Political Violence During the End of Apartheid

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Political Violence During the End of Apartheid

South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy between 1990 and 1994 was both a historic political transformation and a period of extraordinary violence. The unbanning of liberation movements, release of political prisoners, and beginning of constitutional negotiations did not immediately produce peace. Instead, negotiations unfolded alongside massacres, assassinations, township warfare, attacks on commuters, conflicts involving migrant-worker hostels, political intimidation, and allegations of covert intervention by elements of the apartheid security establishment.

The violence cannot be explained by a single conflict or group. It included fierce confrontation between supporters of the African National Congress (ANC) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), especially in KwaZulu-Natal and the townships surrounding Johannesburg; violence by state security forces and homeland authorities; attacks by right-wing organisations; armed activity by ANC-aligned Self-Defence Units; and local struggles involving political, economic, criminal, territorial, and personal rivalries. The resulting instability repeatedly threatened negotiations and raised doubts about whether South Africa could reach a democratic election peacefully.

The Violent Transition from Apartheid

The political opening beginning in 1990 fundamentally changed South Africa's political landscape. Liberation organisations could operate openly, political mobilisation expanded dramatically, and negotiations began over a new constitutional order. Yet the decline of formal apartheid authority also intensified struggles over political power at the local and national levels.

Violence that had already developed during the 1980s continued and, in several regions, escalated. Contemporary human-rights investigations and later historical studies documented thousands of political deaths during the transition. Political killings became particularly severe in KwaZulu-Natal and the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging region.

The violence consequently became part of the political transition itself. Massacres and assassinations could interrupt negotiations, alter relations between political organisations, generate international pressure, and change calculations about the timetable for democratic elections.

ANC–IFP Conflict in KwaZulu-Natal

One of the most destructive conflicts involved supporters of the ANC and Inkatha, later the Inkatha Freedom Party. The struggle had roots extending into the 1980s and became especially severe in KwaZulu-Natal.

Communities were sometimes divided according to political allegiance. Killings generated retaliation, which in turn produced further attacks. Political intimidation, assassinations, armed groups, displacement, and the destruction of homes contributed to conditions that in some areas resembled local civil war.

The conflict was not simply a confrontation between two national political organisations. Local leadership struggles, traditional authority, access to resources, community rivalries, policing, weapons, youth mobilisation, and territorial control could all influence violence. Some areas effectively became political "no-go areas" dominated by one organisation or another.

Violence remained particularly intense immediately before the April 1994 election and continued in parts of KwaZulu-Natal after apartheid formally ended.

East Rand and Kathorus Township Wars

The townships east of Johannesburg became another major centre of transition-era violence. Thokoza, Katlehong and Vosloorus—often collectively described as Kathorus—experienced prolonged armed confrontation.

Hostel residents, township organisations, ANC supporters, IFP supporters, Self-Defence Units, police, private security personnel and criminal networks all appeared within accounts of the conflict. Territorial boundaries and political affiliation could determine whether residents could safely move through particular neighbourhoods.

Research on the East Rand has challenged interpretations that reduce the violence entirely to a straightforward ANC–IFP confrontation. Political competition interacted with revenge, local disputes, criminal activity, generational conflict, economic insecurity and struggles for control of communities.

Large numbers of residents were displaced, while armed patrols and community defence structures became increasingly common.

Hostels, Migrant Workers, and Political Conflict

Migrant-worker hostels became closely associated with political violence in Johannesburg and other urban areas. Many hostel residents were Zulu-speaking migrant workers, and some became associated with Inkatha during the political struggles of the early 1990s.

Hostels could function as fortified political enclaves surrounded by communities supporting rival organisations. Attacks involving hostel residents and neighbouring townships contributed to cycles of retaliation and fear.

Yet research also demonstrates that hostel residents were not a politically uniform population. Migration, unemployment, masculinity, generational relationships, local networks and economic insecurity interacted with political allegiance.

Attempts were also made to reduce violence from within these communities. Initiatives involving residents of rival hostels illustrate that grassroots peacebuilding operated alongside the better-known national negotiations.

Train and Commuter Violence

Attacks on trains, buses and taxis became one of the most frightening forms of anonymous violence during the transition. Commuters travelling between townships and workplaces could be attacked without warning, sometimes by unidentified gunmen.

The apparently indiscriminate character of some commuter attacks intensified suspicions that the violence was intended to spread fear and political instability. Human-rights organisations investigated allegations involving hostel-based attackers, police conduct and covert security structures.

Train violence became part of the wider debate over whether apparently spontaneous political conflict was being manipulated by organised forces seeking to destabilise negotiations.

Boipatong Massacre

The Boipatong massacre of June 17, 1992 became one of the defining crises of the transition. Armed attackers associated with the nearby KwaMadala Hostel entered Boipatong and killed residents.

The massacre produced national and international outrage. Allegations that police or state structures had assisted or tolerated the attackers intensified distrust between the ANC and the government.

Nelson Mandela and the ANC suspended participation in negotiations following the massacre and demanded stronger measures against political violence. Boipatong therefore demonstrated how a local massacre could directly affect the national constitutional process.

Questions concerning state involvement remained highly controversial and became part of the wider debate about a possible covert "third force."

Bhisho Massacre

On September 7, 1992, ANC supporters marched in Bhisho in the Ciskei homeland during a campaign against the government of Brigadier Oupa Gqozo. Members of the Ciskei Defence Force opened fire on demonstrators, killing and injuring protesters.

Bhisho illustrated the volatile role of the homeland governments during the transition. Although apartheid was being dismantled nationally, homeland political and military structures remained capable of resisting the political changes taking place around them.

Together with Boipatong, the massacre became one of the major violent crises surrounding negotiations in 1992.

The "Third Force" Controversy

Perhaps the most disputed aspect of transition-era violence was the allegation that a covert "third force" connected to elements of the apartheid security establishment deliberately encouraged violence.

The term encompassed allegations involving police units, military intelligence, covert organisations, hit squads, financial assistance to anti-ANC organisations, weapons distribution, and collaboration with political or vigilante groups.

The 1991 "Inkathagate" scandal, involving revelations of secret government funding connected to Inkatha, strengthened ANC suspicions about government involvement in political destabilisation.

Subsequent investigations and Truth and Reconciliation Commission proceedings produced evidence concerning covert operations, security-force collaboration and the training of Inkatha-aligned operatives, including recruits trained in the Caprivi Strip.

The evidence did not mean that every incident of ANC–IFP or township violence had been centrally orchestrated. Historical research emphasizes the interaction between covert intervention and genuinely local political, social, criminal and economic conflicts.

Police and Security-Force Involvement

Police conduct became one of the central controversies surrounding political violence. Human-rights monitors documented allegations that police sometimes failed to protect communities, treated political groups differently, assisted particular factions, or participated directly in abuses.

Investigations also examined the activities of the South African Defence Force and covert security structures. Later testimony before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission addressed counterinsurgency operations, clandestine organisations, hit squads and destabilisation strategies.

These revelations contributed to widespread distrust of state institutions during the negotiations and complicated attempts to establish neutral mechanisms capable of controlling political violence.

ANC Self-Defence Units and Retaliatory Violence

ANC-aligned communities created Self-Defence Units (SDUs) in numerous townships. Their supporters argued that these organisations were necessary because communities faced attacks and could not rely upon the police for protection.

In practice, some SDUs became participants in armed territorial conflict. Truth and Reconciliation Commission amnesty proceedings documented killings, attempted killings, weapons offences and retaliatory attacks committed by SDU members.

The experience of the SDUs demonstrates the increasingly militarised character of some communities. Distinctions between community protection, political warfare, revenge and criminal violence could become difficult to maintain as conflict escalated.

Political Assassinations

Targeted political killings added another dimension to the crisis. Local activists, political organisers and officials could become targets in struggles over territorial and organisational control.

The most consequential assassination was the killing of South African Communist Party leader and senior ANC figure Chris Hani on April 10, 1993 by Janusz Waluś as part of a far-right conspiracy.

Hani's assassination triggered enormous demonstrations and fears of nationwide upheaval. The crisis also demonstrated the political importance of Nelson Mandela, whose public response helped restrain the potential escalation.

Rather than halting the transition, Hani's murder increased pressure to reach agreement on a democratic election.

White Right-Wing Violence

Militant white organisations also threatened the transition. Sections of the white right rejected negotiations and opposed the creation of a nonracial democratic government.

Armed right-wing groups attempted to mobilise resistance and became involved in confrontations during the final phase of apartheid. Their activities added another potential source of political violence at a time when ANC–IFP conflict and instability in the homelands were already threatening the transition.

The fragmentation of white political authority nevertheless limited the ability of the far right to prevent democratic elections.

Shell House and the 1994 Election Crisis

The final weeks before the April 1994 election were exceptionally dangerous. The IFP had not yet committed itself to participating in the election, while violence between ANC and IFP supporters remained intense.

On March 28, 1994, IFP marchers converged on central Johannesburg. ANC security personnel at Shell House, the ANC headquarters, opened fire during the confrontation, killing a number of marchers.

The Shell House shootings became another deeply controversial episode demonstrating that serious violence was not confined to the apartheid state or one political organisation.

At nearly the same moment, KwaZulu-Natal was experiencing severe political bloodshed. A state of emergency was declared in Natal on March 31 as authorities attempted to control the escalating crisis.

Only days before voting began, negotiations succeeded in bringing the IFP into the election.

National Peace Accord and Peacebuilding

Political organisations and civil-society groups attempted to create institutions capable of containing the violence. The National Peace Accord of 1991 established structures intended to reduce political conflict and encourage negotiation at national, regional and community levels.

Local peace committees attempted to mediate disputes, establish codes of political conduct and prevent retaliation. Their effectiveness varied considerably, particularly where communities distrusted the police or where armed political structures remained powerful.

Nevertheless, peacebuilding mechanisms helped create channels through which conflicts could be addressed without immediately resorting to violence. Grassroots peace initiatives complemented negotiations among national political leaders.

Political Violence and the Negotiations

Violence and negotiation developed simultaneously rather than as separate processes. Boipatong contributed to the ANC's withdrawal from negotiations. Bhisho intensified pressure for political compromise. Chris Hani's assassination threatened widespread unrest but also increased the urgency of establishing an election date.

The possibility that continuing violence could destroy the transition influenced political leaders on all sides. Negotiations therefore concerned not only constitutional principles but also practical questions of political security, policing, armed formations, homeland governments and the conditions necessary for credible elections.

The eventual agreement to hold elections in April 1994 did not mean that the violence had already ended. Instead, the election occurred despite an extraordinarily unstable political environment.

The 1994 Election and the End of Apartheid

South Africa's first democratic election on April 26–29, 1994 marked the political end of apartheid and brought an ANC-led government to power.

The successful election was remarkable partly because of the violence immediately preceding it. Political killings in KwaZulu-Natal reached extremely high levels during March and April, while fears remained that political organisations or armed groups might disrupt voting.

The IFP's last-minute agreement to participate removed one of the largest immediate threats to the election. Despite logistical problems and continuing insecurity, voting proceeded on a massive scale.

Democratic government greatly changed the political context of violence, but it did not immediately eliminate the armed networks, rivalries and social damage produced during the transition.

Truth, Accountability, and the Legacy of the Violence

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission later became an important forum for investigating political violence. Testimony, organisational submissions and amnesty hearings produced extensive records concerning abuses committed by state institutions, liberation movements, the IFP, Self-Defence Units and other political actors.

The evidence demonstrated the complexity of assigning responsibility. Some violence involved covert state operations or collaboration. Other incidents emerged from direct political rivalry, retaliation, community disputes, criminal networks or combinations of these factors.

The transition also left communities with long-term consequences. Families lost relatives, residents were displaced, neighbourhoods became politically divided, weapons circulated widely, and cultures of armed self-defence developed in areas where government institutions had lost legitimacy.

Political violence also persisted after the democratic election, particularly in KwaZulu-Natal, demonstrating that changing the national political system could not immediately resolve conflicts developed over many years.

Conclusion

The end of apartheid is often remembered through negotiations, Nelson Mandela's presidency and South Africa's first democratic election. The transition was also one of the country's most violent political periods.

ANC–IFP warfare, township conflict, hostel violence, commuter massacres, political assassinations, homeland repression, white right-wing militancy, armed Self-Defence Units and allegations of covert security-force intervention created a complex landscape in which responsibility cannot be reduced to a single actor or explanation.

Evidence concerning clandestine state activity and security-force collusion makes the "third force" controversy essential to understanding the period, but local political competition, retaliation, economic insecurity, criminal activity and community divisions were also important components of the violence.

Massacres such as Boipatong and Bhisho repeatedly threatened constitutional negotiations. Chris Hani's assassination brought the country close to a wider political explosion. The Shell House confrontation and severe KwaZulu-Natal bloodshed demonstrated how precarious conditions remained only weeks before the 1994 election.

South Africa's democratic transition therefore represented not simply a negotiated transfer of political power but an attempt to construct democracy amid widespread armed conflict. Understanding that violence is essential to understanding both the achievement of the 1994 settlement and the difficult legacy inherited by post-apartheid South Africa.

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