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Created page with "=====The NATO Summit Exposed the Real Source of Trump’s Power===== [https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/jul/10/nato-summit-trump-power | Robert Reich | The Guardian | July 10, 2026] The article argues that President Trump’s willingness to disregard diplomatic conventions gives him unusual leverage but damages NATO, international institutions, and trust in American leadership. =====Once Again Trump Brought His Wrecking Ball to the NATO Summit===== [http..."
 
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=====The NATO Summit Exposed the Real Source of Trump’s Power=====
```wiki
{{#seo:
 
|title=Foreign Policy and U.S. Global Standing – WikiDemocracy
 
|description=An overview of changing American foreign policy, NATO and transatlantic relations, declining global trust, great-power competition, economic statecraft, military power, foreign aid, and the emerging multipolar international order.
 
|keywords=U.S. foreign policy, American global standing, NATO, transatlantic relations, global order, soft power, China, great power competition, multilateralism, foreign aid, diplomacy, American leadership
 
|image=File:Placeholder.png
 
|image_width=300
 
|image_height=200
 
|type=article}}
 
[[Category:Foreign Policy]]
[[Category:United States Foreign Relations]]
[[Category:International Relations]]
[[Category:NATO]]
[[Category:Global Politics]]
 
__NOTOC__
 
== Foreign Policy and U.S. Global Standing ==
 
=== Alliances, NATO, and Transatlantic Relations ===
 
The traditional alliance system built around American military, economic, and political leadership is undergoing a significant period of uncertainty. NATO remains broadly supported in many member countries, but disputes over defense spending, trade, Greenland, Iran, Ukraine, and American commitments have raised questions about the reliability of the United States as a long-term security partner.
 
President Donald Trump's confrontational and transactional approach to diplomacy has increased pressure on NATO members to spend more on defense and accept greater responsibility for European security. Supporters argue that this pressure has produced stronger military commitments and forced European governments to confront longstanding weaknesses in their defense capabilities. Critics contend that threats, public disputes, and uncertainty about American commitments undermine the trust required for collective defense.
 
European countries are increasingly discussing strategic autonomy. Governments are investing in domestic defense industries, artificial intelligence, space technology, critical infrastructure, and independent military capabilities. Canada and European states are also reconsidering their reliance on American technology and supply networks.
 
This shift does not necessarily mean the end of NATO. Some analysts envision a rebalanced alliance in which Europe assumes greater responsibility while the United States remains an important military and strategic partner. The future of the transatlantic relationship may therefore depend on whether greater European independence strengthens the alliance or accelerates political and industrial separation.
 
=== American Global Standing, Reputation, and Soft Power ===
 
International perceptions of the United States have become an increasingly important measure of American power. Surveys indicate that many people outside the United States are skeptical that American foreign policy promotes peace or adequately considers the interests of other nations.
 
Confidence in American leadership has declined in numerous countries. Many international respondents view the United States as less reliable, while opinions of American political leadership have become more negative. These changes affect diplomatic relationships and may encourage allies and middle powers to develop alternative partnerships.
 
American influence, however, extends beyond military power. Universities, culture, technology, democratic institutions, international education, foreign assistance, and public diplomacy have historically contributed to U.S. soft power. Reductions in cultural programs, development assistance, and international engagement may weaken these sources of influence.
 
The United States continues to possess enormous cultural, economic, technological, and military influence. Global soft-power assessments still rank the country among the world's most influential nations. The central concern is whether declining trust and reputation will make that influence more difficult to translate into diplomatic cooperation.
 
=== Global Order, Multilateralism, and Middle Powers ===
 
The international system is becoming less centered on a single dominant power. The post-World War II order created under strong American leadership faces pressure from nationalism, geopolitical rivalry, technological competition, economic fragmentation, and changing power relationships.
 
The United States has withdrawn from, challenged, or attempted to reshape some international institutions. Rather than relying exclusively on traditional multilateral organizations, American policy increasingly emphasizes bilateral negotiations, temporary coalitions, and transactional arrangements.
 
Other countries are responding by diversifying their diplomatic relationships. Middle powers such as India, Brazil, Turkey, Canada, and Australia have greater opportunities to maneuver between major powers. These governments often seek strategic flexibility rather than permanent alignment with Washington, Beijing, or Moscow.
 
The emerging system may not produce a single replacement for the U.S.-led international order. Instead, competing regional systems, economic networks, security coalitions, and diplomatic partnerships may operate simultaneously.
 
Middle powers could play an important role in maintaining international cooperation. However, their ability to constrain major powers remains uncertain, particularly when powerful states are willing to use military or economic pressure unilaterally.
 
=== U.S. Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy ===
 
American foreign policy is increasingly divided between competing visions of the country's role in the world. Liberal internationalists generally favor alliances, international institutions, diplomacy, and sustained global engagement. Nationalist and America First approaches emphasize sovereignty, economic protection, military strength, and transactional relationships.
 
Advocates of restraint argue that the United States should reduce military commitments, limit overseas deployments, and establish a higher threshold for intervention. Other strategists support selective engagement focused on major threats and areas of direct national interest.
 
The Trump administration's foreign policy has emphasized unpredictability, coercive bargaining, tariffs, military pressure, and demands that allies assume greater responsibility. Supporters view this strategy as a necessary response to countries that benefited from American protection without contributing enough to collective security.
 
Critics argue that deliberate disruption may reduce American influence by encouraging allies and adversaries to develop alternatives to U.S.-controlled financial, technological, and security networks.
 
Public opinion remains complex. Although Americans frequently express concerns about foreign interventions and international burdens, surveys indicate continued support for alliances, trade, and some forms of international leadership.
 
The long-term direction of American grand strategy may depend on whether policymakers can develop an approach between unrestricted global intervention and complete withdrawal from international leadership.
 
=== China, Technology, and Great-Power Competition ===
 
Competition between the United States and China is a central feature of the changing international system. The two countries are competing over military power, artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing, critical minerals, scientific research, trade, and influence in global institutions.
 
China is expanding its diplomatic and institutional influence as the United States reduces its involvement in some international organizations. American withdrawal from institutions such as UNESCO may create opportunities for Beijing to shape international standards involving education, culture, science, and technology.
 
Technology restrictions are another major source of competition. The United States has attempted to limit China's access to advanced technologies and critical components. Some researchers question whether increasingly strict controls will slow Chinese development or encourage greater technological self-reliance.
 
Critical minerals are also becoming a strategic concern. Washington is working with partners to reduce dependence on Chinese-controlled supply chains for minerals used in defense systems, batteries, electronics, and advanced manufacturing.


[https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/jul/10/nato-summit-trump-power | Robert Reich | The Guardian | July 10, 2026]
Military competition remains particularly sensitive around Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific. Diplomacy, deterrence, and crisis communication are essential because miscalculation could produce a direct confrontation between two nuclear-armed powers.


The article argues that President Trump’s willingness to disregard diplomatic conventions gives him unusual leverage but damages NATO, international institutions, and trust in American leadership.
The future of U.S.-China relations could range from managed competition to deeper economic and technological separation. Much will depend on whether both governments can protect national interests while creating mechanisms to prevent accidental escalation.


=====Once Again Trump Brought His Wrecking Ball to the NATO Summit=====
=== Economic Statecraft, Trade, and Strategic Resources ===


[https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/jul/10/trump-wrecking-ball-nato-summit-alliance-survived | Simon Tisdall | The Guardian | July 10, 2026]
Economic policy and national security are increasingly interconnected. Tariffs, sanctions, export controls, industrial subsidies, supply-chain policies, and critical-mineral strategies are now frequently treated as instruments of geopolitical power.


NATO survived another turbulent summit, but uncertainty about American reliability is encouraging European governments to prepare for greater strategic independence.
The United States has used access to its markets, financial system, technology, and international networks to influence other governments. Aggressive economic coercion, however, can encourage countries to reduce their dependence on American-controlled systems.


=====Trump Tackles FIFA, NATO, and Iran=====
Strategic autonomy has therefore become an economic as well as a military objective. Governments are investing in domestic manufacturing, alternative payment systems, energy security, critical minerals, and regional supply chains.


[https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-tackles-fifa-nato-iran-2026-07-09/ | Reuters Staff | Reuters | July 10, 2026]
Legal and constitutional disputes also affect economic statecraft. Debates over presidential tariff authority illustrate tensions between executive power, congressional authority, international commerce, and national-security policy.


The report examines how disputes involving NATO, Iran, Greenland, Spain, and even the World Cup reflected the confrontational style of contemporary American foreign policy.
A major question is whether the United States must choose between America First economic policies and rules-based global economic cooperation. Some analysts argue that national economic interests can be protected while maintaining international institutions and predictable trade rules.


=====Despite Trump’s Europe-Baiting, the NATO Summit Went Rather Well=====
=== Military Power, Nuclear Strategy, and Defense ===


[https://www.thetimes.com/comment/the-times-view/article/despite-trumps-europe-baiting-the-nato-summit-went-rather-well-3c6x0m9n7 | Editorial Board | The Times | July 10, 2026]
Military power remains one of the strongest foundations of American international influence. The United States maintains extensive alliances, overseas forces, advanced military technology, and a large nuclear arsenal.


Despite inflammatory rhetoric, the summit produced new defense commitments and demonstrated that Europe continues to depend heavily on American weapons and military technology.
Changing defense priorities increasingly emphasize homeland security, regional defense, China, and strategic competition rather than the counterterrorism operations that dominated the early twenty-first century.


=====Five Takeaways From Europe’s Rupture With the United States=====
Questions about the reliability of American security guarantees are also influencing nuclear strategy. Some analysts warn that allies could eventually consider developing independent nuclear capabilities if they lose confidence in U.S. protection.


[https://www.wsj.com/world/five-takeaways-from-the-wsjs-behind-the-scenes-reporting-on-europes-crisis-with-the-u-s-a7b916a1 | Wall Street Journal Staff | The Wall Street Journal | July 10, 2026]
The weakening of international arms-control systems presents additional risks. Renewed nuclear competition could increase the danger of arms races and strategic miscalculation.


European and Canadian leaders are investing in independent defense, space, artificial-intelligence, and technological capabilities as they reconsider their reliance on Washington.
Despite these dangers, arms-control negotiations remain possible. Historical experience suggests that geopolitical crises sometimes create political opportunities for renewed diplomatic agreements.


=====NATO’s Rutte Says Alliance Reunited After Trump Quarrel=====
American military power is substantial but not unlimited. Simultaneous commitments in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East can place pressure on defense resources, weapons inventories, military personnel, and political attention.


[https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/natos-rutte-brushes-off-disputes-between-trump-allies-2026-07-08/ | Reuters Staff | Reuters | July 9, 2026]
=== Foreign Aid, Democracy Support, and Development ===


NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte argued that the alliance’s ability to reconcile public disagreements demonstrated resilience rather than permanent division.
Foreign assistance has historically been an important component of American influence. Development programs, democracy assistance, humanitarian aid, and educational initiatives create relationships that may last for generations.


=====Pentagon Seeks to Rally Latin America Behind a New Monroe Doctrine=====
Reductions in American foreign assistance are changing the international development system. Governments, foundations, and private organizations are attempting to replace some lost programs, but the emerging network remains fragmented and often underfunded.


[https://www.reuters.com/world/pentagon-seeks-rally-latin-america-behind-new-monroe-doctrine-2026-07-08/ | Reuters Staff | Reuters | July 9, 2026]
Some policymakers favor a more transactional approach to development assistance. Under this model, aid is closely connected to commercial agreements, access to strategic resources, migration policy, or diplomatic cooperation.


The administration is promoting a renewed assertion of American primacy in the Western Hemisphere while seeking regional cooperation against narcotics trafficking, migration, and Chinese influence.
Others argue that long-term development partnerships produce greater strategic benefits. Investments in health, infrastructure, education, accountable government, and economic growth can strengthen relationships without requiring immediate political concessions.


=====Trump Tells NATO Leaders He Wants the United States to Remain=====
Debates over democracy and development are particularly important in Africa and other rapidly growing regions. Commercial engagement and support for accountable institutions do not necessarily have to be competing objectives.


[https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/trump-told-nato-leaders-he-wants-keep-us-alliance-source-says-2026-07-08/ | Reuters Staff | Reuters | July 8, 2026]
Foreign aid therefore represents more than humanitarian spending. It can also serve as an instrument of diplomacy, reputation, economic partnership, and long-term strategic influence.


Trump reportedly reassured NATO leaders that the United States intended to remain in the alliance after months of threats and uncertainty.
=== Artificial Intelligence and Geopolitical Power ===


=====Network and Structural Power: Four Trends Weakening U.S. Leverage=====
Artificial intelligence is emerging as a new source of international power. Advanced AI could affect scientific research, economic productivity, military planning, intelligence, diplomacy, and national competitiveness.


[https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/07/network-and-structural-power-the-four-trend-lines-weakening-us-leverage | Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | July 7, 2026]
Countries that develop powerful AI systems may gain significant advantages in innovation and strategic decision-making. The distribution of computing resources, advanced chips, energy, scientific expertise, and data could therefore influence the future balance of power.


The authors contend that increasingly aggressive American economic coercion is producing fewer concessions while encouraging allies to reduce their dependence on U.S.-controlled networks.
Research also indicates that artificial-intelligence systems may produce different recommendations when evaluating military escalation, alliances, intervention, and diplomatic cooperation. The use of AI in foreign-policy decision-making raises important questions about accountability and strategic risk.


=====Rahm Emanuel Assails Netanyahu as American Politics Shift on Israel=====
Alliances may become increasingly important in the AI era. Shared standards, interoperable systems, scientific cooperation, and technology partnerships could help democratic countries maintain influence.


[https://apnews.com/article/60357c348e611a93a70949f5e69fce6e | Associated Press Staff | Associated Press | July 7, 2026]
The competition over artificial intelligence is not limited to the United States and China. Countries able to build research institutions, attract talent, and create unexpected interdisciplinary innovations may influence the direction of future technological development.


Emanuel’s criticism of Israel’s government illustrates growing divisions in the United States over military aid, settlements, Gaza, and the future of the bilateral relationship.
=== Changing Global Power and International Relations ===


=====As the United States Steps Out of UNESCO, China Steps Up=====
The distribution of global power is changing. Many Americans believe the influence of the United States is declining while China and other countries are gaining international weight.


[https://www.brookings.edu/articles/as-the-us-steps-out-of-unesco-china-steps-up/ | Brookings Staff | Brookings Institution | July 7, 2026]
The United States is responding in several ways. American policy increasingly emphasizes strategic competition, the Western Hemisphere, critical resources, economic security, and demands for greater contributions from allies.


America’s withdrawal from UNESCO could create additional opportunities for China to influence international education, culture, science, and technology policy.
A renewed focus on the Western Hemisphere reflects concerns about migration, narcotics trafficking, regional political instability, and China's growing economic influence in Latin America.


=====Will American Power in Europe Run Out?=====
At the same time, countries around the world are questioning whether Washington remains a predictable partner. Declining confidence in American institutions and political leadership may accelerate efforts to diversify defense, trade, and diplomatic relationships.


[https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/07/will-american-power-in-europe-run-out | Stephen Wertheim | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | July 7, 2026]
These developments do not necessarily mean the immediate end of American global power. The United States retains military alliances, technological capabilities, major financial institutions, leading universities, cultural influence, and an enormous economy.


The traditional transatlantic bargain is changing, but American power in Europe may evolve into a more balanced partnership rather than disappear completely.
The more significant question is how these sources of power will be used. Coercive strategies may produce rapid concessions but also encourage long-term resistance. Alliances and multilateral cooperation can increase American influence but require compromise and sustained commitments.


=====NATO Gets High Marks From Member States=====
=== Conclusion ===


[https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/07/06/nato-gets-high-marks-from-member-states/ | Richard Wike and Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | July 6, 2026]
American foreign policy and global standing are entering a period of profound transformation. NATO and other alliances remain important, but partners are preparing for a world in which U.S. commitments may be less predictable and American dominance less complete.


Surveys show that NATO remains broadly popular in many member countries even as doubts persist about U.S. leadership and the alliance’s future direction.
Declining trust in American leadership is encouraging European governments, middle powers, and developing nations to diversify their relationships. China is seeking greater influence in technology, global institutions, trade, and diplomacy, while other states pursue strategic autonomy.


=====NATO Chief Faces Challenge as Trump Demands Loyalty=====
Military strength remains central to American power, but economic networks, alliances, scientific leadership, cultural influence, foreign assistance, and international legitimacy are equally important. Overreliance on military or economic coercion could weaken the networks that have historically expanded American influence.


[https://apnews.com/article/f8379b038dfbbf7afde80bb50a0bd96e | Lorne Cook | Associated Press | July 5, 2026]
The emerging international system is likely to be more multipolar, competitive, and fragmented. The central debate for the United States is no longer simply whether to lead or withdraw. It is how to exercise power effectively in a world where allies demand greater independence, competitors possess growing capabilities, and international cooperation remains necessary to address shared challenges.


NATO leaders face the challenge of satisfying demands for higher military spending while protecting the alliance from disputes over Iran, Greenland, Ukraine, and trade.
The future of American global standing will depend on whether the United States can combine national strength with diplomacy, credible alliances, technological leadership, and the ability to maintain international trust.


=====Trump Won Spending Promises From NATO—Now He Wants Enforcement=====
__TOC__
```


[https://apnews.com/article/8d994efb518c6a8538cbe3c6ac539147 | Associated Press Staff | Associated Press | July 6, 2026]


The United States is pressing NATO governments to fulfill ambitious defense-spending promises while shifting more responsibility for European security to Europe.


=====Why America Cannot Remain a Global Power=====


[https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/07/03/why-america-cannot-remain-a-global-power-the-choice-coming-after-2027/ | Modern Diplomacy Staff | Modern Diplomacy | July 3, 2026]


The essay argues that simultaneous challenges involving China, Russia, Europe, and the Middle East could exceed America’s political and military capacity.
=== Alliances, NATO, and Transatlantic Relations ===


=====Europe’s No-Panic Playbook for a Radically Different U.S. Foreign Policy=====
=====The NATO Summit Exposed the Real Source of Trump’s Power=====


[https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/europes-no-panic-playbook-for-a-radically-different-us-foreign-policy/ | Atlantic Council Staff | Atlantic Council | July 2, 2026]
[https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/jul/10/nato-summit-trump-power | Robert Reich | The Guardian | July 10, 2026]


European governments are advised to expand their independent capabilities without abandoning NATO or unnecessarily accelerating a break with Washington.
The article argues that President Trump’s willingness to disregard diplomatic conventions gives him unusual leverage but damages NATO, international institutions, and trust in American leadership.


=====Europe Should Take the Long Bet on the United States=====
=====Once Again Trump Brought His Wrecking Ball to the NATO Summit=====


[https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/europe-should-take-the-long-bet-on-the-us-and-the-transatlantic-security-relationship/ | Atlantic Council Staff | Atlantic Council | July 2, 2026]
[https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/jul/10/trump-wrecking-ball-nato-summit-alliance-survived | Simon Tisdall | The Guardian | July 10, 2026]


The article argues that substantial American public support for NATO and global engagement provides a foundation for repairing the transatlantic relationship.
NATO survived another turbulent summit, but uncertainty about American reliability is encouraging European governments to prepare for greater strategic independence.


=====Nuclear Weapons and the Future of American Power=====
=====Trump Tackles FIFA, NATO, and Iran=====


[https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/07/nuclear-weapons-and-the-future-of-american-power | Carnegie Endowment Staff | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | July 2, 2026]
[https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-tackles-fifa-nato-iran-2026-07-09/ | Reuters Staff | Reuters | July 10, 2026]


The weakening arms-control system creates serious dangers but does not eliminate the possibility of renewed negotiations following future geopolitical shocks.
The report examines how disputes involving NATO, Iran, Greenland, Spain, and even the World Cup reflected the confrontational style of contemporary American foreign policy.


=====Comparing How Americans and Others View the U.S. Global Role=====
=====Despite Trump’s Europe-Baiting, the NATO Summit Went Rather Well=====


[https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/06/23/comparing-how-americans-and-others-around-the-world-view-the-united-states-global-role/ | Richard Wike, Laura Silver, Moira Fagan, and Jonathan Schulman | Pew Research Center | June 23, 2026]
[https://www.thetimes.com/comment/the-times-view/article/despite-trumps-europe-baiting-the-nato-summit-went-rather-well-3c6x0m9n7 | Editorial Board | The Times | July 10, 2026]


International respondents are much less likely than Americans to believe that the United States promotes peace or considers the interests of other nations.
Despite inflammatory rhetoric, the summit produced new defense commitments and demonstrated that Europe continues to depend heavily on American weapons and military technology.


=====Trump Gets Negative Reviews as Fewer See the U.S. as Reliable=====
=====Five Takeaways From Europe’s Rupture With the United States=====


[https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/06/23/trump-gets-negative-reviews-internationally-as-fewer-say-u-s-is-a-reliable-partner/ | Richard Wike, Laura Silver, Moira Fagan, and Jonathan Schulman | Pew Research Center | June 23, 2026]
[https://www.wsj.com/world/five-takeaways-from-the-wsjs-behind-the-scenes-reporting-on-europes-crisis-with-the-u-s-a7b916a1 | Wall Street Journal Staff | The Wall Street Journal | July 10, 2026]


A multinational survey documents declining confidence in the United States, its president, its democratic institutions, and its reliability as an international partner.
European and Canadian leaders are investing in independent defense, space, artificial-intelligence, and technological capabilities as they reconsider their reliance on Washington.


=====European Views of Trump and the United States Are Especially Negative=====
=====NATO’s Rutte Says Alliance Reunited After Trump Quarrel=====


[https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/06/23/european-views-of-trump-and-the-u-s-are-especially-negative/ | Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | June 23, 2026]
[https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/natos-rutte-brushes-off-disputes-between-trump-allies-2026-07-08/ | Reuters Staff | Reuters | July 9, 2026]


Confidence in American leadership has fallen sharply across numerous European countries, reinforcing concerns about the future of transatlantic cooperation.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte argued that the alliance’s ability to reconcile public disagreements demonstrated resilience rather than permanent division.


=====In Middle-Income Nations, Most Say the U.S. Interferes Abroad=====
=====Trump Tells NATO Leaders He Wants the United States to Remain=====


[https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/06/23/in-middle-income-nations-most-say-the-u-s-interferes-in-other-countries-affairs/ | Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | June 23, 2026]
[https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/trump-told-nato-leaders-he-wants-keep-us-alliance-source-says-2026-07-08/ | Reuters Staff | Reuters | July 8, 2026]


Many respondents in middle-income countries believe Washington interferes in other nations’ affairs and does not adequately consider their interests.
Trump reportedly reassured NATO leaders that the United States intended to remain in the alliance after months of threats and uncertainty.


=====How Do Views of Trump Compare With Other Global Leaders?=====
=====Network and Structural Power: Four Trends Weakening U.S. Leverage=====


[https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/06/23/how-do-views-of-trump-compare-with-other-global-leaders/ | Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | June 23, 2026]
[https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/07/network-and-structural-power-the-four-trend-lines-weakening-us-leverage | Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | July 7, 2026]


International confidence in the American president trails that of several other major global leaders, although opinions vary substantially by country.
The authors contend that increasingly aggressive American economic coercion is producing fewer concessions while encouraging allies to reduce their dependence on U.S.-controlled networks.


=====China Sets Out Its Vision for a New Global Order=====
=====Will American Power in Europe Run Out?=====


[https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/06/china-sets-out-its-vision-new-global-order-will-it-commit-resources-match-its-ambition | Chatham House Staff | Chatham House | June 24, 2026]
[https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/07/will-american-power-in-europe-run-out | Stephen Wertheim | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | July 7, 2026]


China is presenting an alternative vision of global governance as the United States retreats from or challenges parts of the existing international system.
The traditional transatlantic bargain is changing, but American power in Europe may evolve into a more balanced partnership rather than disappear completely.


=====Retreat, Rebel, Replace, or Reform? Multilateralism Under Trump=====
=====NATO Gets High Marks From Member States=====


[https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/06/retreat-rebel-replace-or-reform-making-sense-of-multilateralism-under-trump-20 | Stewart Patrick | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | June 16, 2026]
[https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/07/06/nato-gets-high-marks-from-member-states/ | Richard Wike and Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | July 6, 2026]


The administration’s approach combines withdrawal from some institutions with efforts to reshape, bypass, or replace others through more personalized arrangements.
Surveys show that NATO remains broadly popular in many member countries even as doubts persist about U.S. leadership and the alliance’s future direction.


=====The End of Trans-Atlanticism=====
=====Trump Won Spending Promises From NATO—Now He Wants Enforcement=====


[https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/06/15/trans-atlanticism-europe-united-states-mark-carney-davos-nato/ | Foreign Policy Staff | Foreign Policy | June 15, 2026]
[https://apnews.com/article/8d994efb518c6a8538cbe3c6ac539147 | Associated Press Staff | Associated Press | July 6, 2026]


The article argues that the political, economic, and ideological conditions that sustained the postwar transatlantic partnership have largely disappeared.
The United States is pressing NATO governments to fulfill ambitious defense-spending promises while shifting more responsibility for European security to Europe.


=====Global Governance in the Twenty-First Century=====
=====NATO Chief Faces Challenge as Trump Demands Loyalty=====


[https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/06/global-governance-in-the-twenty-first-century-sustain-reform-transform | Stewart Patrick and Carnegie Endowment Staff | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | June 11, 2026]
[https://apnews.com/article/f8379b038dfbbf7afde80bb50a0bd96e | Lorne Cook | Associated Press | July 5, 2026]


The report explores how multilateral institutions can be maintained, reformed, or transformed amid nationalism, geopolitical competition, inequality, technology, and climate change.
NATO leaders face the challenge of satisfying demands for higher military spending while protecting the alliance from disputes over Iran, Greenland, Ukraine, and trade.


=====What Comes After Global Order=====
=====Europe’s No-Panic Playbook for a Radically Different U.S. Foreign Policy=====


[https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/06/10/global-order-china-united-states-ordering/ | Foreign Policy Staff | Foreign Policy | June 10, 2026]
[https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/europes-no-panic-playbook-for-a-radically-different-us-foreign-policy/ | Atlantic Council Staff | Atlantic Council | July 2, 2026]


Rather than replacing one fixed international order with another, the world may be entering a continuous struggle among competing systems and coalitions.
European governments are advised to expand their independent capabilities without abandoning NATO or unnecessarily accelerating a break with Washington.


=====U.S. Power Is Wrung Out=====
=====Europe Should Take the Long Bet on the United States=====


[https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/06/09/iran-war-trump-china-united-states-military-defense-weapons-geopolitics-strategy-taiwan/ | Foreign Policy Staff | Foreign Policy | June 9, 2026]
[https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/europe-should-take-the-long-bet-on-the-us-and-the-transatlantic-security-relationship/ | Atlantic Council Staff | Atlantic Council | July 2, 2026]


Military commitments in the Middle East could deplete American resources needed to deter China and manage other strategic challenges.
The article argues that substantial American public support for NATO and global engagement provides a foundation for repairing the transatlantic relationship.


=====Don’t Give Up on Global Order=====
=====European Views of Trump and the United States Are Especially Negative=====


[https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/dont-give-global-order | Robert Kagan | Foreign Affairs | June 9, 2026]
[https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/06/23/european-views-of-trump-and-the-u-s-are-especially-negative/ | Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | June 23, 2026]


The essay defends sustained American leadership and argues that abandoning the international order would impose larger costs than maintaining it.
Confidence in American leadership has fallen sharply across numerous European countries, reinforcing concerns about the future of transatlantic cooperation.


=====Friendly Proliferation=====
=====The End of Trans-Atlanticism=====


[https://www.csis.org/analysis/friendly-proliferation | CSIS Staff | Center for Strategic and International Studies | June 9, 2026]
[https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/06/15/trans-atlanticism-europe-united-states-mark-carney-davos-nato/ | Foreign Policy Staff | Foreign Policy | June 15, 2026]


Declining allied trust in American security guarantees is fueling debate over whether additional U.S. partners may eventually seek nuclear weapons.
The article argues that the political, economic, and ideological conditions that sustained the postwar transatlantic partnership have largely disappeared.


=====The NATO Ankara Summit: “NATO 3.0” in Practice=====
=====The NATO Ankara Summit: “NATO 3.0” in Practice=====
Line 196: Line 274:


Greater European burden-sharing could strengthen NATO, but continued perceptions of U.S. unreliability may encourage strategic and industrial separation.
Greater European burden-sharing could strengthen NATO, but continued perceptions of U.S. unreliability may encourage strategic and industrial separation.
=====Post-U.S. International Democracy Support=====
[https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/06/post-us-international-democracy-support-aspiration-in-search-of-substance | Thomas Carothers | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | June 8, 2026]
Governments and private organizations are attempting to replace lost American democracy assistance, but the emerging system remains fragmented and underfunded.


=====The Transatlantic Crucible=====
=====The Transatlantic Crucible=====
Line 220: Line 292:


The United States is asking Indo-Pacific partners to assume more responsibility for deterring China while Washington expands its own military investments.
The United States is asking Indo-Pacific partners to assume more responsibility for deterring China while Washington expands its own military investments.
=====Strategic Stalemates in the U.S.-China Artificial-Intelligence Race=====
[https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.23475 | Jingwen Liu and Jyh-An Lee | arXiv | May 22, 2026]
The paper questions whether increasingly strict American technology controls will slow China or instead accelerate Chinese self-reliance and innovation.
=====After the Rupture: The Reordering of the World=====
[https://www.cfr.org/event/after-the-rupture-the-reordering-of-the-world | Council on Foreign Relations Staff | Council on Foreign Relations | May 19, 2026]
Foreign-policy leaders discuss middle powers, transactional diplomacy, institutional fragmentation, and the redistribution of influence in a less U.S.-centered world.


=====Fighting Without Friends=====
=====Fighting Without Friends=====
Line 244: Line 304:


NATO and other alliances must adapt to declining American predominance rather than being treated as either permanent assets or obsolete liabilities.
NATO and other alliances must adapt to declining American predominance rather than being treated as either permanent assets or obsolete liabilities.
=====In Diplomacy, Pomp Matters—Especially When Trump Goes to China=====
[https://apnews.com/article/trump-china-xi-ceremony-diplomacy-4e90fbc4bac7db9285f04d23b9321ff7 | Associated Press Staff | Associated Press | May 12, 2026]
China’s ceremonial treatment of American leaders illustrates how symbolism, prestige, and carefully staged public events can influence high-level diplomacy.


=====Trump’s Feuds With Allies May Outlast the Iran War=====
=====Trump’s Feuds With Allies May Outlast the Iran War=====
Line 262: Line 316:


A multinational survey found a dramatic decline in views of the United States following disputes over tariffs, alliances, Iran, Ukraine, and Greenland.
A multinational survey found a dramatic decline in views of the United States following disputes over tariffs, alliances, Iran, Ukraine, and Greenland.
=====Trump’s War Exposes the Weakness of Middle Powers=====
[https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/05/04/middle-powers-geopolitics-global-order-trump-war-iran-china/ | Foreign Policy Staff | Foreign Policy | May 4, 2026]
The article questions whether middle powers can collectively shape international outcomes when major powers remain willing to act unilaterally.
=====Most Americans Say U.S. Foreign Policy Ignores Other Countries=====
[https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/04/28/most-americans-now-say-u-s-foreign-policy-ignores-the-interests-of-other-countries/ | Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | April 28, 2026]
A growing share of Americans believes foreign policy does not adequately account for other countries’ interests or the requirements of international cooperation.
=====Which Countries Do Americans Think Are Gaining Influence?=====
[https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/04/28/what-countries-do-americans-think-are-gaining-and-losing-influence-in-todays-world/ | Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | April 28, 2026]
Americans increasingly perceive their country’s influence as weakening while China and several other powers gain greater international weight.


=====The Iran War Shows the Limits of U.S. Power=====
=====The Iran War Shows the Limits of U.S. Power=====
Line 292: Line 328:


Survey evidence indicates that alliances, trade, and international engagement retain broad public support despite partisan conflict over specific policies.
Survey evidence indicates that alliances, trade, and international engagement retain broad public support despite partisan conflict over specific policies.
=====When Economic Security Meets Economic Statecraft=====
[https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PEA4700/PEA4706-2/RAND_PEA4706-2.pdf | RAND Corporation Staff | RAND Corporation | April 13, 2026]
The report examines how national-security concerns, trade restrictions, industrial policy, sanctions, and supply-chain management are becoming increasingly interconnected.


=====Deepening Strategic Alignment in the U.S.-Japan Alliance=====
=====Deepening Strategic Alignment in the U.S.-Japan Alliance=====
Line 311: Line 341:
Renewed threats to leave NATO intensified concerns about the durability of American security commitments and the future of collective defense.
Renewed threats to leave NATO intensified concerns about the durability of American security commitments and the future of collective defense.


=====India and a Changing Global Order=====
=====The Postliberal Superpower=====
 
[https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/postliberal-superpower | Foreign Affairs Staff | Foreign Affairs | March 9, 2026]
 
The article analyzes how nationalist and postliberal ideas are reshaping American defense strategy, alliances, values, and the definition of national interest.
 
=====U.S. Policy Shifts and the Future of the Transatlantic Alliance=====


[https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/03/india-and-a-changing-global-order-foreign-policy-in-the-trump-2-0-era | Carnegie Endowment Staff | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | March 25, 2026]
[https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/us-policy-shifts-and-future-transatlantic-alliance | Rice University Baker Institute Staff | Baker Institute for Public Policy | March 3, 2026]


India is balancing cooperation with Washington against trade disputes, Russian ties, strategic autonomy, and an increasingly multipolar international environment.
Pressure over Greenland, tariffs, NATO, and regional priorities could permanently damage the alliance while benefiting Russia and China.


=====The World After Trump=====
=====China Leads Scientific Trends While the West Launches New Ones=====


[https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/23/introducing-the-spring-2026-print-issue/ | Ravi Agrawal | Foreign Policy | March 23, 2026]
[https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.01117 | Jeffrey W. Lockhart, Jamshid Sourati, Feng Shi, and James Evans | arXiv | March 1, 2026]


The issue examines how countries, institutions, and political movements are preparing for an international system transformed by Trump’s foreign policy.
China increasingly leads research in rapidly emerging fields, while the United States and Europe retain strength in creating unexpected interdisciplinary directions.


=====The Role of Diplomacy in Managing Cross-Strait Relations=====
=====Trump’s 2026 State of the Union: Foreign Policy Issue Guide=====


[https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-role-of-diplomacy-in-us-management-of-cross-strait-relations/ | Brookings Institution Staff | Brookings Institution | March 20, 2026]
[https://www.cfr.org/articles/trumps-2026-state-of-the-union-foreign-policy-issue-guide | Council on Foreign Relations Staff | Council on Foreign Relations | February 23, 2026]


Careful diplomacy can strengthen deterrence around Taiwan while reducing miscalculation, escalation, and the risk of a direct U.S.-China conflict.
The guide reviews major changes in trade, immigration, national security, alliances, China policy, and the administration’s broader America First agenda.


=====Strategic, Not Transactional: Development Cooperation and U.S. Interests=====
=====Testing Assumptions About U.S. Foreign Policy in 2026=====


[https://www.cgdev.org/publication/strategic-not-transactional-using-development-cooperation-advance-economic-and-national | Center for Global Development Staff | Center for Global Development | March 18, 2026]
[https://www.stimson.org/2026/testing-assumptions-about-us-foreign-policy-in-2026/ | Stimson Center Staff | Stimson Center | February 12, 2026]


The authors argue that development assistance should advance long-term strategic relationships rather than function primarily as a short-term transactional bargaining tool.
Experts examine uncertain assumptions surrounding alliances, China, Ukraine, Iran, military power, and the future direction of American grand strategy.


=====The Postliberal Superpower=====
=====Is Trump Reshaping the World Order?=====


[https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/postliberal-superpower | Foreign Affairs Staff | Foreign Affairs | March 9, 2026]
[https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-trump-reshaping-the-world-order/ | Brookings Institution Scholars | Brookings Institution | February 2, 2026]


The article analyzes how nationalist and postliberal ideas are reshaping American defense strategy, alliances, values, and the definition of national interest.
Brookings scholars assess how tariffs, institutional withdrawals, pressure on allies, reduced foreign aid, and unilateral actions are changing the international system.


=====Embracing “Cuspness” in an Emerging Multipolar World=====
=====How the World Is Seeing the United States as 2026 Begins=====


[https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2026/03/embracing-cuspness-australian-strategy-in-an-emerging.html | RAND Corporation Staff | RAND Corporation | March 5, 2026]
[https://www.cfr.org/articles/how-the-world-is-seeing-the-united-states-as-2026-begins | Council on Foreign Relations Experts | Council on Foreign Relations | January 23, 2026]


Australia may respond to intensifying great-power competition by maintaining flexibility between regions and pursuing a more transactional form of strategic autonomy.
Experts describe how governments are reacting to rapid American policy changes involving trade, territory, alliances, international institutions, and military commitments.


=====U.S. Policy Shifts and the Future of the Transatlantic Alliance=====
=====Trump’s European Threats Could Cause Lasting Damage=====


[https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/us-policy-shifts-and-future-transatlantic-alliance | Rice University Baker Institute Staff | Baker Institute for Public Policy | March 3, 2026]
[https://apnews.com/article/trump-nato-europe-greenland-denmark-627268004024f111097d7e1c5c2da357 | Associated Press Staff | Associated Press | January 22, 2026]


Pressure over Greenland, tariffs, NATO, and regional priorities could permanently damage the alliance while benefiting Russia and China.
Threats involving Greenland, tariffs, and NATO have encouraged European countries and Canada to question Washington’s reliability and seek alternative partnerships.


=====Trump’s 2026 State of the Union: Foreign Policy Issue Guide=====
=====America Revived=====


[https://www.cfr.org/articles/trumps-2026-state-of-the-union-foreign-policy-issue-guide | Council on Foreign Relations Staff | Council on Foreign Relations | February 23, 2026]
[https://www.cfr.org/reports/america-revived | Robert Blackwill and Richard Fontaine | Council on Foreign Relations | January 20, 2026]


The guide reviews major changes in trade, immigration, national security, alliances, China policy, and the administration’s broader America First agenda.
The report proposes a grand strategy combining military strength, diplomacy, economic leadership, alliances, and renewed legitimacy in international institutions.


=====The Supreme Court Strikes Down Trump’s Global Tariffs=====
=====Greenland, Davos, and a Week That Could Redefine the Alliance=====


[https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/us-supreme-court-rejects-trumps-global-tariffs-2026-02-20/ | Reuters Staff | Reuters | February 20, 2026]
[https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/greenland-davos-and-a-week-that-could-redefine-the-transatlantic-alliance/ | Atlantic Council Staff | Atlantic Council | January 19, 2026]


The ruling limited presidential tariff authority and highlighted tensions between executive power, Congress, global commerce, and economic statecraft.
European leaders confronted difficult choices between accommodation and resistance as American territorial and tariff threats intensified.


=====Trump’s New 2026 Shock Doctrine=====
=====Trump’s Quest for Greenland Could Be NATO’s Darkest Hour=====


[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/400900268_Trump%27s_New_2026_Shock_Doctrine_War_Deals_and_Global_Chaos | ResearchGate Contributor | ResearchGate | February 19, 2026]
[https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/trumps-quest-for-greenland-could-be-natos-darkest-hour/ | Atlantic Council Staff | Atlantic Council | January 7, 2026]


The paper characterizes unpredictability, coercive bargaining, military pressure, and deliberate disruption as central features of the administration’s international strategy.
Pressure on Denmark over Greenland threatened to turn a territorial dispute into an unprecedented internal crisis for NATO.


=====Testing Assumptions About U.S. Foreign Policy in 2026=====
=====The Most Significant Question for Trump’s America in 2026=====


[https://www.stimson.org/2026/testing-assumptions-about-us-foreign-policy-in-2026/ | Stimson Center Staff | Stimson Center | February 12, 2026]
[https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/inflection-points/the-most-significant-question-for-trumps-america-in-2026-what-sticks/ | Frederick Kempe | Atlantic Council | January 5, 2026]


Experts examine uncertain assumptions surrounding alliances, China, Ukraine, Iran, military power, and the future direction of American grand strategy.
Trump’s policies have pushed allies toward higher military spending while simultaneously encouraging them to hedge against American unpredictability.


=====U.S. Critical-Minerals Trade Bloc Aims to Counter China=====
=====America and the World: Trump 2.0 Foreign Policy=====


[https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-hosts-countries-talks-weaken-chinas-grip-critical-minerals-2026-02-04/ | Reuters Staff | Reuters | February 4, 2026]
[https://fpa.org/topics/america-and-the-world-trump-2-0-foreign-policy/ | Foreign Policy Association Staff | Foreign Policy Association | 2026]


Washington is seeking coordinated trade rules and price protections to reduce China’s control over minerals essential to defense and advanced manufacturing.
This resource collection covers American grand strategy, international institutions, alliances, military power, economic policy, and alternative approaches to global leadership.


=====Is Trump Reshaping the World Order?=====
=====America Revived: A Grand Strategy of Resolute Global Leadership=====


[https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-trump-reshaping-the-world-order/ | Brookings Institution Scholars | Brookings Institution | February 2, 2026]
[https://www.cfr.org/event/council-special-report-launch-america-revived-grand-strategy-resolute-global-leadership | Council on Foreign Relations Staff | Council on Foreign Relations | 2026]


Brookings scholars assess how tariffs, institutional withdrawals, pressure on allies, reduced foreign aid, and unilateral actions are changing the international system.
Panelists debate a proposed strategy combining credible military power with alliances, diplomacy, economic influence, and international legitimacy.


=====The 2026 National Defense Strategy by the Numbers=====
=====The Future of American Leadership and the International Order=====


[https://www.csis.org/analysis/2026-national-defense-strategy-numbers-radical-changes-moderate-changes-and-some | Mark Cancian | Center for Strategic and International Studies | January 27, 2026]
[https://www.brookings.edu/projects/project-on-international-order-and-strategy/about/ | Brookings Institution Staff | Brookings Institution | 2026]


The analysis identifies major changes in defense priorities, including reduced emphasis on counterterrorism and increased attention to homeland and regional security.
The Brookings project studies changing power relationships, U.S. strategy, institutional competition, alliances, and opportunities for international cooperation.


=====Trump Is Demolishing the Global Order—What Might Replace It?=====
=====Security Alliances and Partnerships=====


[https://carnegieendowment.org/diversify-their-diplomatic-portfolios | Carnegie Endowment Staff | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | January 27, 2026]
[https://www.brookings.edu/topics/security-alliances-partnerships/ | Brookings Institution Staff | Brookings Institution | 2026]


Countries are responding to American unpredictability by diversifying trade, defense relationships, diplomatic partnerships, and supply chains.
This research collection examines NATO, Asian alliances, military assistance, burden-sharing, crisis management, and the role of partnerships in U.S. strategy.


=====Three Possible Pathways for U.S.-China Relations=====
=====Munich Security Conference 2026=====


[https://www.brookings.edu/articles/three-potential-pathways-for-us-china-relations-under-trump/ | Brookings Institution Staff | Brookings Institution | January 26, 2026]
[https://foreignpolicy.com/projects/munich-security-conference/ | Foreign Policy Staff | Foreign Policy | 2026]


The report outlines possibilities ranging from a managed accommodation to a hard strategic split or a prolonged effort by both sides to reduce vulnerability.
Reporting from the conference covers transatlantic tensions, Ukraine, China, defense spending, nuclear security, and international reactions to U.S. policy.


=====How the World Is Seeing the United States as 2026 Begins=====
=====American Views on Global Leadership=====


[https://www.cfr.org/articles/how-the-world-is-seeing-the-united-states-as-2026-begins | Council on Foreign Relations Experts | Council on Foreign Relations | January 23, 2026]
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sqPdF7NDO9o | Council on Foreign Relations | YouTube | 2026]


Experts describe how governments are reacting to rapid American policy changes involving trade, territory, alliances, international institutions, and military commitments.
Panelists discuss public opinion on alliances, trade, military engagement, national security, and America’s role in international affairs.


=====Dispatch From Davos: The Geopolitics of the New Realism=====
=====Six Trump Lessons for Global Leaders in 2026=====


[https://www.cfr.org/articles/dispatch-from-davos-the-geopolitics-of-the-new-realism | Michael Froman | Council on Foreign Relations | January 23, 2026]
[https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/12/29/trump-lessons-2026-china-india-europe-middle-east/ | Foreign Policy Contributors | Foreign Policy | December 29, 2025]


Davos participants increasingly viewed international relations through the lens of power, national resilience, strategic autonomy, and economic security.
International leaders learned to prepare for tariffs, transactional bargaining, downgraded alliances, sudden policy changes, and possible accommodation with American adversaries.


=====Trump’s European Threats Could Cause Lasting Damage=====
=====The 2025 National Security Strategy=====


[https://apnews.com/article/trump-nato-europe-greenland-denmark-627268004024f111097d7e1c5c2da357 | Associated Press Staff | Associated Press | January 22, 2026]
[https://missilethreat.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/National-Security-Strategy-2025.pdf | Executive Office of the President | United States Government | December 2025]


Threats involving Greenland, tariffs, and NATO have encouraged European countries and Canada to question Washington’s reliability and seek alternative partnerships.
The official strategy emphasizes American primacy in the Western Hemisphere, economic security, reduced burdens in Europe and the Middle East, and competition with China.


=====America Revived=====
=====A Year in Review: Foreign Policy in 2025=====


[https://www.cfr.org/reports/america-revived | Robert Blackwill and Richard Fontaine | Council on Foreign Relations | January 20, 2026]
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DAbYMUBPQYo | One Decision | YouTube | December 2025]


The report proposes a grand strategy combining military strength, diplomacy, economic leadership, alliances, and renewed legitimacy in international institutions.
Former officials and analysts review the year’s major developments involving alliances, China, Russia, Europe, the Middle East, and American global leadership.


=====The Middle Power Moment=====
=====Increasing the Value of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance=====


[https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/01/the-middle-power-moment | Stewart Patrick | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | January 20, 2026]
[https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/10/increasing-the-value-of-the-linchpin-alliance-between.html | RAND Corporation Staff | RAND Corporation | October 16, 2025]


Middle powers could help preserve international cooperation as American dominance recedes and the global system becomes more multipolar.
The alliance faces growing pressure to modernize its military, political, and economic foundations in response to North Korea, China, and doubts about American commitments.


=====Global Soft Power Index 2026: A Global Mood Shift=====
=====Transitioning Transatlantic Ties=====


[https://brandfinance.com/insights/global-soft-power-index-2026-executive-summary | Brand Finance Staff | Brand Finance | January 20, 2026]
[https://www.iiss.org/events/2025/10/transitioning-transatlantic-ties/ | International Institute for Strategic Studies Staff | IISS | October 9, 2025]


The United States remained the world’s most influential soft-power country but experienced significant declines across reputation, governance, relations, and trust measurements.
The discussion considers how European security and U.S. foreign policy are changing as both sides reconsider the traditional distribution of responsibilities.


=====Greenland, Davos, and a Week That Could Redefine the Alliance=====
=====Navigating Disruption: Allied Responses to U.S. Foreign Policy=====


[https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/greenland-davos-and-a-week-that-could-redefine-the-transatlantic-alliance/ | Atlantic Council Staff | Atlantic Council | January 19, 2026]
[https://features.csis.org/responses-to-US-foreign-policy/ | CSIS Contributors | Center for Strategic and International Studies | October 6, 2025]


European leaders confronted difficult choices between accommodation and resistance as American territorial and tariff threats intensified.
Eight case studies examine how allies and partners are coping with American tariffs, security demands, diplomatic unpredictability, and changing strategic priorities.


=====The Strategic Importance of U.S. Values-Based Soft Power=====
=====Transatlantic Relations Under Trump: An Uneasy Peace=====


[https://www.bushcenter.org/publications/the-strategic-importance-of-u-s-values-based-soft-power | George W. Bush Presidential Center Staff | George W. Bush Presidential Center | January 16, 2026]
[https://www.csis.org/analysis/transatlantic-relations-under-trump-uneasy-peace | Max Bergmann | Center for Strategic and International Studies | October 6, 2025]


International education, democratic values, culture, development assistance, and open institutions remain important sources of American influence beyond military power.
Europe has attempted to accommodate transactional American demands while gradually reducing its economic, technological, and military dependence on Washington.


=====Surveying Experts on the State of U.S.-China Relations=====
=====How NATO Allies Might Respond to a U.S. Withdrawal=====


[https://chinapower.csis.org/survey-experts-us-china-relations-2026/ | ChinaPower Project Staff | Center for Strategic and International Studies | January 13, 2026]
[https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA2800/RRA2807-2/RAND_RRA2807-2.pdf | RAND Corporation Researchers | RAND Corporation | June 18, 2025]


Experts assess the likelihood of cooperation, confrontation, economic separation, military crisis, and diplomatic stabilization between Washington and Beijing.
The report explores possible military, diplomatic, and institutional responses if Washington substantially reduces or ends its role in NATO.


=====The Fate of “America First”=====
=====Consequences of the Russia-Ukraine War=====


[https://www.foreignaffairs.com/americas/fate-america-first | Reid Smith | Foreign Affairs | January 9, 2026]
[https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RBA3141-1.html | RAND Corporation Staff | RAND Corporation | May 22, 2025]


The article examines whether military intervention and regime-change ambitions are compatible with promises to limit American involvement in foreign conflicts.
The war has changed NATO, European defense spending, Russian military power, global energy markets, and Washington’s strategic calculations.


=====Greenland, Rare Earths, and Arctic Security=====
=====The Realists’ Grand Experiment=====


[https://www.csis.org/analysis/greenland-rare-earths-and-arctic-security | CSIS Staff | Center for Strategic and International Studies | January 8, 2026]
[https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/04/the-realists-grand-experiment.html | RAND Corporation Staff | RAND Corporation | April 11, 2025]


Greenland’s strategic location and mineral resources place it at the intersection of Arctic security, economic competition, climate change, and U.S.-China rivalry.
A more restrained and transactional U.S. foreign policy could encourage allies to assume greater responsibility but might also reduce American influence over their actions.


=====Global Development Policy and the New World Disorder=====
=====The U.S.-Japan Alliance Under New Political Leadership=====


[https://www.idos-research.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/publikationen/Policy_Brief/2026/PB_2.2026.pdf | German Institute of Development and Sustainability Staff | IDOS | January 7, 2026]
[https://www.rand.org/events/2025/03/the-us-japan-alliance.html | RAND Corporation Staff | RAND Corporation | March 10, 2025]


Reductions in American development cooperation are weakening Washington’s agenda-setting power and accelerating changes in the international aid system.
American and Japanese experts discuss how leadership changes, regional security threats, trade, and technology may reshape the bilateral alliance.


=====Trump’s Quest for Greenland Could Be NATO’s Darkest Hour=====
=====Critical Foreign-Policy Decisions and Artificial Intelligence=====


[https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/trumps-quest-for-greenland-could-be-natos-darkest-hour/ | Atlantic Council Staff | Atlantic Council | January 7, 2026]
[https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.06263 | Benjamin Jensen and Others | arXiv | March 8, 2025]


Pressure on Denmark over Greenland threatened to turn a territorial dispute into an unprecedented internal crisis for NATO.
The study finds that artificial-intelligence systems differ significantly in recommendations involving escalation, intervention, cooperation, and alliance management.


=====The Most Significant Question for Trump’s America in 2026=====
=====Foreign-Policy Priorities for the Incoming Administration=====


[https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/inflection-points/the-most-significant-question-for-trumps-america-in-2026-what-sticks/ | Frederick Kempe | Atlantic Council | January 5, 2026]
[https://perryworldhouse.upenn.edu/events/foreign-policy-priorities-for-the-incoming-u-s-administration/ | Perry World House Staff | University of Pennsylvania | January 15, 2025]


Trump’s policies have pushed allies toward higher military spending while simultaneously encouraging them to hedge against American unpredictability.
Experts review the conflicts, alliances, democratic challenges, climate problems, and strategic competition awaiting the new administration.


=====A Middle Way for American Foreign Policy=====


[https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/middle-way-american-foreign-policy | Foreign Affairs Staff | Foreign Affairs | December 31, 2025]


The article proposes an approach between expansive liberal internationalism and unilateral America First nationalism.
=== American Global Standing, Reputation, and Soft Power ===


=====Six Trump Lessons for Global Leaders in 2026=====
=====Comparing How Americans and Others View the U.S. Global Role=====


[https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/12/29/trump-lessons-2026-china-india-europe-middle-east/ | Foreign Policy Contributors | Foreign Policy | December 29, 2025]
[https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/06/23/comparing-how-americans-and-others-around-the-world-view-the-united-states-global-role/ | Richard Wike, Laura Silver, Moira Fagan, and Jonathan Schulman | Pew Research Center | June 23, 2026]


International leaders learned to prepare for tariffs, transactional bargaining, downgraded alliances, sudden policy changes, and possible accommodation with American adversaries.
International respondents are much less likely than Americans to believe that the United States promotes peace or considers the interests of other nations.


=====Breaking Down Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy=====
=====In Middle-Income Nations, Most Say the U.S. Interferes Abroad=====


[https://www.brookings.edu/articles/breaking-down-trumps-2025-national-security-strategy/ | Brookings Institution Scholars | Brookings Institution | December 8, 2025]
[https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/06/23/in-middle-income-nations-most-say-the-u-s-interferes-in-other-countries-affairs/ | Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | June 23, 2026]


The strategy prioritizes the Western Hemisphere, economic nationalism, immigration enforcement, burden-shifting, and competition with China.
Many respondents in middle-income countries believe Washington interferes in other nations’ affairs and does not adequately consider their interests.


=====What Trump’s National Security Strategy Means for Foreign Policy=====
=====How Do Views of Trump Compare With Other Global Leaders?=====


[https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-what-trumps-national-security-strategy-means-for-us-foreign-policy/ | Atlantic Council Experts | Atlantic Council | December 5, 2025]
[https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/06/23/how-do-views-of-trump-compare-with-other-global-leaders/ | Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | June 23, 2026]


Experts analyze the strategy’s emphasis on economic statecraft, the Western Hemisphere, burden-sharing, national sovereignty, and selective international engagement.
International confidence in the American president trails that of several other major global leaders, although opinions vary substantially by country.


=====Increasing the Value of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance=====
=====Don’t Give Up on Global Order=====


[https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/10/increasing-the-value-of-the-linchpin-alliance-between.html | RAND Corporation Staff | RAND Corporation | October 16, 2025]
[https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/dont-give-global-order | Robert Kagan | Foreign Affairs | June 9, 2026]


The alliance faces growing pressure to modernize its military, political, and economic foundations in response to North Korea, China, and doubts about American commitments.
The essay defends sustained American leadership and argues that abandoning the international order would impose larger costs than maintaining it.


=====Transitioning Transatlantic Ties=====
=====Middle Powers Take Center Stage=====


[https://www.iiss.org/events/2025/10/transitioning-transatlantic-ties/ | International Institute for Strategic Studies Staff | IISS | October 9, 2025]
[https://www.cfr.org/articles/middle-powers-take-center-stage | Council on Foreign Relations Staff | Council on Foreign Relations | June 2026]


The discussion considers how European security and U.S. foreign policy are changing as both sides reconsider the traditional distribution of responsibilities.
Canada, India, Brazil, Turkey, and other middle powers are gaining room to maneuver as confidence in American leadership declines.


=====Navigating Disruption: Allied Responses to U.S. Foreign Policy=====
=====Global Soft Power Index 2026: A Global Mood Shift=====


[https://features.csis.org/responses-to-US-foreign-policy/ | CSIS Contributors | Center for Strategic and International Studies | October 6, 2025]
[https://brandfinance.com/insights/global-soft-power-index-2026-executive-summary | Brand Finance Staff | Brand Finance | January 20, 2026]


Eight case studies examine how allies and partners are coping with American tariffs, security demands, diplomatic unpredictability, and changing strategic priorities.
The United States remained the world’s most influential soft-power country but experienced significant declines across reputation, governance, relations, and trust measurements.


=====Transatlantic Relations Under Trump: An Uneasy Peace=====
=====The Strategic Importance of U.S. Values-Based Soft Power=====


[https://www.csis.org/analysis/transatlantic-relations-under-trump-uneasy-peace | Max Bergmann | Center for Strategic and International Studies | October 6, 2025]
[https://www.bushcenter.org/publications/the-strategic-importance-of-u-s-values-based-soft-power | George W. Bush Presidential Center Staff | George W. Bush Presidential Center | January 16, 2026]


Europe has attempted to accommodate transactional American demands while gradually reducing its economic, technological, and military dependence on Washington.
International education, democratic values, culture, development assistance, and open institutions remain important sources of American influence beyond military power.


=====The Decline of the West and the Rise of “the Rest”=====
=====The United States External Cultural-Policy Report=====


[https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2025-09/decline-west-and-rise-rest-will-lead-new-world-order | Amitav Acharya | Chatham House | September 15, 2025]
[https://www.ifa.de/en/publications/results/usa-ecp-country-report-2026/ | Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations Staff | ifa | 2026]


American withdrawal may produce a decentralized global order led increasingly by Asian and Global South countries rather than simple international collapse.
Cuts to foreign aid, public diplomacy, education, and cultural programs signal a shift from soft power toward military and economic coercion.


=====Making America Weak Again=====
=====Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index 2026=====


[https://skidmore.blog/2025/07/19/making-america-weak-again/ | David Skidmore | The Internationalist | July 19, 2025]
[https://static.brandirectory.com/reports/brand-finance-soft-power-index-2026-digital.pdf | Brand Finance Staff | Brand Finance | January 2026]


Declining international approval is presented as evidence that confrontational nationalism may weaken rather than strengthen American power.
The full index compares countries on familiarity, reputation, governance, culture, diplomacy, education, business, media, and international influence.


=====Three Summer Deadlines That Will Reveal Trump’s View of U.S. Power=====
=====Three Summer Deadlines That Will Reveal Trump’s View of U.S. Power=====
Line 563: Line 597:
Surveys across 24 nations found falling confidence in American leadership and widespread doubts about Trump’s handling of international affairs.
Surveys across 24 nations found falling confidence in American leadership and widespread doubts about Trump’s handling of international affairs.


=====How NATO Allies Might Respond to a U.S. Withdrawal=====


[https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA2800/RRA2807-2/RAND_RRA2807-2.pdf | RAND Corporation Researchers | RAND Corporation | June 18, 2025]


The report explores possible military, diplomatic, and institutional responses if Washington substantially reduces or ends its role in NATO.
=== Global Order, Multilateralism, and Middle Powers ===
 
=====Retreat, Rebel, Replace, or Reform? Multilateralism Under Trump=====
 
[https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/06/retreat-rebel-replace-or-reform-making-sense-of-multilateralism-under-trump-20 | Stewart Patrick | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | June 16, 2026]
 
The administration’s approach combines withdrawal from some institutions with efforts to reshape, bypass, or replace others through more personalized arrangements.
 
=====Global Governance in the Twenty-First Century=====
 
[https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/06/global-governance-in-the-twenty-first-century-sustain-reform-transform | Stewart Patrick and Carnegie Endowment Staff | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | June 11, 2026]
 
The report explores how multilateral institutions can be maintained, reformed, or transformed amid nationalism, geopolitical competition, inequality, technology, and climate change.
 
=====What Comes After Global Order=====
 
[https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/06/10/global-order-china-united-states-ordering/ | Foreign Policy Staff | Foreign Policy | June 10, 2026]
 
Rather than replacing one fixed international order with another, the world may be entering a continuous struggle among competing systems and coalitions.
 
=====After the Rupture: The Reordering of the World=====
 
[https://www.cfr.org/event/after-the-rupture-the-reordering-of-the-world | Council on Foreign Relations Staff | Council on Foreign Relations | May 19, 2026]
 
Foreign-policy leaders discuss middle powers, transactional diplomacy, institutional fragmentation, and the redistribution of influence in a less U.S.-centered world.
 
=====Trump’s War Exposes the Weakness of Middle Powers=====
 
[https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/05/04/middle-powers-geopolitics-global-order-trump-war-iran-china/ | Foreign Policy Staff | Foreign Policy | May 4, 2026]
 
The article questions whether middle powers can collectively shape international outcomes when major powers remain willing to act unilaterally.
 
=====India and a Changing Global Order=====
 
[https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/03/india-and-a-changing-global-order-foreign-policy-in-the-trump-2-0-era | Carnegie Endowment Staff | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | March 25, 2026]
 
India is balancing cooperation with Washington against trade disputes, Russian ties, strategic autonomy, and an increasingly multipolar international environment.
 
=====The World After Trump=====
 
[https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/23/introducing-the-spring-2026-print-issue/ | Ravi Agrawal | Foreign Policy | March 23, 2026]
 
The issue examines how countries, institutions, and political movements are preparing for an international system transformed by Trump’s foreign policy.
 
=====Embracing “Cuspness” in an Emerging Multipolar World=====
 
[https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2026/03/embracing-cuspness-australian-strategy-in-an-emerging.html | RAND Corporation Staff | RAND Corporation | March 5, 2026]
 
Australia may respond to intensifying great-power competition by maintaining flexibility between regions and pursuing a more transactional form of strategic autonomy.
 
=====Trump Is Demolishing the Global Order—What Might Replace It?=====
 
[https://carnegieendowment.org/diversify-their-diplomatic-portfolios | Carnegie Endowment Staff | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | January 27, 2026]
 
Countries are responding to American unpredictability by diversifying trade, defense relationships, diplomatic partnerships, and supply chains.


=====Consequences of the Russia-Ukraine War=====
=====The Middle Power Moment=====


[https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RBA3141-1.html | RAND Corporation Staff | RAND Corporation | May 22, 2025]
[https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/01/the-middle-power-moment | Stewart Patrick | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | January 20, 2026]


The war has changed NATO, European defense spending, Russian military power, global energy markets, and Washington’s strategic calculations.
Middle powers could help preserve international cooperation as American dominance recedes and the global system becomes more multipolar.


=====International Engagement and Support for Foreign Aid=====
=====Alternative Options for U.S. Policy Toward the International Order=====


[https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2025/05/01/international-engagement-and-support-for-foreign-aid/ | Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | May 1, 2025]
[https://www.rand.org/pubs/authors/m/mazarr_michael_j.html | Michael J. Mazarr and RAND Researchers | RAND Corporation | Updated 2026]


Most Americans support considering other countries’ interests, although opinions about foreign aid and international engagement remain divided by party.
RAND research compares American primacy, selective engagement, restraint, institutional reform, and other possible strategies for managing the international system.


=====The Realists’ Grand Experiment=====
=====The Decline of the West and the Rise of “the Rest”=====


[https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/04/the-realists-grand-experiment.html | RAND Corporation Staff | RAND Corporation | April 11, 2025]
[https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2025-09/decline-west-and-rise-rest-will-lead-new-world-order | Amitav Acharya | Chatham House | September 15, 2025]


A more restrained and transactional U.S. foreign policy could encourage allies to assume greater responsibility but might also reduce American influence over their actions.
American withdrawal may produce a decentralized global order led increasingly by Asian and Global South countries rather than simple international collapse.


=====The Fracturing of the U.S.-Led Liberal International Order=====
=====The Fracturing of the U.S.-Led Liberal International Order=====
Line 592: Line 678:


The report traces the weakening of the postwar system as American commitment declines and other powers pursue competing regional and global arrangements.
The report traces the weakening of the postwar system as American commitment declines and other powers pursue competing regional and global arrangements.
=====China: Balancing the United States While Increasing Global Influence=====
[https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/competing-visions-international-order/02-china-balancing-us-increasing-global-influence | Chatham House Researchers | Chatham House | March 27, 2025]
China seeks greater influence within existing institutions while constructing alternative partnerships and presenting itself as a defender of sovereignty and development.


=====Germany’s Internationalist Vision in Crisis=====
=====Germany’s Internationalist Vision in Crisis=====
Line 611: Line 691:
The final chapter considers possible futures ranging from renewed cooperation to fragmented regional blocs and intensified great-power competition.
The final chapter considers possible futures ranging from renewed cooperation to fragmented regional blocs and intensified great-power competition.


=====The New Game in Foreign Aid: Deal Power=====


[https://www.ussc.edu.au/the-new-game-in-aid-deal-power | Lester Munson | United States Studies Centre | March 11, 2025]


Development assistance is increasingly being treated as a transactional instrument for securing strategic, commercial, and diplomatic agreements.
=== U.S. Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy ===
 
=====Most Americans Say U.S. Foreign Policy Ignores Other Countries=====
 
[https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/04/28/most-americans-now-say-u-s-foreign-policy-ignores-the-interests-of-other-countries/ | Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | April 28, 2026]
 
A growing share of Americans believes foreign policy does not adequately account for other countries’ interests or the requirements of international cooperation.
 
=====Trump’s New 2026 Shock Doctrine=====
 
[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/400900268_Trump%27s_New_2026_Shock_Doctrine_War_Deals_and_Global_Chaos | ResearchGate Contributor | ResearchGate | February 19, 2026]
 
The paper characterizes unpredictability, coercive bargaining, military pressure, and deliberate disruption as central features of the administration’s international strategy.
 
=====How Diplomacy Reshapes Online Discourse=====
 
[https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.09942 | Hunjun Shin, Hoonbae Moon, and Mohit Singhal | arXiv | January 14, 2026]
 
Research on U.S.-North Korea diplomacy suggests that high-level negotiations can produce lasting changes in how foreign adversaries are discussed, even when talks later fail.


=====The U.S.-Japan Alliance Under New Political Leadership=====
=====The Fate of “America First”=====


[https://www.rand.org/events/2025/03/the-us-japan-alliance.html | RAND Corporation Staff | RAND Corporation | March 10, 2025]
[https://www.foreignaffairs.com/americas/fate-america-first | Reid Smith | Foreign Affairs | January 9, 2026]


American and Japanese experts discuss how leadership changes, regional security threats, trade, and technology may reshape the bilateral alliance.
The article examines whether military intervention and regime-change ambitions are compatible with promises to limit American involvement in foreign conflicts.


=====Critical Foreign-Policy Decisions and Artificial Intelligence=====
=====The Foreign Policy of the United States=====


[https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.06263 | Benjamin Jensen and Others | arXiv | March 8, 2025]
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_policy_of_the_United_States | Wikipedia Contributors | Wikipedia | Updated 2026]


The study finds that artificial-intelligence systems differ significantly in recommendations involving escalation, intervention, cooperation, and alliance management.
The overview traces American foreign policy from early neutrality through global primacy, liberal internationalism, the war on terrorism, great-power competition, and America First.


=====Foreign-Policy Priorities for the Incoming Administration=====
=====A Middle Way for American Foreign Policy=====


[https://perryworldhouse.upenn.edu/events/foreign-policy-priorities-for-the-incoming-u-s-administration/ | Perry World House Staff | University of Pennsylvania | January 15, 2025]
[https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/middle-way-american-foreign-policy | Foreign Affairs Staff | Foreign Affairs | December 31, 2025]


Experts review the conflicts, alliances, democratic challenges, climate problems, and strategic competition awaiting the new administration.
The article proposes an approach between expansive liberal internationalism and unilateral America First nationalism.


=====Competing Visions of Restraint for U.S. Foreign Policy=====
=====Competing Visions of Restraint for U.S. Foreign Policy=====
Line 647: Line 743:
The discussion examines the administration’s rapid turn toward transactional diplomacy, unilateral action, protectionism, and reduced support for collective institutions.
The discussion examines the administration’s rapid turn toward transactional diplomacy, unilateral action, protectionism, and reduced support for collective institutions.


=====False Choices: Democracy and Development in U.S.-Africa Policy=====


[https://www.csis.org/analysis/false-choices-balancing-democracy-and-development-us-africa-policy | CSIS Staff | Center for Strategic and International Studies | October 21, 2025]


Commercial diplomacy and democracy assistance need not be competing goals, particularly in African countries seeking investment, accountable government, and development.
=== China, Technology, and Great-Power Competition ===
 
=====As the United States Steps Out of UNESCO, China Steps Up=====
 
[https://www.brookings.edu/articles/as-the-us-steps-out-of-unesco-china-steps-up/ | Brookings Staff | Brookings Institution | July 7, 2026]
 
America’s withdrawal from UNESCO could create additional opportunities for China to influence international education, culture, science, and technology policy.
 
=====Why America Cannot Remain a Global Power=====
 
[https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/07/03/why-america-cannot-remain-a-global-power-the-choice-coming-after-2027/ | Modern Diplomacy Staff | Modern Diplomacy | July 3, 2026]
 
The essay argues that simultaneous challenges involving China, Russia, Europe, and the Middle East could exceed America’s political and military capacity.
 
=====China Sets Out Its Vision for a New Global Order=====
 
[https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/06/china-sets-out-its-vision-new-global-order-will-it-commit-resources-match-its-ambition | Chatham House Staff | Chatham House | June 24, 2026]
 
China is presenting an alternative vision of global governance as the United States retreats from or challenges parts of the existing international system.
 
=====U.S. Power Is Wrung Out=====
 
[https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/06/09/iran-war-trump-china-united-states-military-defense-weapons-geopolitics-strategy-taiwan/ | Foreign Policy Staff | Foreign Policy | June 9, 2026]
 
Military commitments in the Middle East could deplete American resources needed to deter China and manage other strategic challenges.
 
=====Strategic Stalemates in the U.S.-China Artificial-Intelligence Race=====
 
[https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.23475 | Jingwen Liu and Jyh-An Lee | arXiv | May 22, 2026]
 
The paper questions whether increasingly strict American technology controls will slow China or instead accelerate Chinese self-reliance and innovation.
 
=====In Diplomacy, Pomp Matters—Especially When Trump Goes to China=====
 
[https://apnews.com/article/trump-china-xi-ceremony-diplomacy-4e90fbc4bac7db9285f04d23b9321ff7 | Associated Press Staff | Associated Press | May 12, 2026]
 
China’s ceremonial treatment of American leaders illustrates how symbolism, prestige, and carefully staged public events can influence high-level diplomacy.
 
=====Which Countries Do Americans Think Are Gaining Influence?=====
 
[https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/04/28/what-countries-do-americans-think-are-gaining-and-losing-influence-in-todays-world/ | Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | April 28, 2026]
 
Americans increasingly perceive their country’s influence as weakening while China and several other powers gain greater international weight.
 
=====The Role of Diplomacy in Managing Cross-Strait Relations=====
 
[https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-role-of-diplomacy-in-us-management-of-cross-strait-relations/ | Brookings Institution Staff | Brookings Institution | March 20, 2026]
 
Careful diplomacy can strengthen deterrence around Taiwan while reducing miscalculation, escalation, and the risk of a direct U.S.-China conflict.
 
=====U.S. Critical-Minerals Trade Bloc Aims to Counter China=====
 
[https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-hosts-countries-talks-weaken-chinas-grip-critical-minerals-2026-02-04/ | Reuters Staff | Reuters | February 4, 2026]
 
Washington is seeking coordinated trade rules and price protections to reduce China’s control over minerals essential to defense and advanced manufacturing.
 
=====Three Possible Pathways for U.S.-China Relations=====
 
[https://www.brookings.edu/articles/three-potential-pathways-for-us-china-relations-under-trump/ | Brookings Institution Staff | Brookings Institution | January 26, 2026]
 
The report outlines possibilities ranging from a managed accommodation to a hard strategic split or a prolonged effort by both sides to reduce vulnerability.
 
=====Surveying Experts on the State of U.S.-China Relations=====
 
[https://chinapower.csis.org/survey-experts-us-china-relations-2026/ | ChinaPower Project Staff | Center for Strategic and International Studies | January 13, 2026]
 
Experts assess the likelihood of cooperation, confrontation, economic separation, military crisis, and diplomatic stabilization between Washington and Beijing.
 
=====Greenland, Rare Earths, and Arctic Security=====
 
[https://www.csis.org/analysis/greenland-rare-earths-and-arctic-security | CSIS Staff | Center for Strategic and International Studies | January 8, 2026]
 
Greenland’s strategic location and mineral resources place it at the intersection of Arctic security, economic competition, climate change, and U.S.-China rivalry.
 
=====United States and the Changing International System=====
 
[https://www.chathamhouse.org/topics/major-powers | Chatham House Staff | Chatham House | Updated 2026]
 
This collection examines how the United States, China, Russia, Europe, and emerging powers are competing to shape international rules and institutions.
 
=====Breaking Down Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy=====
 
[https://www.brookings.edu/articles/breaking-down-trumps-2025-national-security-strategy/ | Brookings Institution Scholars | Brookings Institution | December 8, 2025]
 
The strategy prioritizes the Western Hemisphere, economic nationalism, immigration enforcement, burden-shifting, and competition with China.
 
=====China: Balancing the United States While Increasing Global Influence=====
 
[https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/competing-visions-international-order/02-china-balancing-us-increasing-global-influence | Chatham House Researchers | Chatham House | March 27, 2025]
 
China seeks greater influence within existing institutions while constructing alternative partnerships and presenting itself as a defender of sovereignty and development.
 
 
 
=== Economic Statecraft, Trade, and Strategic Resources ===
 
=====When Economic Security Meets Economic Statecraft=====
 
[https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PEA4700/PEA4706-2/RAND_PEA4706-2.pdf | RAND Corporation Staff | RAND Corporation | April 13, 2026]
 
The report examines how national-security concerns, trade restrictions, industrial policy, sanctions, and supply-chain management are becoming increasingly interconnected.
 
=====The Supreme Court Strikes Down Trump’s Global Tariffs=====
 
[https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/us-supreme-court-rejects-trumps-global-tariffs-2026-02-20/ | Reuters Staff | Reuters | February 20, 2026]
 
The ruling limited presidential tariff authority and highlighted tensions between executive power, Congress, global commerce, and economic statecraft.
 
=====Dispatch From Davos: The Geopolitics of the New Realism=====
 
[https://www.cfr.org/articles/dispatch-from-davos-the-geopolitics-of-the-new-realism | Michael Froman | Council on Foreign Relations | January 23, 2026]
 
Davos participants increasingly viewed international relations through the lens of power, national resilience, strategic autonomy, and economic security.
 
=====What Trump’s National Security Strategy Means for Foreign Policy=====
 
[https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-what-trumps-national-security-strategy-means-for-us-foreign-policy/ | Atlantic Council Experts | Atlantic Council | December 5, 2025]
 
Experts analyze the strategy’s emphasis on economic statecraft, the Western Hemisphere, burden-sharing, national sovereignty, and selective international engagement.


=====America First or Rules-Based Global Economic Governance=====
=====America First or Rules-Based Global Economic Governance=====
Line 659: Line 871:
The article argues that American economic interests and rules-based international cooperation are not inherently incompatible.
The article argues that American economic interests and rules-based international cooperation are not inherently incompatible.


=====The United States External Cultural-Policy Report=====


[https://www.ifa.de/en/publications/results/usa-ecp-country-report-2026/ | Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations Staff | ifa | 2026]


Cuts to foreign aid, public diplomacy, education, and cultural programs signal a shift from soft power toward military and economic coercion.
=== Military Power, Nuclear Strategy, and Defense ===


=====America and the World: Trump 2.0 Foreign Policy=====
=====Nuclear Weapons and the Future of American Power=====


[https://fpa.org/topics/america-and-the-world-trump-2-0-foreign-policy/ | Foreign Policy Association Staff | Foreign Policy Association | 2026]
[https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/07/nuclear-weapons-and-the-future-of-american-power | Carnegie Endowment Staff | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | July 2, 2026]


This resource collection covers American grand strategy, international institutions, alliances, military power, economic policy, and alternative approaches to global leadership.
The weakening arms-control system creates serious dangers but does not eliminate the possibility of renewed negotiations following future geopolitical shocks.


=====The 2025 National Security Strategy=====
=====Friendly Proliferation=====


[https://missilethreat.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/National-Security-Strategy-2025.pdf | Executive Office of the President | United States Government | December 2025]
[https://www.csis.org/analysis/friendly-proliferation | CSIS Staff | Center for Strategic and International Studies | June 9, 2026]


The official strategy emphasizes American primacy in the Western Hemisphere, economic security, reduced burdens in Europe and the Middle East, and competition with China.
Declining allied trust in American security guarantees is fueling debate over whether additional U.S. partners may eventually seek nuclear weapons.


=====Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index 2026=====
=====The 2026 National Defense Strategy by the Numbers=====


[https://static.brandirectory.com/reports/brand-finance-soft-power-index-2026-digital.pdf | Brand Finance Staff | Brand Finance | January 2026]
[https://www.csis.org/analysis/2026-national-defense-strategy-numbers-radical-changes-moderate-changes-and-some | Mark Cancian | Center for Strategic and International Studies | January 27, 2026]


The full index compares countries on familiarity, reputation, governance, culture, diplomacy, education, business, media, and international influence.
The analysis identifies major changes in defense priorities, including reduced emphasis on counterterrorism and increased attention to homeland and regional security.


=====Middle Powers Take Center Stage=====


[https://www.cfr.org/articles/middle-powers-take-center-stage | Council on Foreign Relations Staff | Council on Foreign Relations | June 2026]


Canada, India, Brazil, Turkey, and other middle powers are gaining room to maneuver as confidence in American leadership declines.
=== Foreign Aid, Democracy Support, and Development ===


=====America Revived: A Grand Strategy of Resolute Global Leadership=====
=====Rahm Emanuel Assails Netanyahu as American Politics Shift on Israel=====


[https://www.cfr.org/event/council-special-report-launch-america-revived-grand-strategy-resolute-global-leadership | Council on Foreign Relations Staff | Council on Foreign Relations | 2026]
[https://apnews.com/article/60357c348e611a93a70949f5e69fce6e | Associated Press Staff | Associated Press | July 7, 2026]


Panelists debate a proposed strategy combining credible military power with alliances, diplomacy, economic influence, and international legitimacy.
Emanuel’s criticism of Israel’s government illustrates growing divisions in the United States over military aid, settlements, Gaza, and the future of the bilateral relationship.


=====The Future of American Leadership and the International Order=====
=====Post-U.S. International Democracy Support=====


[https://www.brookings.edu/projects/project-on-international-order-and-strategy/about/ | Brookings Institution Staff | Brookings Institution | 2026]
[https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/06/post-us-international-democracy-support-aspiration-in-search-of-substance | Thomas Carothers | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | June 8, 2026]


The Brookings project studies changing power relationships, U.S. strategy, institutional competition, alliances, and opportunities for international cooperation.
Governments and private organizations are attempting to replace lost American democracy assistance, but the emerging system remains fragmented and underfunded.


=====Security Alliances and Partnerships=====
=====Strategic, Not Transactional: Development Cooperation and U.S. Interests=====


[https://www.brookings.edu/topics/security-alliances-partnerships/ | Brookings Institution Staff | Brookings Institution | 2026]
[https://www.cgdev.org/publication/strategic-not-transactional-using-development-cooperation-advance-economic-and-national | Center for Global Development Staff | Center for Global Development | March 18, 2026]


This research collection examines NATO, Asian alliances, military assistance, burden-sharing, crisis management, and the role of partnerships in U.S. strategy.
The authors argue that development assistance should advance long-term strategic relationships rather than function primarily as a short-term transactional bargaining tool.


=====Munich Security Conference 2026=====
=====Global Development Policy and the New World Disorder=====


[https://foreignpolicy.com/projects/munich-security-conference/ | Foreign Policy Staff | Foreign Policy | 2026]
[https://www.idos-research.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/publikationen/Policy_Brief/2026/PB_2.2026.pdf | German Institute of Development and Sustainability Staff | IDOS | January 7, 2026]


Reporting from the conference covers transatlantic tensions, Ukraine, China, defense spending, nuclear security, and international reactions to U.S. policy.
Reductions in American development cooperation are weakening Washington’s agenda-setting power and accelerating changes in the international aid system.


=====American Views on Global Leadership=====
=====False Choices: Democracy and Development in U.S.-Africa Policy=====


[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sqPdF7NDO9o | Council on Foreign Relations | YouTube | 2026]
[https://www.csis.org/analysis/false-choices-balancing-democracy-and-development-us-africa-policy | CSIS Staff | Center for Strategic and International Studies | October 21, 2025]


Panelists discuss public opinion on alliances, trade, military engagement, national security, and America’s role in international affairs.
Commercial diplomacy and democracy assistance need not be competing goals, particularly in African countries seeking investment, accountable government, and development.


=====A Year in Review: Foreign Policy in 2025=====
=====International Engagement and Support for Foreign Aid=====


[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DAbYMUBPQYo | One Decision | YouTube | December 2025]
[https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2025/05/01/international-engagement-and-support-for-foreign-aid/ | Pew Research Center Staff | Pew Research Center | May 1, 2025]


Former officials and analysts review the year’s major developments involving alliances, China, Russia, Europe, the Middle East, and American global leadership.
Most Americans support considering other countries’ interests, although opinions about foreign aid and international engagement remain divided by party.


=====The Foreign Policy of the United States=====
=====The New Game in Foreign Aid: Deal Power=====


[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_policy_of_the_United_States | Wikipedia Contributors | Wikipedia | Updated 2026]
[https://www.ussc.edu.au/the-new-game-in-aid-deal-power | Lester Munson | United States Studies Centre | March 11, 2025]


The overview traces American foreign policy from early neutrality through global primacy, liberal internationalism, the war on terrorism, great-power competition, and America First.
Development assistance is increasingly being treated as a transactional instrument for securing strategic, commercial, and diplomatic agreements.
 
=====United States and the Changing International System=====
 
[https://www.chathamhouse.org/topics/major-powers | Chatham House Staff | Chatham House | Updated 2026]


This collection examines how the United States, China, Russia, Europe, and emerging powers are competing to shape international rules and institutions.


=====Alternative Options for U.S. Policy Toward the International Order=====


[https://www.rand.org/pubs/authors/m/mazarr_michael_j.html | Michael J. Mazarr and RAND Researchers | RAND Corporation | Updated 2026]
=== Artificial Intelligence and Geopolitical Power ===
 
RAND research compares American primacy, selective engagement, restraint, institutional reform, and other possible strategies for managing the international system.


=====Artificial General Intelligence and the Rise and Fall of Nations=====
=====Artificial General Intelligence and the Rise and Fall of Nations=====
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The report explores how advanced artificial intelligence could redistribute technological, economic, military, and geopolitical power among nations.
The report explores how advanced artificial intelligence could redistribute technological, economic, military, and geopolitical power among nations.


=====China Leads Scientific Trends While the West Launches New Ones=====


[https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.01117 | Jeffrey W. Lockhart, Jamshid Sourati, Feng Shi, and James Evans | arXiv | March 1, 2026]


China increasingly leads research in rapidly emerging fields, while the United States and Europe retain strength in creating unexpected interdisciplinary directions.
=== Changing Global Power and International Relations ===
 
=====Pentagon Seeks to Rally Latin America Behind a New Monroe Doctrine=====
 
[https://www.reuters.com/world/pentagon-seeks-rally-latin-america-behind-new-monroe-doctrine-2026-07-08/ | Reuters Staff | Reuters | July 9, 2026]
 
The administration is promoting a renewed assertion of American primacy in the Western Hemisphere while seeking regional cooperation against narcotics trafficking, migration, and Chinese influence.


=====How Diplomacy Reshapes Online Discourse=====
=====Trump Gets Negative Reviews as Fewer See the U.S. as Reliable=====


[https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.09942 | Hunjun Shin, Hoonbae Moon, and Mohit Singhal | arXiv | January 14, 2026]
[https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/06/23/trump-gets-negative-reviews-internationally-as-fewer-say-u-s-is-a-reliable-partner/ | Richard Wike, Laura Silver, Moira Fagan, and Jonathan Schulman | Pew Research Center | June 23, 2026]


Research on U.S.-North Korea diplomacy suggests that high-level negotiations can produce lasting changes in how foreign adversaries are discussed, even when talks later fail.
A multinational survey documents declining confidence in the United States, its president, its democratic institutions, and its reliability as an international partner.


=====The Changing Foundations of American Global Standing=====
=====Making America Weak Again=====


[https://www.cfr.org/reports/america-revived | Robert Blackwill and Richard Fontaine | Council on Foreign Relations | January 20, 2026]
[https://skidmore.blog/2025/07/19/making-america-weak-again/ | David Skidmore | The Internationalist | July 19, 2025]


America retains considerable military, economic, technological, diplomatic, and cultural resources, but converting those resources into leadership requires legitimacy and reliable alliances.
Declining international approval is presented as evidence that confrontational nationalism may weaken rather than strengthen American power.
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