Ranked Choice Voting: Difference between revisions
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STV is a family of multi-winner proportional representation electoral systems. The proportionality of its results and the proportion of votes actually used to elect someone are equivalent to those produced by proportional representation election systems based on lists. STV systems can be thought of as a variation on the largest remainders method that uses candidate-based solid coalitions, rather than party lists.[clarification needed][1] Surplus votes belonging to winning candidates (those in excess of an electoral quota) may be thought of as remainder votes. Surplus votes may be transferred from a successful candidate to another candidate and then possibly used to elect that candidate. | STV is a family of multi-winner proportional representation electoral systems. The proportionality of its results and the proportion of votes actually used to elect someone are equivalent to those produced by proportional representation election systems based on lists. STV systems can be thought of as a variation on the largest remainders method that uses candidate-based solid coalitions, rather than party lists.[clarification needed][1] Surplus votes belonging to winning candidates (those in excess of an electoral quota) may be thought of as remainder votes. Surplus votes may be transferred from a successful candidate to another candidate and then possibly used to elect that candidate. | ||
[http://www.fairvote.org/ranked_choice_voting_is_a_victory_for_san_francisco_voters FairVote.org SF Mayoral Article] | =====Ranking Candidates Is More Accurate Than Voting===== | ||
[https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ranking-candidates-more-accurate/ Scientific American Article on RCV 2004] | |||
Thus, true majority rule and rank-order voting result in dramatically different outcomes. Considering this sharp contrast, it may seem hard to say which method is better at capturing the essence of voters’ views. But we propose to do just that. We can evaluate these two systems—and any other—according to some fundamental principles that any electoral method should satisfy. Kenneth J. Arrow of Stanford University originated this axiomatic approach to voting theory in a 1951 monograph, a work that has profoundly shaped the voting literature. | |||
=====Ranked choice voting is a victory for San Francisco voters===== | |||
[http://www.fairvote.org/ranked_choice_voting_is_a_victory_for_san_francisco_voters FairVote.org SF Mayoral Article] | |||
Ranked choice voting offers a proven solution for voters. RCV played a key role in last year’s exciting high turnout mayoral and city council wins in Minneapolis and St. Paul by people of color, LGBTQ candidates, and other underrepresented communities. Bay Area’s four cities with RCV have seen significant increases in representation of women and people of color. When San Franciscan first adopted RCV, it led the nation on a plethora of social issues, and voting in a fair, inclusive process is part of that progress. | |||
=====Maine ranked-choice voting as a case of electoral-system change===== | =====Maine ranked-choice voting as a case of electoral-system change===== | ||
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[https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2019/3/21/18275785/electoral-college-ranked-choice-voting-president-democracy by Lee Drutman 21/3/19 Vox] | [https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2019/3/21/18275785/electoral-college-ranked-choice-voting-president-democracy by Lee Drutman 21/3/19 Vox] | ||
It would maximize participation and broad-based appeal, and improve our democracy. | It would maximize participation and broad-based appeal, and improve our democracy. | ||
=====Ranked-choice voting isa already changing politics for the better===== | |||
[https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/05/04/ranked-choice-voting-is-already-changing-politics-better/ by Katrina Vanden Heuvel 4/5/21 The Washington Post] | |||
=====Some on the Right Flirt With a Voting Method the Left Loves===== | |||
[https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/08/us/ranked-choice-voting-elections.html by Michael Wines 8/2/24 The New York Times] | |||
Long viewed as an intriguing, if somewhat wonky, approach to conducting elections, ranked-choice voting — allowing voters to list candidates in order of preference instead of selecting just one — appears to be having a moment. | |||
====='If You Can Keep It': The Realities Of Ranked Choice Voting===== | |||
[https://www.npr.org/2024/08/26/1198912746/1a-08-26-2024 by npr 26/8/24] | |||
Both major political parties have now wrapped up their conventions. In one way, they're advertisements for why Americans should vote for each party's candidates, from president all the way down the ticket. | |||
=====Missouri joins other red states in trying to stamp out ranked choice voting===== | |||
[https://www.npr.org/2024/06/05/nx-s1-4969563/ranked-choice-voting-bans by Jason Rosenbaum 5/6/24 npr] | |||
Ranked choice voting allows voters to rank candidates and ensures the winner gains majority support, as compared to the vast majority of elections, where someone can win with a plurality of votes. | |||
=====The single transferable vote and ethnic conflict: The evidence from Northern Ireland===== | |||
[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0261379413001224 by Paul Mitchell 3/14 ScienceDirect] | |||
There has been a long-running debate amongst constitutional engineers between those who favour the proportional representation of parties (usually via PR-Closed List systems) and post-election power-sharing (Lijphart) and those who favour attempting to induce pre-election inter-ethnic ‘vote-pooling’ (Horowitz) as a more effective and stable method of governing divided societies. | |||
=====Single transferable vote with Borda elimination: proportional representation, moderation, quasi-chaos and stability===== | |||
[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0261379404000289 by Chris Geller 6/05 ScienceDirect] | |||
Modifying single transferable vote (STV) by removing candidates according to their Borda scores creates a new vote counting system (STV-B) that is not quasi-chaotic, results in proportional representation, and promotes the election of moderate candidates. Dummett, M.A.E. [1997. Principles of Electoral Reform. Oxford University, New York] noted quasi-chaos in STV and proposed the “Quota/Borda system” (QBS) as a solution. | |||
=====Making wasted votes count: Turnout, transfers, and preferential voting in practice===== | |||
[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0261379413000930 by James W. Endersby 3/14 ScienceDirect] | |||
Proponents of electoral reform champion the single transferable vote (STV) or aligned forms of preferential voting (AV, IRV, RCV) as a method to improve participation among and representation of the general public. Voters provide an ordinal ranking among alternatives on the ballot, and ballots not used to elect a candidate are transferred to another favored alternative. | |||
=====Confused or competent? How voters use the STV ballot paper===== | |||
[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0261379413001662 by John Curtice 6/14 ScienceDirect] | |||
STV is often extolled because it allows voters to express a nuanced choice, but is criticised for being too confusing. In practice the system is little used, but evidence from where it is indicates much depends on how voters choose to use it. STV was used for the first time in Scottish local elections in 2007, providing valuable new evidence on how voters respond to the system. | |||
=====Electoral Reform and Party Adaptation: The Introduction of the Single Transferable Vote in Scotland===== | |||
[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-923X.2008.00925.x by ALISTAIR CLARK, LYNN BENNIE 22/5/08 WILEY] | |||
The 2007 Scottish Local Government Elections saw the first large scale use of the Single Transferable Vote (STV) in a mainland election in Britain. This presented a range of challenges for Scotland's political parties, more familiar with campaigning under first-past-the-post or the Scottish parliament's semi-proportional Additional Member System (AMS). Most crucially, STV meant the parties had to come to terms with multi-member wards and the transferral of votes between parties. Following a short discussion of the results of the STV elections, this article assesses evidence on how the parties adapted to the new electoral system, focussing particularly on candidate and campaign strategies. | |||
=====Japan's new electoral system:: la plus ça change ===== | |||
[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0261379499000268 by Margaret McKean 12/2000 ScienceDirect] | |||
We examine the impact on parties and candidates of Japan's new electoral rules, first used in the 1996 House of Representatives election. We argue that the Japanese rules, which not only permit dual candidacy but also allow votes cast in the single member district (SMD) portion of the race to allocate proportional representation (PR) seats to dual candidates, effectively defeat the purposes of electoral reform. | |||
=====A characterization of proportionally representative committees===== | |||
[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825622000574 by Haris Aziz 5/22 ScienceDirect] | |||
In multiwinner elections, a central concern is proportional representation of voters. Around the world, prominent electoral reform movements advocate for electoral systems that guarantee proportional representation. For example, the Electoral Reform Society in the United Kingdom has the goal of having “public authorities in the UK elected by proportional representation,”1 and the FairVote organization in the United States is “committed to finding practical ways to advance […] American forms of proportional representation. | |||
=====Voting for a coalition government: A game-theoretic view===== | |||
[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0176268097000189 by Stefano Vannucci 9/1977 ScienceDirect] | |||
I investigate direct electoral choice of the governing coalition in a multiparty parliamentary system and analyse some double-ballot electoral systems for inducing winning coalitional agreements among parties before the last round. The effectiveness of such electoral systems is shown to depend heavily on both the actual vote allocation and rules for the allotment of power among the parties of the governing coalition. Some alternative single-ballot coalition-selecting procedures based upon proportional representation are also described and discussed. | |||
=====Who ought to be elected and who is actually elected? An empirical investigation of 92 elections under three procedures===== | |||
[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/0261379494000196 by Dan S Felsenthal, | |||
Moshé Machover 6/1995 ScienceDirect] | |||
Three voting procedures—Borda's Count (BR), Plurality Voting (PV), and the Single Transferable Vote (STV)—are compared with one another in relation to the outcomes of 92 real elections conducted in Britain by various trade unions, professional associations, and non-profit organizations. | |||
=====Incumbency advantage in a proportional electoral system: A regression discontinuity analysis of Irish elections===== | |||
[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0176268015000245 by Paul Redmond 6/15 ScienceDirect] | |||
The existence of a large incumbency advantage in the winner-takes-all plurality system of the United States is well documented. It is unclear whether incumbents in proportional systems should enjoy such a large advantage. | |||
=====Learn About Ranked Choice Voting===== | |||
[https://www.sierraclub.org/idaho/blog/2024/10/learn-about-ranked-choice-voting by SIERRA CLUB 16/10/24] | |||
With Proposition 1 on the ballot this fall, you've probably been hearing a lot about "Ranked Choice Voting" lately. | |||
=====Sierra Club Endorses DC Ballot Measure for Ranked Choice Voting===== | |||
[https://www.sierraclub.org/dc/sierra-club-endorses-dc-ballot-measure-ranked-choice-voting by Mark Rodeffer 30/9/24 SIERRA CLUB] | |||
The Sierra Club endorses Initiative 83 to improve DC’s local democracy with ranked choice voting, which requires that candidates earn a majority of votes to be elected. Under ranked choice voting, voters cast a ballot for their top candidate and rank other candidates. If a voter’s top candidate does not win, their vote moves to their next choice, with the process continuing until a candidate wins more than 50% of votes. | |||
=====Instant Runoff Voting: Rethinking Oregon’s Voting System===== | |||
[https://www.sierraclub.org/oregon/blog/2018/10/instant-runoff-voting-rethinking-oregon-s-voting-system by Elizabeth Wilson 3/10/18 SIERRA CLUB] | |||
As a voter, I am constantly torn between wanting to support the candidates who I find the most inspiring and feeling like I will be wasting my vote if I do. The United States is a two-party system, and we as voters have been held hostage by both the GOP and the democratic party. We are forced to vote for the candidate we think has a chance at winning, the lesser of two evils. It forces us to vote our fears, not our hopes. | |||
=====Social Choice Theory and Voting Mechanisms===== | |||
[https://www.nature.com/research-intelligence/nri-topic-summaries/social-choice-theory-and-voting-mechanisms-micro-105838 by nature] | |||
Social choice theory provides a foundational framework for analysing collective decision‐making, where diverse individual preferences are aggregated into a single, socially endorsed outcome. This field investigates the theoretical underpinnings of voting mechanisms, which range from simple plurality systems to more sophisticated, strategy‐proof procedures designed to elicit and merge ordinal preferences. Voting mechanisms are not only essential for ensuring fair representation in political elections, but also find applications in distributed systems, resource allocation, and various multiagent scenarios. Recent studies have increasingly focused on the balance between fairness, efficiency and strategic incentives, striving to achieve outcomes that minimise social cost while preserving individual rationality. | |||
