8, 2026] | |||
Greenland’s strategic location and mineral resources place it at the intersection of Arctic security, economic competition, climate change, and U.S.-China rivalry. | |||
=====United States and the Changing International System===== | |||
[https://www.chathamhouse.org/topics/major-powers | Chatham House Staff | Chatham House | Updated 2026] | |||
This collection examines how the United States, China, Russia, Europe, and emerging powers are competing to shape international rules and institutions. | |||
=====Breaking Down Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy===== | |||
[https://www.brookings.edu/articles/breaking-down-trumps-2025-national-security-strategy/ | Brookings Institution Scholars | Brookings Institution | December 8, 2025] | |||
The strategy prioritizes the Western Hemisphere, economic nationalism, immigration enforcement, burden-shifting, and competition with China. | |||
=====China: Balancing the United States While Increasing Global Influence===== | |||
[https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/competing-visions-international-order/02-china-balancing-us-increasing-global-influence | Chatham House Researchers | Chatham House | March 27, 2025] | |||
China seeks greater influence within existing institutions while constructing alternative partnerships and presenting itself as a defender of sovereignty and development. | |||
=== Economic Statecraft, Trade, and Strategic Resources === | |||
=====When Economic Security Meets Economic Statecraft===== | |||
[https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PEA4700/PEA4706-2/RAND_PEA4706-2.pdf | RAND Corporation Staff | RAND Corporation | April 13, 2026] | |||
The report examines how national-security concerns, trade restrictions, industrial policy, sanctions, and supply-chain management are becoming increasingly interconnected. | |||
=====The Supreme Court Strikes Down Trump’s Global Tariffs===== | |||
[https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/us-supreme-court-rejects-trumps-global-tariffs-2026-02-20/ | Reuters Staff | Reuters | February 20, 2026] | |||
The ruling limited presidential tariff authority and highlighted tensions between executive power, Congress, global commerce, and economic statecraft. | |||
=====Dispatch From Davos: The Geopolitics of the New Realism===== | |||
[https://www.cfr.org/articles/dispatch-from-davos-the-geopolitics-of-the-new-realism | Michael Froman | Council on Foreign Relations | January 23, 2026] | |||
Davos participants increasingly viewed international relations through the lens of power, national resilience, strategic autonomy, and economic security. | |||
=====What Trump’s National Security Strategy Means for Foreign Policy===== | |||
[https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-what-trumps-national-security-strategy-means-for-us-foreign-policy/ | Atlantic Council Experts | Atlantic Council | December 5, 2025] | |||
Experts analyze the strategy’s emphasis on economic statecraft, the Western Hemisphere, burden-sharing, national sovereignty, and selective international engagement. | |||
=====America First or Rules-Based Global Economic Governance===== | =====America First or Rules-Based Global Economic Governance===== | ||
| Line 659: | Line 871: | ||
The article argues that American economic interests and rules-based international cooperation are not inherently incompatible. | The article argues that American economic interests and rules-based international cooperation are not inherently incompatible. | ||
=== Military Power, Nuclear Strategy, and Defense === | |||
===== | =====Nuclear Weapons and the Future of American Power===== | ||
[https:// | [https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/07/nuclear-weapons-and-the-future-of-american-power | Carnegie Endowment Staff | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | July 2, 2026] | ||
The weakening arms-control system creates serious dangers but does not eliminate the possibility of renewed negotiations following future geopolitical shocks. | |||
===== | =====Friendly Proliferation===== | ||
[https:// | [https://www.csis.org/analysis/friendly-proliferation | CSIS Staff | Center for Strategic and International Studies | June 9, 2026] | ||
Declining allied trust in American security guarantees is fueling debate over whether additional U.S. partners may eventually seek nuclear weapons. | |||
===== | =====The 2026 National Defense Strategy by the Numbers===== | ||
[https:// | [https://www.csis.org/analysis/2026-national-defense-strategy-numbers-radical-changes-moderate-changes-and-some | Mark Cancian | Center for Strategic and International Studies | January 27, 2026] | ||
The | The analysis identifies major changes in defense priorities, including reduced emphasis on counterterrorism and increased attention to homeland and regional security. | ||
=== Foreign Aid, Democracy Support, and Development === | |||
===== | =====Rahm Emanuel Assails Netanyahu as American Politics Shift on Israel===== | ||
[https:// | [https://apnews.com/article/60357c348e611a93a70949f5e69fce6e | Associated Press Staff | Associated Press | July 7, 2026] | ||
Emanuel’s criticism of Israel’s government illustrates growing divisions in the United States over military aid, settlements, Gaza, and the future of the bilateral relationship. | |||
===== | =====Post-U.S. International Democracy Support===== | ||
[https:// | [https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/06/post-us-international-democracy-support-aspiration-in-search-of-substance | Thomas Carothers | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | June 8, 2026] | ||
Governments and private organizations are attempting to replace lost American democracy assistance, but the emerging system remains fragmented and underfunded. | |||
===== | =====Strategic, Not Transactional: Development Cooperation and U.S. Interests===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.cgdev.org/publication/strategic-not-transactional-using-development-cooperation-advance-economic-and-national | Center for Global Development Staff | Center for Global Development | March 18, 2026] | ||
The authors argue that development assistance should advance long-term strategic relationships rather than function primarily as a short-term transactional bargaining tool. | |||
===== | =====Global Development Policy and the New World Disorder===== | ||
[https:// | [https://www.idos-research.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/publikationen/Policy_Brief/2026/PB_2.2026.pdf | German Institute of Development and Sustainability Staff | IDOS | January 7, 2026] | ||
Reductions in American development cooperation are weakening Washington’s agenda-setting power and accelerating changes in the international aid system. | |||
===== | =====False Choices: Democracy and Development in U.S.-Africa Policy===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.csis.org/analysis/false-choices-balancing-democracy-and-development-us-africa-policy | CSIS Staff | Center for Strategic and International Studies | October 21, 2025] | ||
Commercial diplomacy and democracy assistance need not be competing goals, particularly in African countries seeking investment, accountable government, and development. | |||
===== | =====International Engagement and Support for Foreign Aid===== | ||
[https://www. | [https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2025/05/01/international-engagement-and-support-for-foreign-aid/ | Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | May 1, 2025] | ||
Most Americans support considering other countries’ interests, although opinions about foreign aid and international engagement remain divided by party. | |||
=====The Foreign | =====The New Game in Foreign Aid: Deal Power===== | ||
[https:// | [https://www.ussc.edu.au/the-new-game-in-aid-deal-power | Lester Munson | United States Studies Centre | March 11, 2025] | ||
Development assistance is increasingly being treated as a transactional instrument for securing strategic, commercial, and diplomatic agreements. | |||
=== Artificial Intelligence and Geopolitical Power === | |||
=====Artificial General Intelligence and the Rise and Fall of Nations===== | =====Artificial General Intelligence and the Rise and Fall of Nations===== | ||
| Line 749: | Line 949: | ||
The report explores how advanced artificial intelligence could redistribute technological, economic, military, and geopolitical power among nations. | The report explores how advanced artificial intelligence could redistribute technological, economic, military, and geopolitical power among nations. | ||
=== Changing Global Power and International Relations === | |||
=====Pentagon Seeks to Rally Latin America Behind a New Monroe Doctrine===== | |||
[https://www.reuters.com/world/pentagon-seeks-rally-latin-america-behind-new-monroe-doctrine-2026-07-08/ | Reuters Staff | Reuters | July 9, 2026] | |||
The administration is promoting a renewed assertion of American primacy in the Western Hemisphere while seeking regional cooperation against narcotics trafficking, migration, and Chinese influence. | |||
===== | =====Trump Gets Negative Reviews as Fewer See the U.S. as Reliable===== | ||
[https:// | [https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/06/23/trump-gets-negative-reviews-internationally-as-fewer-say-u-s-is-a-reliable-partner/ | Richard Wike, Laura Silver, Moira Fagan, and Jonathan Schulman | Pew Research Center | June 23, 2026] | ||
A multinational survey documents declining confidence in the United States, its president, its democratic institutions, and its reliability as an international partner. | |||
===== | =====Making America Weak Again===== | ||
[https:// | [https://skidmore.blog/2025/07/19/making-america-weak-again/ | David Skidmore | The Internationalist | July 19, 2025] | ||
Declining international approval is presented as evidence that confrontational nationalism may weaken rather than strengthen American power. | |||
Latest revision as of 10:41, 11 July 2026
```wiki
Foreign Policy and U.S. Global Standing
Alliances, NATO, and Transatlantic Relations
The traditional alliance system built around American military, economic, and political leadership is undergoing a significant period of uncertainty. NATO remains broadly supported in many member countries, but disputes over defense spending, trade, Greenland, Iran, Ukraine, and American commitments have raised questions about the reliability of the United States as a long-term security partner.
President Donald Trump's confrontational and transactional approach to diplomacy has increased pressure on NATO members to spend more on defense and accept greater responsibility for European security. Supporters argue that this pressure has produced stronger military commitments and forced European governments to confront longstanding weaknesses in their defense capabilities. Critics contend that threats, public disputes, and uncertainty about American commitments undermine the trust required for collective defense.
European countries are increasingly discussing strategic autonomy. Governments are investing in domestic defense industries, artificial intelligence, space technology, critical infrastructure, and independent military capabilities. Canada and European states are also reconsidering their reliance on American technology and supply networks.
This shift does not necessarily mean the end of NATO. Some analysts envision a rebalanced alliance in which Europe assumes greater responsibility while the United States remains an important military and strategic partner. The future of the transatlantic relationship may therefore depend on whether greater European independence strengthens the alliance or accelerates political and industrial separation.
American Global Standing, Reputation, and Soft Power
International perceptions of the United States have become an increasingly important measure of American power. Surveys indicate that many people outside the United States are skeptical that American foreign policy promotes peace or adequately considers the interests of other nations.
Confidence in American leadership has declined in numerous countries. Many international respondents view the United States as less reliable, while opinions of American political leadership have become more negative. These changes affect diplomatic relationships and may encourage allies and middle powers to develop alternative partnerships.
American influence, however, extends beyond military power. Universities, culture, technology, democratic institutions, international education, foreign assistance, and public diplomacy have historically contributed to U.S. soft power. Reductions in cultural programs, development assistance, and international engagement may weaken these sources of influence.
The United States continues to possess enormous cultural, economic, technological, and military influence. Global soft-power assessments still rank the country among the world's most influential nations. The central concern is whether declining trust and reputation will make that influence more difficult to translate into diplomatic cooperation.
Global Order, Multilateralism, and Middle Powers
The international system is becoming less centered on a single dominant power. The post-World War II order created under strong American leadership faces pressure from nationalism, geopolitical rivalry, technological competition, economic fragmentation, and changing power relationships.
The United States has withdrawn from, challenged, or attempted to reshape some international institutions. Rather than relying exclusively on traditional multilateral organizations, American policy increasingly emphasizes bilateral negotiations, temporary coalitions, and transactional arrangements.
Other countries are responding by diversifying their diplomatic relationships. Middle powers such as India, Brazil, Turkey, Canada, and Australia have greater opportunities to maneuver between major powers. These governments often seek strategic flexibility rather than permanent alignment with Washington, Beijing, or Moscow.
The emerging system may not produce a single replacement for the U.S.-led international order. Instead, competing regional systems, economic networks, security coalitions, and diplomatic partnerships may operate simultaneously.
Middle powers could play an important role in maintaining international cooperation. However, their ability to constrain major powers remains uncertain, particularly when powerful states are willing to use military or economic pressure unilaterally.
U.S. Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy
American foreign policy is increasingly divided between competing visions of the country's role in the world. Liberal internationalists generally favor alliances, international institutions, diplomacy, and sustained global engagement. Nationalist and America First approaches emphasize sovereignty, economic protection, military strength, and transactional relationships.
Advocates of restraint argue that the United States should reduce military commitments, limit overseas deployments, and establish a higher threshold for intervention. Other strategists support selective engagement focused on major threats and areas of direct national interest.
The Trump administration's foreign policy has emphasized unpredictability, coercive bargaining, tariffs, military pressure, and demands that allies assume greater responsibility. Supporters view this strategy as a necessary response to countries that benefited from American protection without contributing enough to collective security.
Critics argue that deliberate disruption may reduce American influence by encouraging allies and adversaries to develop alternatives to U.S.-controlled financial, technological, and security networks.
Public opinion remains complex. Although Americans frequently express concerns about foreign interventions and international burdens, surveys indicate continued support for alliances, trade, and some forms of international leadership.
The long-term direction of American grand strategy may depend on whether policymakers can develop an approach between unrestricted global intervention and complete withdrawal from international leadership.
China, Technology, and Great-Power Competition
Competition between the United States and China is a central feature of the changing international system. The two countries are competing over military power, artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing, critical minerals, scientific research, trade, and influence in global institutions.
China is expanding its diplomatic and institutional influence as the United States reduces its involvement in some international organizations. American withdrawal from institutions such as UNESCO may create opportunities for Beijing to shape international standards involving education, culture, science, and technology.
Technology restrictions are another major source of competition. The United States has attempted to limit China's access to advanced technologies and critical components. Some researchers question whether increasingly strict controls will slow Chinese development or encourage greater technological self-reliance.
Critical minerals are also becoming a strategic concern. Washington is working with partners to reduce dependence on Chinese-controlled supply chains for minerals used in defense systems, batteries, electronics, and advanced manufacturing.
Military competition remains particularly sensitive around Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific. Diplomacy, deterrence, and crisis communication are essential because miscalculation could produce a direct confrontation between two nuclear-armed powers.
The future of U.S.-China relations could range from managed competition to deeper economic and technological separation. Much will depend on whether both governments can protect national interests while creating mechanisms to prevent accidental escalation.
Economic Statecraft, Trade, and Strategic Resources
Economic policy and national security are increasingly interconnected. Tariffs, sanctions, export controls, industrial subsidies, supply-chain policies, and critical-mineral strategies are now frequently treated as instruments of geopolitical power.
The United States has used access to its markets, financial system, technology, and international networks to influence other governments. Aggressive economic coercion, however, can encourage countries to reduce their dependence on American-controlled systems.
Strategic autonomy has therefore become an economic as well as a military objective. Governments are investing in domestic manufacturing, alternative payment systems, energy security, critical minerals, and regional supply chains.
Legal and constitutional disputes also affect economic statecraft. Debates over presidential tariff authority illustrate tensions between executive power, congressional authority, international commerce, and national-security policy.
A major question is whether the United States must choose between America First economic policies and rules-based global economic cooperation. Some analysts argue that national economic interests can be protected while maintaining international institutions and predictable trade rules.
Military Power, Nuclear Strategy, and Defense
Military power remains one of the strongest foundations of American international influence. The United States maintains extensive alliances, overseas forces, advanced military technology, and a large nuclear arsenal.
Changing defense priorities increasingly emphasize homeland security, regional defense, China, and strategic competition rather than the counterterrorism operations that dominated the early twenty-first century.
Questions about the reliability of American security guarantees are also influencing nuclear strategy. Some analysts warn that allies could eventually consider developing independent nuclear capabilities if they lose confidence in U.S. protection.
The weakening of international arms-control systems presents additional risks. Renewed nuclear competition could increase the danger of arms races and strategic miscalculation.
Despite these dangers, arms-control negotiations remain possible. Historical experience suggests that geopolitical crises sometimes create political opportunities for renewed diplomatic agreements.
American military power is substantial but not unlimited. Simultaneous commitments in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East can place pressure on defense resources, weapons inventories, military personnel, and political attention.
Foreign Aid, Democracy Support, and Development
Foreign assistance has historically been an important component of American influence. Development programs, democracy assistance, humanitarian aid, and educational initiatives create relationships that may last for generations.
Reductions in American foreign assistance are changing the international development system. Governments, foundations, and private organizations are attempting to replace some lost programs, but the emerging network remains fragmented and often underfunded.
Some policymakers favor a more transactional approach to development assistance. Under this model, aid is closely connected to commercial agreements, access to strategic resources, migration policy, or diplomatic cooperation.
Others argue that long-term development partnerships produce greater strategic benefits. Investments in health, infrastructure, education, accountable government, and economic growth can strengthen relationships without requiring immediate political concessions.
Debates over democracy and development are particularly important in Africa and other rapidly growing regions. Commercial engagement and support for accountable institutions do not necessarily have to be competing objectives.
Foreign aid therefore represents more than humanitarian spending. It can also serve as an instrument of diplomacy, reputation, economic partnership, and long-term strategic influence.
Artificial Intelligence and Geopolitical Power
Artificial intelligence is emerging as a new source of international power. Advanced AI could affect scientific research, economic productivity, military planning, intelligence, diplomacy, and national competitiveness.
Countries that develop powerful AI systems may gain significant advantages in innovation and strategic decision-making. The distribution of computing resources, advanced chips, energy, scientific expertise, and data could therefore influence the future balance of power.
Research also indicates that artificial-intelligence systems may produce different recommendations when evaluating military escalation, alliances, intervention, and diplomatic cooperation. The use of AI in foreign-policy decision-making raises important questions about accountability and strategic risk.
Alliances may become increasingly important in the AI era. Shared standards, interoperable systems, scientific cooperation, and technology partnerships could help democratic countries maintain influence.
The competition over artificial intelligence is not limited to the United States and China. Countries able to build research institutions, attract talent, and create unexpected interdisciplinary innovations may influence the direction of future technological development.
Changing Global Power and International Relations
The distribution of global power is changing. Many Americans believe the influence of the United States is declining while China and other countries are gaining international weight.
The United States is responding in several ways. American policy increasingly emphasizes strategic competition, the Western Hemisphere, critical resources, economic security, and demands for greater contributions from allies.
A renewed focus on the Western Hemisphere reflects concerns about migration, narcotics trafficking, regional political instability, and China's growing economic influence in Latin America.
At the same time, countries around the world are questioning whether Washington remains a predictable partner. Declining confidence in American institutions and political leadership may accelerate efforts to diversify defense, trade, and diplomatic relationships.
These developments do not necessarily mean the immediate end of American global power. The United States retains military alliances, technological capabilities, major financial institutions, leading universities, cultural influence, and an enormous economy.
The more significant question is how these sources of power will be used. Coercive strategies may produce rapid concessions but also encourage long-term resistance. Alliances and multilateral cooperation can increase American influence but require compromise and sustained commitments.
Conclusion
American foreign policy and global standing are entering a period of profound transformation. NATO and other alliances remain important, but partners are preparing for a world in which U.S. commitments may be less predictable and American dominance less complete.
Declining trust in American leadership is encouraging European governments, middle powers, and developing nations to diversify their relationships. China is seeking greater influence in technology, global institutions, trade, and diplomacy, while other states pursue strategic autonomy.
Military strength remains central to American power, but economic networks, alliances, scientific leadership, cultural influence, foreign assistance, and international legitimacy are equally important. Overreliance on military or economic coercion could weaken the networks that have historically expanded American influence.
The emerging international system is likely to be more multipolar, competitive, and fragmented. The central debate for the United States is no longer simply whether to lead or withdraw. It is how to exercise power effectively in a world where allies demand greater independence, competitors possess growing capabilities, and international cooperation remains necessary to address shared challenges.
The future of American global standing will depend on whether the United States can combine national strength with diplomacy, credible alliances, technological leadership, and the ability to maintain international trust.
```
Alliances, NATO, and Transatlantic Relations
The NATO Summit Exposed the Real Source of Trump’s Power
| Robert Reich | The Guardian | July 10, 2026
The article argues that President Trump’s willingness to disregard diplomatic conventions gives him unusual leverage but damages NATO, international institutions, and trust in American leadership.
Once Again Trump Brought His Wrecking Ball to the NATO Summit
| Simon Tisdall | The Guardian | July 10, 2026
NATO survived another turbulent summit, but uncertainty about American reliability is encouraging European governments to prepare for greater strategic independence.
Trump Tackles FIFA, NATO, and Iran
| Reuters Staff | Reuters | July 10, 2026
The report examines how disputes involving NATO, Iran, Greenland, Spain, and even the World Cup reflected the confrontational style of contemporary American foreign policy.
Despite Trump’s Europe-Baiting, the NATO Summit Went Rather Well
| Editorial Board | The Times | July 10, 2026
Despite inflammatory rhetoric, the summit produced new defense commitments and demonstrated that Europe continues to depend heavily on American weapons and military technology.
Five Takeaways From Europe’s Rupture With the United States
| Wall Street Journal Staff | The Wall Street Journal | July 10, 2026
European and Canadian leaders are investing in independent defense, space, artificial-intelligence, and technological capabilities as they reconsider their reliance on Washington.
NATO’s Rutte Says Alliance Reunited After Trump Quarrel
| Reuters Staff | Reuters | July 9, 2026
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte argued that the alliance’s ability to reconcile public disagreements demonstrated resilience rather than permanent division.
Trump Tells NATO Leaders He Wants the United States to Remain
| Reuters Staff | Reuters | July 8, 2026
Trump reportedly reassured NATO leaders that the United States intended to remain in the alliance after months of threats and uncertainty.
Network and Structural Power: Four Trends Weakening U.S. Leverage
| Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | July 7, 2026
The authors contend that increasingly aggressive American economic coercion is producing fewer concessions while encouraging allies to reduce their dependence on U.S.-controlled networks.
Will American Power in Europe Run Out?
| Stephen Wertheim | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | July 7, 2026
The traditional transatlantic bargain is changing, but American power in Europe may evolve into a more balanced partnership rather than disappear completely.
NATO Gets High Marks From Member States
| Richard Wike and Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | July 6, 2026
Surveys show that NATO remains broadly popular in many member countries even as doubts persist about U.S. leadership and the alliance’s future direction.
Trump Won Spending Promises From NATO—Now He Wants Enforcement
| Associated Press Staff | Associated Press | July 6, 2026
The United States is pressing NATO governments to fulfill ambitious defense-spending promises while shifting more responsibility for European security to Europe.
NATO Chief Faces Challenge as Trump Demands Loyalty
| Lorne Cook | Associated Press | July 5, 2026
NATO leaders face the challenge of satisfying demands for higher military spending while protecting the alliance from disputes over Iran, Greenland, Ukraine, and trade.
Europe’s No-Panic Playbook for a Radically Different U.S. Foreign Policy
| Atlantic Council Staff | Atlantic Council | July 2, 2026
European governments are advised to expand their independent capabilities without abandoning NATO or unnecessarily accelerating a break with Washington.
Europe Should Take the Long Bet on the United States
| Atlantic Council Staff | Atlantic Council | July 2, 2026
The article argues that substantial American public support for NATO and global engagement provides a foundation for repairing the transatlantic relationship.
European Views of Trump and the United States Are Especially Negative
| Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | June 23, 2026
Confidence in American leadership has fallen sharply across numerous European countries, reinforcing concerns about the future of transatlantic cooperation.
The End of Trans-Atlanticism
| Foreign Policy Staff | Foreign Policy | June 15, 2026
The article argues that the political, economic, and ideological conditions that sustained the postwar transatlantic partnership have largely disappeared.
The NATO Ankara Summit: “NATO 3.0” in Practice
| CSIS Staff | Center for Strategic and International Studies | June 9, 2026
Greater European burden-sharing could strengthen NATO, but continued perceptions of U.S. unreliability may encourage strategic and industrial separation.
The Transatlantic Crucible
| Foreign Affairs Staff | Foreign Affairs | June 4, 2026
A rebalanced NATO could reduce America’s role as Europe’s automatic security provider while preserving cooperation on shared strategic threats.
Allies and Partners in the Artificial-Intelligence Era
| Atlantic Council Staff | Atlantic Council | June 1, 2026
Cross-border alliances, interoperable standards, and shared institutions could help democratic countries maintain technological influence as traditional partnerships weaken.
Pentagon Chief Urges Asian Allies to Increase Defense Spending
| Reuters Staff | Reuters | May 31, 2026
The United States is asking Indo-Pacific partners to assume more responsibility for deterring China while Washington expands its own military investments.
Fighting Without Friends
| Council on Foreign Relations Staff | Council on Foreign Relations | May 15, 2026
The article argues that diminished American influence over allies and adversaries is weakening Washington’s ability to set the global security agenda.
The New Transatlantic Bargain
| Council on Foreign Relations Staff | Council on Foreign Relations | May 15, 2026
NATO and other alliances must adapt to declining American predominance rather than being treated as either permanent assets or obsolete liabilities.
Trump’s Feuds With Allies May Outlast the Iran War
| Reuters Staff | Reuters | May 10, 2026
Traditional American partners are hedging against Washington’s unpredictability while China and Russia seek to exploit divisions among Western allies.
Global Perceptions of the United States Fall Below Russia
| Reuters Staff | Reuters | May 8, 2026
A multinational survey found a dramatic decline in views of the United States following disputes over tariffs, alliances, Iran, Ukraine, and Greenland.
The Iran War Shows the Limits of U.S. Power
| Carnegie Endowment Staff | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | April 28, 2026
Historical comparisons demonstrate that even militarily powerful states can suffer diplomatic isolation and strategic setbacks when allies reject their objectives.
Americans Actually Support U.S. Global Leadership
| Council on Foreign Relations Staff | Council on Foreign Relations | April 16, 2026
Survey evidence indicates that alliances, trade, and international engagement retain broad public support despite partisan conflict over specific policies.
Deepening Strategic Alignment in the U.S.-Japan Alliance
| CSIS Staff | Center for Strategic and International Studies | April 3, 2026
Washington and Tokyo are encouraged to strengthen defense, trade, critical-mineral, technological, and regional partnerships amid growing geopolitical uncertainty.
Trump Threatens NATO Exit, Escalating Tensions With Allies
| Reuters Staff | Reuters | April 1, 2026
Renewed threats to leave NATO intensified concerns about the durability of American security commitments and the future of collective defense.
The Postliberal Superpower
| Foreign Affairs Staff | Foreign Affairs | March 9, 2026
The article analyzes how nationalist and postliberal ideas are reshaping American defense strategy, alliances, values, and the definition of national interest.
U.S. Policy Shifts and the Future of the Transatlantic Alliance
| Rice University Baker Institute Staff | Baker Institute for Public Policy | March 3, 2026
Pressure over Greenland, tariffs, NATO, and regional priorities could permanently damage the alliance while benefiting Russia and China.
China Leads Scientific Trends While the West Launches New Ones
| Jeffrey W. Lockhart, Jamshid Sourati, Feng Shi, and James Evans | arXiv | March 1, 2026
China increasingly leads research in rapidly emerging fields, while the United States and Europe retain strength in creating unexpected interdisciplinary directions.
Trump’s 2026 State of the Union: Foreign Policy Issue Guide
| Council on Foreign Relations Staff | Council on Foreign Relations | February 23, 2026
The guide reviews major changes in trade, immigration, national security, alliances, China policy, and the administration’s broader America First agenda.
Testing Assumptions About U.S. Foreign Policy in 2026
| Stimson Center Staff | Stimson Center | February 12, 2026
Experts examine uncertain assumptions surrounding alliances, China, Ukraine, Iran, military power, and the future direction of American grand strategy.
Is Trump Reshaping the World Order?
| Brookings Institution Scholars | Brookings Institution | February 2, 2026
Brookings scholars assess how tariffs, institutional withdrawals, pressure on allies, reduced foreign aid, and unilateral actions are changing the international system.
How the World Is Seeing the United States as 2026 Begins
| Council on Foreign Relations Experts | Council on Foreign Relations | January 23, 2026
Experts describe how governments are reacting to rapid American policy changes involving trade, territory, alliances, international institutions, and military commitments.
Trump’s European Threats Could Cause Lasting Damage
| Associated Press Staff | Associated Press | January 22, 2026
Threats involving Greenland, tariffs, and NATO have encouraged European countries and Canada to question Washington’s reliability and seek alternative partnerships.
America Revived
| Robert Blackwill and Richard Fontaine | Council on Foreign Relations | January 20, 2026
The report proposes a grand strategy combining military strength, diplomacy, economic leadership, alliances, and renewed legitimacy in international institutions.
Greenland, Davos, and a Week That Could Redefine the Alliance
| Atlantic Council Staff | Atlantic Council | January 19, 2026
European leaders confronted difficult choices between accommodation and resistance as American territorial and tariff threats intensified.
Trump’s Quest for Greenland Could Be NATO’s Darkest Hour
| Atlantic Council Staff | Atlantic Council | January 7, 2026
Pressure on Denmark over Greenland threatened to turn a territorial dispute into an unprecedented internal crisis for NATO.
The Most Significant Question for Trump’s America in 2026
| Frederick Kempe | Atlantic Council | January 5, 2026
Trump’s policies have pushed allies toward higher military spending while simultaneously encouraging them to hedge against American unpredictability.
America and the World: Trump 2.0 Foreign Policy
| Foreign Policy Association Staff | Foreign Policy Association | 2026
This resource collection covers American grand strategy, international institutions, alliances, military power, economic policy, and alternative approaches to global leadership.
America Revived: A Grand Strategy of Resolute Global Leadership
| Council on Foreign Relations Staff | Council on Foreign Relations | 2026
Panelists debate a proposed strategy combining credible military power with alliances, diplomacy, economic influence, and international legitimacy.
The Future of American Leadership and the International Order
| Brookings Institution Staff | Brookings Institution | 2026
The Brookings project studies changing power relationships, U.S. strategy, institutional competition, alliances, and opportunities for international cooperation.
Security Alliances and Partnerships
| Brookings Institution Staff | Brookings Institution | 2026
This research collection examines NATO, Asian alliances, military assistance, burden-sharing, crisis management, and the role of partnerships in U.S. strategy.
Munich Security Conference 2026
| Foreign Policy Staff | Foreign Policy | 2026
Reporting from the conference covers transatlantic tensions, Ukraine, China, defense spending, nuclear security, and international reactions to U.S. policy.
American Views on Global Leadership
| Council on Foreign Relations | YouTube | 2026
Panelists discuss public opinion on alliances, trade, military engagement, national security, and America’s role in international affairs.
Six Trump Lessons for Global Leaders in 2026
| Foreign Policy Contributors | Foreign Policy | December 29, 2025
International leaders learned to prepare for tariffs, transactional bargaining, downgraded alliances, sudden policy changes, and possible accommodation with American adversaries.
The 2025 National Security Strategy
| Executive Office of the President | United States Government | December 2025
The official strategy emphasizes American primacy in the Western Hemisphere, economic security, reduced burdens in Europe and the Middle East, and competition with China.
A Year in Review: Foreign Policy in 2025
| One Decision | YouTube | December 2025
Former officials and analysts review the year’s major developments involving alliances, China, Russia, Europe, the Middle East, and American global leadership.
Increasing the Value of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance
| RAND Corporation Staff | RAND Corporation | October 16, 2025
The alliance faces growing pressure to modernize its military, political, and economic foundations in response to North Korea, China, and doubts about American commitments.
Transitioning Transatlantic Ties
| International Institute for Strategic Studies Staff | IISS | October 9, 2025
The discussion considers how European security and U.S. foreign policy are changing as both sides reconsider the traditional distribution of responsibilities.
Navigating Disruption: Allied Responses to U.S. Foreign Policy
| CSIS Contributors | Center for Strategic and International Studies | October 6, 2025
Eight case studies examine how allies and partners are coping with American tariffs, security demands, diplomatic unpredictability, and changing strategic priorities.
Transatlantic Relations Under Trump: An Uneasy Peace
| Max Bergmann | Center for Strategic and International Studies | October 6, 2025
Europe has attempted to accommodate transactional American demands while gradually reducing its economic, technological, and military dependence on Washington.
How NATO Allies Might Respond to a U.S. Withdrawal
| RAND Corporation Researchers | RAND Corporation | June 18, 2025
The report explores possible military, diplomatic, and institutional responses if Washington substantially reduces or ends its role in NATO.
Consequences of the Russia-Ukraine War
| RAND Corporation Staff | RAND Corporation | May 22, 2025
The war has changed NATO, European defense spending, Russian military power, global energy markets, and Washington’s strategic calculations.
The Realists’ Grand Experiment
| RAND Corporation Staff | RAND Corporation | April 11, 2025
A more restrained and transactional U.S. foreign policy could encourage allies to assume greater responsibility but might also reduce American influence over their actions.
The U.S.-Japan Alliance Under New Political Leadership
| RAND Corporation Staff | RAND Corporation | March 10, 2025
American and Japanese experts discuss how leadership changes, regional security threats, trade, and technology may reshape the bilateral alliance.
Critical Foreign-Policy Decisions and Artificial Intelligence
| Benjamin Jensen and Others | arXiv | March 8, 2025
The study finds that artificial-intelligence systems differ significantly in recommendations involving escalation, intervention, cooperation, and alliance management.
Foreign-Policy Priorities for the Incoming Administration
| Perry World House Staff | University of Pennsylvania | January 15, 2025
Experts review the conflicts, alliances, democratic challenges, climate problems, and strategic competition awaiting the new administration.
American Global Standing, Reputation, and Soft Power
Comparing How Americans and Others View the U.S. Global Role
International respondents are much less likely than Americans to believe that the United States promotes peace or considers the interests of other nations.
In Middle-Income Nations, Most Say the U.S. Interferes Abroad
| Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | June 23, 2026
Many respondents in middle-income countries believe Washington interferes in other nations’ affairs and does not adequately consider their interests.
How Do Views of Trump Compare With Other Global Leaders?
| Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | June 23, 2026
International confidence in the American president trails that of several other major global leaders, although opinions vary substantially by country.
Don’t Give Up on Global Order
| Robert Kagan | Foreign Affairs | June 9, 2026
The essay defends sustained American leadership and argues that abandoning the international order would impose larger costs than maintaining it.
Middle Powers Take Center Stage
| Council on Foreign Relations Staff | Council on Foreign Relations | June 2026
Canada, India, Brazil, Turkey, and other middle powers are gaining room to maneuver as confidence in American leadership declines.
Global Soft Power Index 2026: A Global Mood Shift
| Brand Finance Staff | Brand Finance | January 20, 2026
The United States remained the world’s most influential soft-power country but experienced significant declines across reputation, governance, relations, and trust measurements.
The Strategic Importance of U.S. Values-Based Soft Power
| George W. Bush Presidential Center Staff | George W. Bush Presidential Center | January 16, 2026
International education, democratic values, culture, development assistance, and open institutions remain important sources of American influence beyond military power.
The United States External Cultural-Policy Report
| Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations Staff | ifa | 2026
Cuts to foreign aid, public diplomacy, education, and cultural programs signal a shift from soft power toward military and economic coercion.
Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index 2026
| Brand Finance Staff | Brand Finance | January 2026
The full index compares countries on familiarity, reputation, governance, culture, diplomacy, education, business, media, and international influence.
Three Summer Deadlines That Will Reveal Trump’s View of U.S. Power
| Chatham House Staff | Chatham House | July 1, 2025
Decisions involving tariffs, international organizations, and the federal debt could reveal how the administration understands America’s future global role.
U.S. Image Declines in Many Nations
| Richard Wike and Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | June 11, 2025
Surveys across 24 nations found falling confidence in American leadership and widespread doubts about Trump’s handling of international affairs.
Global Order, Multilateralism, and Middle Powers
Retreat, Rebel, Replace, or Reform? Multilateralism Under Trump
| Stewart Patrick | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | June 16, 2026
The administration’s approach combines withdrawal from some institutions with efforts to reshape, bypass, or replace others through more personalized arrangements.
Global Governance in the Twenty-First Century
The report explores how multilateral institutions can be maintained, reformed, or transformed amid nationalism, geopolitical competition, inequality, technology, and climate change.
What Comes After Global Order
| Foreign Policy Staff | Foreign Policy | June 10, 2026
Rather than replacing one fixed international order with another, the world may be entering a continuous struggle among competing systems and coalitions.
After the Rupture: The Reordering of the World
| Council on Foreign Relations Staff | Council on Foreign Relations | May 19, 2026
Foreign-policy leaders discuss middle powers, transactional diplomacy, institutional fragmentation, and the redistribution of influence in a less U.S.-centered world.
Trump’s War Exposes the Weakness of Middle Powers
| Foreign Policy Staff | Foreign Policy | May 4, 2026
The article questions whether middle powers can collectively shape international outcomes when major powers remain willing to act unilaterally.
India and a Changing Global Order
| Carnegie Endowment Staff | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | March 25, 2026
India is balancing cooperation with Washington against trade disputes, Russian ties, strategic autonomy, and an increasingly multipolar international environment.
The World After Trump
| Ravi Agrawal | Foreign Policy | March 23, 2026
The issue examines how countries, institutions, and political movements are preparing for an international system transformed by Trump’s foreign policy.
Embracing “Cuspness” in an Emerging Multipolar World
| RAND Corporation Staff | RAND Corporation | March 5, 2026
Australia may respond to intensifying great-power competition by maintaining flexibility between regions and pursuing a more transactional form of strategic autonomy.
Trump Is Demolishing the Global Order—What Might Replace It?
| Carnegie Endowment Staff | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | January 27, 2026
Countries are responding to American unpredictability by diversifying trade, defense relationships, diplomatic partnerships, and supply chains.
The Middle Power Moment
| Stewart Patrick | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | January 20, 2026
Middle powers could help preserve international cooperation as American dominance recedes and the global system becomes more multipolar.
Alternative Options for U.S. Policy Toward the International Order
| Michael J. Mazarr and RAND Researchers | RAND Corporation | Updated 2026
RAND research compares American primacy, selective engagement, restraint, institutional reform, and other possible strategies for managing the international system.
The Decline of the West and the Rise of “the Rest”
| Amitav Acharya | Chatham House | September 15, 2025
American withdrawal may produce a decentralized global order led increasingly by Asian and Global South countries rather than simple international collapse.
The Fracturing of the U.S.-Led Liberal International Order
| Chatham House Researchers | Chatham House | March 27, 2025
The report traces the weakening of the postwar system as American commitment declines and other powers pursue competing regional and global arrangements.
Germany’s Internationalist Vision in Crisis
| Chatham House Researchers | Chatham House | March 27, 2025
Germany faces pressure to preserve multilateralism while expanding its defense capabilities and preparing for reduced American support.
Envisioning the Future International Order
| Chatham House Researchers | Chatham House | March 27, 2025
The final chapter considers possible futures ranging from renewed cooperation to fragmented regional blocs and intensified great-power competition.
U.S. Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy
Most Americans Say U.S. Foreign Policy Ignores Other Countries
| Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | April 28, 2026
A growing share of Americans believes foreign policy does not adequately account for other countries’ interests or the requirements of international cooperation.
Trump’s New 2026 Shock Doctrine
| ResearchGate Contributor | ResearchGate | February 19, 2026
The paper characterizes unpredictability, coercive bargaining, military pressure, and deliberate disruption as central features of the administration’s international strategy.
How Diplomacy Reshapes Online Discourse
| Hunjun Shin, Hoonbae Moon, and Mohit Singhal | arXiv | January 14, 2026
Research on U.S.-North Korea diplomacy suggests that high-level negotiations can produce lasting changes in how foreign adversaries are discussed, even when talks later fail.
The Fate of “America First”
| Reid Smith | Foreign Affairs | January 9, 2026
The article examines whether military intervention and regime-change ambitions are compatible with promises to limit American involvement in foreign conflicts.
The Foreign Policy of the United States
| Wikipedia Contributors | Wikipedia | Updated 2026
The overview traces American foreign policy from early neutrality through global primacy, liberal internationalism, the war on terrorism, great-power competition, and America First.
A Middle Way for American Foreign Policy
| Foreign Affairs Staff | Foreign Affairs | December 31, 2025
The article proposes an approach between expansive liberal internationalism and unilateral America First nationalism.
Competing Visions of Restraint for U.S. Foreign Policy
| RAND Corporation Researchers | RAND Corporation | January 9, 2025
The report compares schools of restraint that favor fewer military commitments, a reduced overseas presence, and a higher threshold for intervention.
A Shock to the System: The Global Implications of Trump II
| Chatham House Staff | Chatham House | 2025
The discussion examines the administration’s rapid turn toward transactional diplomacy, unilateral action, protectionism, and reduced support for collective institutions.
China, Technology, and Great-Power Competition
As the United States Steps Out of UNESCO, China Steps Up
| Brookings Staff | Brookings Institution | July 7, 2026
America’s withdrawal from UNESCO could create additional opportunities for China to influence international education, culture, science, and technology policy.
Why America Cannot Remain a Global Power
| Modern Diplomacy Staff | Modern Diplomacy | July 3, 2026
The essay argues that simultaneous challenges involving China, Russia, Europe, and the Middle East could exceed America’s political and military capacity.
China Sets Out Its Vision for a New Global Order
| Chatham House Staff | Chatham House | June 24, 2026
China is presenting an alternative vision of global governance as the United States retreats from or challenges parts of the existing international system.
U.S. Power Is Wrung Out
| Foreign Policy Staff | Foreign Policy | June 9, 2026
Military commitments in the Middle East could deplete American resources needed to deter China and manage other strategic challenges.
Strategic Stalemates in the U.S.-China Artificial-Intelligence Race
| Jingwen Liu and Jyh-An Lee | arXiv | May 22, 2026
The paper questions whether increasingly strict American technology controls will slow China or instead accelerate Chinese self-reliance and innovation.
In Diplomacy, Pomp Matters—Especially When Trump Goes to China
| Associated Press Staff | Associated Press | May 12, 2026
China’s ceremonial treatment of American leaders illustrates how symbolism, prestige, and carefully staged public events can influence high-level diplomacy.
Which Countries Do Americans Think Are Gaining Influence?
| Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | April 28, 2026
Americans increasingly perceive their country’s influence as weakening while China and several other powers gain greater international weight.
The Role of Diplomacy in Managing Cross-Strait Relations
| Brookings Institution Staff | Brookings Institution | March 20, 2026
Careful diplomacy can strengthen deterrence around Taiwan while reducing miscalculation, escalation, and the risk of a direct U.S.-China conflict.
U.S. Critical-Minerals Trade Bloc Aims to Counter China
| Reuters Staff | Reuters | February 4, 2026
Washington is seeking coordinated trade rules and price protections to reduce China’s control over minerals essential to defense and advanced manufacturing.
Three Possible Pathways for U.S.-China Relations
| Brookings Institution Staff | Brookings Institution | January 26, 2026
The report outlines possibilities ranging from a managed accommodation to a hard strategic split or a prolonged effort by both sides to reduce vulnerability.
Surveying Experts on the State of U.S.-China Relations
| ChinaPower Project Staff | Center for Strategic and International Studies | January 13, 2026
Experts assess the likelihood of cooperation, confrontation, economic separation, military crisis, and diplomatic stabilization between Washington and Beijing.
Greenland, Rare Earths, and Arctic Security
| CSIS Staff | Center for Strategic and International Studies | January 8, 2026
Greenland’s strategic location and mineral resources place it at the intersection of Arctic security, economic competition, climate change, and U.S.-China rivalry.
United States and the Changing International System
| Chatham House Staff | Chatham House | Updated 2026
This collection examines how the United States, China, Russia, Europe, and emerging powers are competing to shape international rules and institutions.
Breaking Down Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy
| Brookings Institution Scholars | Brookings Institution | December 8, 2025
The strategy prioritizes the Western Hemisphere, economic nationalism, immigration enforcement, burden-shifting, and competition with China.
China: Balancing the United States While Increasing Global Influence
| Chatham House Researchers | Chatham House | March 27, 2025
China seeks greater influence within existing institutions while constructing alternative partnerships and presenting itself as a defender of sovereignty and development.
Economic Statecraft, Trade, and Strategic Resources
When Economic Security Meets Economic Statecraft
| RAND Corporation Staff | RAND Corporation | April 13, 2026
The report examines how national-security concerns, trade restrictions, industrial policy, sanctions, and supply-chain management are becoming increasingly interconnected.
The Supreme Court Strikes Down Trump’s Global Tariffs
| Reuters Staff | Reuters | February 20, 2026
The ruling limited presidential tariff authority and highlighted tensions between executive power, Congress, global commerce, and economic statecraft.
Dispatch From Davos: The Geopolitics of the New Realism
| Michael Froman | Council on Foreign Relations | January 23, 2026
Davos participants increasingly viewed international relations through the lens of power, national resilience, strategic autonomy, and economic security.
What Trump’s National Security Strategy Means for Foreign Policy
| Atlantic Council Experts | Atlantic Council | December 5, 2025
Experts analyze the strategy’s emphasis on economic statecraft, the Western Hemisphere, burden-sharing, national sovereignty, and selective international engagement.
America First or Rules-Based Global Economic Governance
| Brookings Institution Staff | Brookings Institution | 2025
The article argues that American economic interests and rules-based international cooperation are not inherently incompatible.
Military Power, Nuclear Strategy, and Defense
Nuclear Weapons and the Future of American Power
| Carnegie Endowment Staff | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | July 2, 2026
The weakening arms-control system creates serious dangers but does not eliminate the possibility of renewed negotiations following future geopolitical shocks.
Friendly Proliferation
| CSIS Staff | Center for Strategic and International Studies | June 9, 2026
Declining allied trust in American security guarantees is fueling debate over whether additional U.S. partners may eventually seek nuclear weapons.
The 2026 National Defense Strategy by the Numbers
| Mark Cancian | Center for Strategic and International Studies | January 27, 2026
The analysis identifies major changes in defense priorities, including reduced emphasis on counterterrorism and increased attention to homeland and regional security.
Foreign Aid, Democracy Support, and Development
Rahm Emanuel Assails Netanyahu as American Politics Shift on Israel
| Associated Press Staff | Associated Press | July 7, 2026
Emanuel’s criticism of Israel’s government illustrates growing divisions in the United States over military aid, settlements, Gaza, and the future of the bilateral relationship.
Post-U.S. International Democracy Support
| Thomas Carothers | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | June 8, 2026
Governments and private organizations are attempting to replace lost American democracy assistance, but the emerging system remains fragmented and underfunded.
Strategic, Not Transactional: Development Cooperation and U.S. Interests
| Center for Global Development Staff | Center for Global Development | March 18, 2026
The authors argue that development assistance should advance long-term strategic relationships rather than function primarily as a short-term transactional bargaining tool.
Global Development Policy and the New World Disorder
| German Institute of Development and Sustainability Staff | IDOS | January 7, 2026
Reductions in American development cooperation are weakening Washington’s agenda-setting power and accelerating changes in the international aid system.
False Choices: Democracy and Development in U.S.-Africa Policy
| CSIS Staff | Center for Strategic and International Studies | October 21, 2025
Commercial diplomacy and democracy assistance need not be competing goals, particularly in African countries seeking investment, accountable government, and development.
International Engagement and Support for Foreign Aid
| Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | May 1, 2025
Most Americans support considering other countries’ interests, although opinions about foreign aid and international engagement remain divided by party.
The New Game in Foreign Aid: Deal Power
| Lester Munson | United States Studies Centre | March 11, 2025
Development assistance is increasingly being treated as a transactional instrument for securing strategic, commercial, and diplomatic agreements.
Artificial Intelligence and Geopolitical Power
Artificial General Intelligence and the Rise and Fall of Nations
| RAND Corporation Researchers | RAND Corporation | July 2, 2025
The report explores how advanced artificial intelligence could redistribute technological, economic, military, and geopolitical power among nations.
Changing Global Power and International Relations
Pentagon Seeks to Rally Latin America Behind a New Monroe Doctrine
| Reuters Staff | Reuters | July 9, 2026
The administration is promoting a renewed assertion of American primacy in the Western Hemisphere while seeking regional cooperation against narcotics trafficking, migration, and Chinese influence.
Trump Gets Negative Reviews as Fewer See the U.S. as Reliable
A multinational survey documents declining confidence in the United States, its president, its democratic institutions, and its reliability as an international partner.
Making America Weak Again
| David Skidmore | The Internationalist | July 19, 2025
Declining international approval is presented as evidence that confrontational nationalism may weaken rather than strengthen American power.