The Difference Principle and Economic Inequality
The Difference Principle and Economic Inequality
John Rawls's Difference Principle provides one of the most influential philosophical standards for evaluating economic inequality. Rather than requiring an equal distribution of income and wealth, Rawls argues that social and economic inequalities can be justified only when they form part of an institutional arrangement that works to the greatest benefit of society's least advantaged members.
The principle is part of Rawls's broader conception of justice as fairness. It connects questions about income and wealth to equality of opportunity, ownership, political power, taxation, inheritance, incentives, and the organization of economic institutions. The central issue is therefore not simply how unequal a society is, but whether its inequalities can be justified to citizens who occupy its least advantageous positions.
The Difference Principle and Justice as Fairness
Rawls develops the Difference Principle alongside the original position and veil of ignorance. Individuals choosing principles for society without knowing their own wealth, class, talents, opportunities, or eventual social position have reasons to protect themselves against ending up among the least advantaged.
The resulting conception of justice does not demand identical economic outcomes. Inequalities may exist, but their justification depends on whether they improve the position of disadvantaged citizens compared with feasible alternative arrangements.
This distinguishes the Difference Principle from both strict economic equality and theories that regard market outcomes as presumptively just. Economic inequality requires justification rather than being accepted simply because it results from markets, differences in talent, or economic growth.
The Least Advantaged and the Limits of Inequality
The Difference Principle directs particular attention toward the least advantaged. Economic arrangements should therefore be evaluated partly according to how income, wealth, opportunities, and other important social goods are distributed to citizens occupying disadvantaged positions.
An increase in inequality is not justified merely because everyone becomes somewhat richer. The relevant question is whether the institutional arrangement containing that inequality provides the greatest feasible benefit to the least advantaged while remaining consistent with Rawls's other principles.
This makes the Difference Principle a demanding constraint on inequality. Large differences in income or wealth cannot be defended simply by pointing to productivity, incentives, or aggregate prosperity. Their effects on disadvantaged citizens must be central to their justification.
Fair Equality of Opportunity
Rawls's treatment of inequality cannot be separated from fair equality of opportunity. Formal legal equality is insufficient if citizens with similar talents and motivation have dramatically different prospects because of family wealth or social class.
Educational opportunities, inherited resources, access to capital, employment, and other institutional arrangements can therefore influence whether an economic system satisfies justice as fairness.
The Difference Principle does not provide an independent justification for inequalities created by an otherwise unfair opportunity structure. Economic institutions must satisfy both fair equality of opportunity and requirements concerning the position of the least advantaged.
Property-Owning Democracy
The material gives substantial attention to property-owning democracy as an institutional response to economic inequality. Instead of allowing productive assets to become highly concentrated and then relying primarily on taxes and transfers, property-owning democracy seeks a much broader distribution of capital and productive property.
The objective is to give citizens greater control over the economic resources necessary for meaningful independence and participation in society. Broad ownership can also reduce the ability of concentrated wealth to dominate economic and political institutions.
Property-owning democracy therefore represents a predistributive approach to inequality. Institutions influence the distribution of economic power before highly unequal market outcomes emerge rather than attempting to correct those outcomes only afterward.
Welfare-State Capitalism and Economic Systems
Rawls's criticism of welfare-state capitalism is important for understanding the economic implications of the Difference Principle. A welfare state can provide assistance to poorer citizens while leaving ownership of productive wealth heavily concentrated.
Such a system may alleviate poverty without eliminating the structural inequalities that allow a relatively small group to exercise disproportionate economic and political power.
Rawlsian scholarship consequently examines property-owning democracy and liberal socialism as alternatives. The relevant question is which economic institutions can best protect basic liberties, fair opportunity, reciprocity, and the economic position of disadvantaged citizens.
Incentives and Economic Inequality
Economic incentives create one of the most controversial applications of the Difference Principle. Higher salaries or other unequal rewards might be justified when they encourage productive activity that ultimately improves the circumstances of the least advantaged.
This does not provide an unlimited defense of incentive inequality. Higher rewards must contribute to an institutional arrangement that genuinely benefits disadvantaged citizens rather than merely increasing the wealth of those already well positioned.
The debate therefore concerns both economic evidence and moral justification. It asks whether particular inequalities are actually necessary to produce beneficial outcomes and whether alternative institutional arrangements could accomplish the same objectives with less inequality.
The Rawls-Cohen Debate
G. A. Cohen developed an influential egalitarian criticism of Rawls's treatment of incentives. Cohen questioned why talented citizens committed to justice should demand substantially greater compensation before using their abilities productively.
The disagreement exposes an important question about the scope of justice. Rawls primarily applies principles of distributive justice to society's basic institutional structure. Cohen argues that individual economic behavior and personal choices may also need to reflect an egalitarian ethos.
The debate therefore asks whether justice can be achieved through fair institutions alone or whether citizens themselves must adopt economic motivations compatible with greater equality.
Natural Talent, Luck, and Economic Desert
Rawls rejects the idea that natural talents automatically create unlimited moral claims to the economic rewards those talents can generate. People do not choose their natural abilities, family backgrounds, or many of the social circumstances affecting their opportunities.
The economic benefits arising from talent should consequently be organized through institutions that contribute to fair social cooperation. Differences in ability may produce different economic roles and rewards, but these differences remain subject to principles of justice.
This argument challenges straightforward meritocratic defenses of inequality and contributes to broader debates about luck, responsibility, desert, and the moral significance of individual achievement.
Taxation, Redistribution, and Predistribution
Taxation is an important mechanism through which Rawlsian principles can influence economic distribution. Income taxes, inheritance taxes, consumption taxes, and other fiscal institutions affect both available resources and economic opportunity.
However, the material emphasizes that Rawlsian justice cannot be reduced to taxation and redistribution. The organization of markets, property rights, education, finance, employment, and ownership can determine how unequal economic outcomes become before redistribution occurs.
Predistribution therefore seeks to structure economic institutions so that wealth and productive resources are more broadly dispersed from the beginning. This approach reflects Rawls's concern with preventing concentrations of economic power rather than merely compensating for their consequences.
Inheritance and Intergenerational Wealth
Inheritance creates a significant challenge for fair equality of opportunity. Large transfers of wealth can allow economic advantages to persist across generations regardless of differences in individual effort or achievement.
Rawlsian approaches therefore examine inheritance and estate taxation as possible means of limiting excessive concentrations of wealth. The goal is not necessarily to prohibit inheritance but to prevent inherited economic power from undermining fair opportunity.
Some scholarship also considers whether a regulated right to leave property to descendants can satisfy the Difference Principle when the resulting institutional arrangements continue to benefit disadvantaged citizens.
Political Power and Economic Inequality
Economic inequality matters not only because people possess different quantities of income and wealth. Large concentrations of economic resources can translate into unequal political influence.
Wealth can affect citizens' ability to participate in politics, shape public debate, influence institutions, obtain access to decision-makers, and protect their interests. Extreme economic inequality can consequently threaten the political equality required by a society of free and equal citizens.
Rawlsian concerns about inequality therefore extend beyond material living standards. The distribution of economic power can influence whether democratic institutions themselves remain fair.
Reciprocity and Democratic Equality
The Difference Principle can be understood as a principle of reciprocity among citizens engaged in social cooperation. Those who gain more from economic institutions should do so under arrangements that also improve the prospects of those who receive less.
This conception differs from simply maximizing total economic output. The benefits and burdens of cooperation must be distributed according to terms that citizens occupying different social positions could reasonably accept.
Democratic equality consequently combines fair opportunity with concern for the least advantaged. Citizens should relate to one another as political and social equals rather than as members of permanently dominant and subordinate economic classes.
Alternative Theories and Critiques of Rawls
The Difference Principle has generated extensive criticism and alternative theories of distributive justice. Libertarian approaches associated with Robert Nozick emphasize legitimate acquisition and voluntary transfer rather than evaluating distributions according to a particular pattern.
Amartya Sen challenges Rawls's reliance on primary goods by emphasizing capabilities. People can possess similar resources yet have very different abilities to convert those resources into meaningful opportunities and ways of living.
Other approaches emphasize desert, luck egalitarianism, welfare, utility, equality, or relational concerns. These disagreements demonstrate that debates over inequality involve not only how resources should be distributed but also what should count as advantage and why particular inequalities are morally objectionable.
Global Inequality and the Difference Principle
The scope of the Difference Principle has also generated debate. Rawls developed it primarily as a principle governing the basic structure of a domestic society rather than as a straightforward rule for distributing resources globally.
Critics argue that global markets, trade, financial institutions, and international inequalities profoundly affect individual opportunities and therefore deserve similar distributive scrutiny.
Defenders of Rawls's position distinguish the relationships among citizens within a political society from those among independent peoples. The controversy has become an important part of the wider philosophical debate over global economic justice.
New Applications of Rawlsian Fairness
The material also demonstrates that the Difference Principle continues to influence fields beyond conventional debates about income distribution. Rawlsian concepts have been applied to healthcare, financial institutions, social disadvantage, technology, and other areas involving unequal benefits and burdens.
Recent research has applied maximin and Difference Principle reasoning to artificial intelligence and machine learning. Some approaches attempt to improve outcomes for the worst-performing groups rather than simply maximizing average performance.
These applications demonstrate both the flexibility and limitations of Rawlsian reasoning. A principle originally designed to evaluate society's basic institutions cannot automatically be converted into a technical fairness formula without considering the wider social structure in which decisions occur.
Conclusion
The Difference Principle provides a framework for distinguishing inequality that can be justified through fair social cooperation from inequality that primarily preserves economic advantage. Rawls does not argue that every citizen must possess identical income or wealth. Instead, inequalities must operate within institutions that protect fair opportunity and provide the greatest benefit to the least advantaged.
The implications extend far beyond conventional redistribution. Property ownership, inheritance, taxation, education, incentives, political influence, economic institutions, and intergenerational advantage all affect whether economic inequality can satisfy justice as fairness.
The central Rawlsian question is therefore not simply how much inequality exists. It is whether the institutions producing that inequality could be justified to free and equal citizens, particularly those who occupy society's least advantaged positions.
The Difference Principle: Foundations and Explanations
| Samuel Freeman | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | n.d.
Explains Rawls's argument for the Difference Principle, under which social and economic inequalities must be arranged to provide the greatest benefit to society's least advantaged members.
| Leif Wenar | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | 2008
Provides a comprehensive overview of Rawls's political philosophy, including equality-based reciprocity, primary goods, fair equality of opportunity, and the Difference Principle.
| Samuel Freeman | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | 2008
Examines Rawls's original position and veil of ignorance and explains why Rawls believed impartial decision-makers would endorse principles protecting the least advantaged.
| Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | n.d.
Surveys Rawls's theory of justice and explains how the Difference Principle primarily regulates inequalities of income and wealth.
| Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | n.d.
Compares Rawlsian distributive justice with competing approaches such as Dworkin's equality of resources and Nozick's entitlement theory.
| Julian Lamont and Christi Favor | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | n.d.
Reviews major theories of distributive justice and places Rawls's Difference Principle within broader debates over equality, resources, desert, and liberty.
| Julian Lamont | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | 1996
Explains the important distinction between strict equality and Rawls's concern with maximizing the absolute position of society's least advantaged group.
| Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | n.d.
Surveys egalitarian political philosophy and discusses Rawls's effort to prevent social class and arbitrary circumstances from determining people's prospects.
| Stefan Gosepath | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | 2026
Examines theories of equality and the presumption that unequal distributions require impartial moral justification.
| Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | n.d.
Places Rawls within the history of Western theories of justice and explains his requirement that socioeconomic inequalities be morally justified.
| Alistair MacFarlane | Philosophy Now | 2012
Introduces Rawls's theory of justice and explains why inequalities generated by talent can be accepted only when they improve the position of the least well-off.
| Philosophy Now | Philosophy Now | 2015
Discusses Rawls's argument that some inequality may provide productive incentives but should be tolerated only insofar as it benefits the worst-off.
| Philosophy Now | Philosophy Now | 2011
Situates the Difference Principle within modern liberalism and contrasts Rawlsian limits on inequality with classical liberal approaches.
| Philosophy Now | Philosophy Now | 2023
Discusses Rawls's view that inequalities should be permitted only where incentives or other arrangements improve conditions for those at the bottom.
| Philosophy Now | Philosophy Now | 2007
Connects education, opportunity, and distributive justice to Rawls's argument for permitting inequality only where it maximally benefits the least well-off.
| Philosophy Now | Philosophy Now | 2019
Considers Rawlsian principles in relation to market economies, taxation, employment, and Third Way approaches to social justice.
| Philosophy Now | Philosophy Now | 2012
Examines taxation through Rawlsian justice and asks when unequal incomes may legitimately be permitted because they improve the condition of disadvantaged people.
| Political Science Institute | Political Science Institute | 2025
Provides an accessible account of justice as fairness, the original position, opportunity, and the Difference Principle.
| Ethics Unwrapped | University of Texas at Austin | n.d.
Explains the veil of ignorance as Rawls's method for designing social institutions without knowing one's own economic or social position.
| Stanford University | Stanford University | n.d.
Explains Rawls's stronger conception of fair equality of opportunity and why class background should not determine prospects for success.
Rawls, Inequality, and Economic Institutions
| Author(s) | American Journal of Law and Equality / MIT Press | 2023
Applies Rawls's framework directly to contemporary economic inequality and questions whether welfare-state capitalism can satisfy justice as fairness.
| Walter E. Schaller | Economic Affairs | 1998
Examines Rawls's Difference Principle and economic inequality, including the problem of individuals voluntarily entering the least-advantaged group.
| Samuel Freeman | Oxford Academic | n.d.
Analyzes Rawls's theory of distributive justice and explains the requirement that economic institutions make the least advantaged better off than alternative arrangements would.
| Alexander Kaufman | Cambridge University Press | 2018
Provides an extended philosophical analysis of the Difference Principle and debates over how much economic inequality it actually permits.
| Alexander Kaufman | Cambridge University Press | 2018
Examines democratic equality and argues that Rawlsian justice may support a substantially more egalitarian distribution of income than is often assumed.
| Author(s) | Cambridge University Press | n.d.
Discusses the Difference Principle as a restriction requiring inequalities to work maximally to the advantage of the worst-off social groups.
Argues that Rawls's political philosophy would require much greater equality of wealth and opportunity than exists in contemporary American society.
| Robert S. Taylor | Polity | 2021
Reassesses A Theory of Justice fifty years after publication and emphasizes Rawls's interest in markets, property-owning democracy, and liberal socialism.
Connects Thomas Piketty's analysis of wealth concentration with Rawls's critique of welfare-state capitalism and defense of property-owning democracy.
| Author(s) | Journal of Social Philosophy | 2023
Examines whether Rawls's political philosophy remains useful for confronting the modern rise of income and wealth inequality.
| Daniel Chandler | Time | 2024
Uses Rawls's ideas to argue that reducing inequality requires changing economic institutions and ownership patterns rather than relying only on taxes and transfers.
Explores Rawls's largely overlooked critique of capitalism and argues that severe concentrations of economic power conflict with liberal equality.
Discusses Rawls's openness to liberal socialism and the possibility that democratic ownership could better satisfy principles of liberty and economic justice.
| University of Manchester Global Development Institute | University of Manchester | 2021
Explains Rawls's rejection of welfare-state capitalism because it permits large inequalities and concentrations of productive property despite providing a social minimum.
| Author(s) | The Daily Economy | 2023
Uses Rawls as a framework for teaching debates about how much income inequality a just society should tolerate.
Property-Owning Democracy and Predistribution
| Martin O'Neill | PhilArchive | 2009
Defends Rawls's property-owning democracy as an institutional alternative that disperses capital ownership rather than merely redistributing income after market outcomes occur.
| Samuel Freeman | University of Pennsylvania | 2013
Explains the relationship between property-owning democracy and the Difference Principle and why Rawls regarded concentrated productive wealth as unjust.
| Samuel Freeman | PhilPapers | 2013
Summarizes Freeman's argument that widespread ownership of productive capital is central to Rawls's preferred economic regime.
| David Schweickart | Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews | 2013
Reviews debates over property-owning democracy and Rawls's rejection of conventional welfare-state capitalism.
| Hwa Yol Jung | Boston University | n.d.
Compares Rawlsian property-owning democracy with liberal democratic socialism and discusses which institutional system best realizes justice as fairness.
| N. Pagkratis | University of Helsinki | 2020
Investigates whether Rawls's property-owning democracy provides a useful model for addressing contemporary concentrations of wealth.
| Tilo Wesche | PhilPapers | 2013
Examines Rawls's conception of property and the political consequences of unequal ownership of productive resources.
| Samuel Freeman and others | Analyse & Kritik | n.d.
Includes scholarship connecting property-owning democracy, economic institutions, and the Difference Principle.
| Alex Raskolnikov | Journal of Legal Analysis | 2025
Develops a case for predistribution and connects it to Rawls's view that economic institutions should prevent severe inequality before it arises.
| Contributors | Wikipedia | n.d.
Provides an overview of property-owning democracy and its Rawlsian aim of dispersing productive assets, economic power, and political influence.
| Contributors | Wikipedia | n.d.
Surveys forms of economic democracy and discusses Rawls's endorsement of institutional systems capable of satisfying the two principles of justice.
| David Schweickart | ResearchGate | 2016
Compares property-owning democracy with economic democracy and examines whether either system better controls socioeconomic inequality.
Incentives, Talent, and the Cohen Critique
| Paula Casal | Utilitas | 2017
Compares Rawls, G. A. Cohen, and John Stuart Mill on whether unequal economic rewards are justified as incentives for productive work.
| Douglas MacKay | Economics & Philosophy | 2016
Defends some Rawlsian incentive inequalities against Cohen's claim that talented citizens cannot legitimately demand them.
| J. Donald Moon | Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy | 2015
Compares Rawls and Cohen over economic incentives, equality, and whether scarcity of talent can morally justify higher incomes.
| J. Donald Moon | PhilPapers | 2015
Summarizes the Rawls-Cohen debate over whether an egalitarian society needs income incentives for talented workers.
| Justin P. Holt | Journal article / JSTOR | 2011
Examines G. A. Cohen's critique of Rawlsian liberalism and the inequalities permitted by the Difference Principle.
| Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen / related scholarship | PhilArchive | 2013
Examines Cohen's argument that personal economic choices must also reflect egalitarian principles rather than leaving justice entirely to institutions.
| Richard C. Robinson | Springer | n.d.
Presents Cohen's incentives argument against Rawls and asks whether unequal compensation can be reconciled with a sincere commitment to distributive justice.
| Author(s) | Oxford Academic | n.d.
Discusses Cohen's neo-Marxist critique that Rawlsian incentives can undermine solidarity and that justice requires an egalitarian personal ethos.
| Nigel Pleasants | Social Philosophy and Policy | 2022
Reassesses Cohen's distinction between strict and lax interpretations of the Difference Principle.
| Steven Wall | Social Philosophy and Policy | 2012
Evaluates Cohen's attack on Rawls and considers whether the Difference Principle can remain a genuine principle of justice.
| Reviewer | Journal of Politics | 2010
Reviews Cohen's Rescuing Justice and Equality and his influential challenge to Rawls's justification of incentive-generated inequalities.
Reconsiders Cohen's egalitarian critique of Rawls and the role of the Difference Principle in arguments about socialism and economic equality.
| Author(s) | Cambridge University Press | n.d.
Explores Cohen's proposal that an egalitarian ethos among citizens could reduce the need for large income incentives.
| Sharon A. Lloyd | Review of Politics | 2025
Reconsiders Cohen's incentives objection and emphasizes reciprocity rather than simple maximization of the income of the least advantaged.
| Dean Machin | Political Quarterly / Wiley | 2013
Interprets the Difference Principle as compensation for social inequality and asks why income differences should benefit the least advantaged.
Taxation, Inheritance, and Redistribution
| Maxime Desmarais-Tremblay | Journal of Institutional Economics | 2026
Analyzes Rawls's writings on taxation, incentives, occupational freedom, and the institutional requirements of the Difference Principle.
| Charles O'Kelley | Seattle University Law Review | 1981
Investigates how Rawlsian principles might guide the design of an income tax system.
| Jennifer Bird-Pollan | University of Kentucky College of Law | n.d.
Examines wealth-transfer taxation through Rawls's veil of ignorance, fair equality of opportunity, and Difference Principle.
Evaluates consumption taxation within Rawls's theory and considers whether different forms of taxation respect choice and distributive justice.
Reviews inheritance taxation through competing theories of equality of opportunity, including Rawls's fair equality of opportunity.
| Will Hutton | The Observer / Guardian | 2023
Invokes Rawls in arguing that taxation and public services should expand opportunities and improve conditions for society's least advantaged.
| Tim Adams | The Observer / Guardian | 2024
Discusses Ingrid Robeyns's limitarian argument that extreme personal wealth can undermine democracy and that stronger taxation could reduce harmful inequality.
| Robert Armstrong and Martin Sandbu | Financial Times | 2024
Examines proposals for a global minimum tax on billionaires and the economic and political challenges posed by extreme wealth concentration.
Explores the growing importance of inheritance in determining economic position and the resulting challenge to meaningful equality of opportunity.
Examines arguments that inherited wealth is morally arbitrary and considers voluntary redistribution and wealth taxation.
| Guardian staff and agencies | The Guardian | 2025
Reports warnings that enormous intergenerational wealth transfers could deepen inequality and weaken social mobility without policy intervention.
| Pedro Patrício and Nuno A. M. Araújo | arXiv | 2021
Models the effects of inheritance and social class on long-run wealth distribution and shows mechanisms through which inequality can persist across generations.
Examines the conflict between parental advantages, equal opportunity, inheritance, and the possibility of maintaining a socially acceptable degree of inequality.
Alternative Theories and Critiques of Rawls
| Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | n.d.
Explains Robert Nozick's entitlement theory, one of the most influential libertarian objections to Rawlsian patterned redistribution.
| Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | n.d.
Presents Amartya Sen's capability approach and his criticism that equal primary goods can produce unequal real freedoms because people convert resources differently.
| Author(s) | Cambridge University Press | n.d.
Explains Sen's criticism that Rawls's focus on income, wealth, and primary goods does not sufficiently account for differences in people's ability to turn resources into valuable lives.
| Mozaffar Qizilbash | Springer | 2022
Surveys Amartya Sen's theory of justice and its relationship to Rawlsian institutional and distributive approaches.
| Kristina Meshelski | Ethics & Global Politics | 2019
Examines Sen's nonideal theory and arguments that comparative improvements in justice may be more useful than Rawls's ideal institutional theory.
| Michael Walzer | Dissent | n.d.
Discusses Sen's Idea of Justice in relation to Rawls and Cohen and the broader evolution of contemporary theories of distributive justice.
| Reiko Gotoh | History of Economic Ideas | 2014
Analyzes Sen's critique of Rawls and argues that shifting from primary goods to capabilities significantly alters how inequality should be evaluated.
| Author(s) | Oxford Academic | n.d.
Compares Rawlsian justice with luck egalitarianism and examines whether inequalities caused by circumstances beyond individual control should be compensated.
| Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | n.d.
Surveys philosophical theories of desert and merit that challenge or supplement Rawls's rejection of natural talent as a moral basis for unequal rewards.
| Andrew Lister | Journal of Politics | 2022
Investigates egalitarianism, desert, and Rawls's argument that morally arbitrary natural advantages should not automatically determine distributive shares.
| Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | n.d.
Provides broader philosophical context for debates about equality, equal moral status, and distributive outcomes.
| Philippe Van Parijs | Oxford Open Economics | 2024
Asks whether maximin is the appropriate answer to unjust inequality and revisits the logic underlying Rawls's Difference Principle.
| Debra Satz | Oxford Open Economics | 2024
Examines why inequality may be objectionable and discusses Rawlsian fair equality of opportunity alongside other egalitarian concerns.
| Rebecca Benson and others | Oxford Open Economics | 2024
Reviews public attitudes toward inequality and the distinction between inequality itself and inequality perceived as unfair.
Global Justice and the Scope of the Difference Principle
| Michael Blake | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | 2013
Examines debates over whether Rawlsian distributive principles should apply internationally as well as within individual political societies.
Surveys proposals for a global Difference Principle and debates about equality of opportunity and cosmopolitan distributive justice.
| Oisin Suttle | European Journal of International Law | 2014
Examines whether Rawls's argument from moral equality to distributive justice should extend beyond national boundaries to global economic institutions.
| Author(s) | Ethics / University of Chicago Press | n.d.
Discusses Rawls's Law of Peoples and the controversy created by his refusal to adopt a global Difference Principle.
| Reviewer | Philosophy Now | n.d.
Reviews debates about Rawlsian justice at the international level and whether principles benefiting the least advantaged should operate globally.
Empirical and Quantitative Applications
| Yong Tao, Xiangjun Wu and Changshuai Li | arXiv | 2014
Attempts to incorporate Rawlsian fairness into a formal economic model of income distribution and the Gini coefficient.
| Venkat Venkatasubramanian and Yu Luo | arXiv | 2018
Uses bargaining theory and statistical mechanics to investigate the longstanding question of how much income inequality can be regarded as fair.
Develops a statistical model of income distributions while connecting economic equilibrium to Rawlsian ideas about social fairness.
Reports research testing the implications of concentrating distributive concern on society's least advantaged in the spirit of Rawls's Difference Principle.
| Author(s) | Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal | n.d.
Compares utilitarian social-welfare analysis with Rawlsian distributive justice and explores how the two approaches produce different policy judgments.
Rawls Beyond Traditional Economic Distribution
| Douglas MacKay and others | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | n.d.
Examines health inequality and distributive justice, illustrating questions that arise when Rawlsian ideas are extended beyond income and wealth.
| Perihan Elif Ekmekci and others | National Library of Medicine / PMC | 2015
Explores how Rawls's theory might be extended to healthcare and argues that natural disadvantages provide an important reason for distributive correction.
Examines Rawlsian impartiality, autonomy, and justice against the background of real-world social and economic inequality.
Places Rawls within broader egalitarian philosophy and examines his treatment of the natural lottery and individual responsibility.
Explores the importance of self-respect, one of Rawls's central primary goods, and connects social inequality with status and recognition.
| Richard W. Miller | Ethics | 2016
Investigates egalitarian norms implicit in capitalist institutions and discusses Rawlsian principles as standards for evaluating economic arrangements.
Reexamines A Theory of Justice and asks whether inequalities permitted under the Difference Principle are compatible with a genuinely just social order.
Investigates historical injustice within political liberalism and considers the limits of the Difference Principle as a remedy for entrenched disadvantage.
Recent and New Applications of Rawlsian Fairness
| Alycia Carey and Xintao Wu | arXiv | 2025
Applies competing theories of distributive justice, including Rawls's Difference Principle, to fairness among participants in federated machine-learning systems.
| Kessia Nepomuceno and Fabio Petrillo | arXiv | 2025
Uses Rawlsian and Dworkinian theories to argue that genuine fairness may sometimes require corrective treatment rather than purely formal equality.
| Jian Kang, Yan Zhu, Yinglong Xia, Jiebo Luo and Hanghang Tong | arXiv | 2022
Applies the Rawlsian Difference Principle to graph neural networks by attempting to improve outcomes for the worst-performing groups without destroying overall utility.
| Stanley Simoes, Deepak P and Muiris MacCarthaigh | arXiv | 2022
Explores how Rawls's Difference Principle can be translated into computational fairness criteria for clustering algorithms.
Additional Rawlsian Scholarship
| David Copp | Journal article / JSTOR | 1974
Provides an early critical analysis of justice and the Difference Principle shortly after publication of A Theory of Justice.
| Leonard Choptiany | Ethics | 1973
Offers an influential early critique arguing that aspects of Rawls's principles, including the Difference Principle, may be excessively demanding.
| L. Premchand | Essex Student Journal | 2017
Provides a focused discussion of social justice and the claim that inequalities are permissible only when they benefit society's least favored members.
| F. Esmaeili | University of North Florida | 2015
Examines whether the Difference Principle provides a practically fruitful method of organizing political and economic institutions.
| E. Nehri | Middle East Technical University | 2024
Offers a critical study of Rawls's Difference Principle with particular attention to the meaning and identification of the least advantaged.
| D. Kraynaya | Manchester Student Law Review | n.d.
Questions whether the Difference Principle is essentially another form of egalitarian redistribution and examines its treatment of unequal primary goods.
| John Rawls | California State University Long Beach | 1971
Provides excerpts from A Theory of Justice explaining justice as fairness, the original position, and the institutional regulation of social and economic inequalities.
| John Rawls | Texas A&M University | 1971
Provides Rawls's own discussion of the two principles of justice and examples illustrating how the Difference Principle applies to income groups.
| Ian Shapiro | Yale Open Courses | n.d.
Discusses Rawls, distributive justice, moral arbitrariness, inequality, and the philosophical foundations of the modern welfare state.
| Reviewer | Philosophy Now | 2026
Reviews a contemporary Rawlsian political program and discusses the Difference Principle, equality of opportunity, and criticism of unfettered markets.
| Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | n.d.
Provides an extensive scholarly bibliography covering Rawls, incentives, inequality, equality of opportunity, taxation, egalitarianism, and competing theories of distributive justice.
The Difference Principle and the Limits of Inequality
| Maurizio Bovi | Springer | 2025
Examines how much economic inequality Rawls's theory can tolerate and argues that inequality is justified only when it benefits the least advantaged under fair conditions of opportunity.
| Philippe Van Parijs | Oxford Open Economics | 2024
Reconsiders the maximin idea behind the Difference Principle and asks whether maximizing the position of the worst-off provides an adequate response to unjust inequality.
| Debra Satz | Oxford Open Economics | 2024
Examines several reasons economic inequality can be objectionable, including its effects on opportunity, political power, status, and social relationships.
| Rebecca Benson et al. | Oxford Open Economics | 2024
Reviews evidence about attitudes toward inequality and compares popular judgments of fairness with philosophical approaches associated with Rawls and other theorists.
| Simon Szreter | Oxford Open Economics | 2024
Surveys the history and ideology of economic inequality while identifying Rawls's A Theory of Justice as a landmark philosophical challenge to unequal social arrangements.
| Pablo Beramendi et al. | Oxford Open Economics | 2024
Explores the relationship between economic inequality and political equality, including the danger that wealth disparities can translate into unequal political influence.
| Josep Ferret Mas | PhilArchive | 2023
Analyzes different interpretations of Rawls's Difference Principle and its relationship to the claim that economic growth will eventually benefit poorer citizens.
| Francesco Nalli | Review of Political Economy | 2023
Investigates the economic principles embedded in political liberalism, including Rawls's treatment of opportunity, inequality, markets, and distributive institutions.
| Andreas Føllesdal | Review of Social Economy | 2023
Uses Rawlsian reasoning to defend limited economic inequality while considering when inequalities become incompatible with justice.
| Daniel W. L. Lai | Ethics and Social Welfare | 2023
Critically compares Rawlsian distributive justice with competing accounts that place greater emphasis on human well-being.
| Peter Stone | Ethical Theory and Moral Practice | 2022
Reviews contemporary egalitarian philosophy and explains the continuing influence of Rawls on debates about economic inequality, opportunity, respect, and luck.
| Sven Ove Hansson | History of European Ideas | 2022
Compares Rawls with Condorcet and examines earlier arguments that inequalities should be acceptable only when they benefit everyone or especially those worst off.
| Philippe Mongin and Marcus Pivato | Economic Theory | 2021
Gives an axiomatic economic analysis of Rawls's Difference Principle and examines alternative versions of the maximin allocation rule.
| Mark R. Reiff | Review of Economic Philosophy | 2012
Argues that Rawls's Difference Principle has sometimes been misused to justify supply-side economics and rising inequality contrary to Rawls's egalitarian purposes.
| Mark R. Reiff | University of Manchester | 2012
Examines the relationship between the Difference Principle, rising inequality, incentive arguments, and claims that enrichment at the top will eventually benefit those below.
| Andrew Williams | Canadian Journal of Philosophy | 1995
Identifies several formulations of the Difference Principle in Rawls's work and examines their different implications for permissible inequality.
| Peter Koller | Erkenntnis | 1983
Critically examines interpretations of the Difference Principle as a maximin rule and proposes an alternative understanding of its egalitarian rationale.
| Richard O. Zerbe Jr. | Social Choice and Welfare | 1988
Compares Rawlsian Difference Principles with economic utilitarianism and considers the circumstances in which utilitarian reasoning might produce Rawls-like distributions.
| Amartya Sen | Journal of Economic Theory / Springer | 1976
Develops measures of welfare inequality and examines the implications of Rawlsian reasoning for social welfare comparisons.
| Samuel Freeman | Oxford Academic | 2018
Provides a detailed interpretation of the Difference Principle, including its requirements for the least advantaged and its implications for economic systems.
Income, Wealth, and the Least Advantaged
| Jeffrey Edward Green | American Political Science Review | 2013
Argues that Rawlsian scholarship pays too little attention to the super-rich and asks whether extreme concentrations of wealth can themselves become objects of legitimate regulation.
| Dean Machin | Political Quarterly | 2013
Presents the Difference Principle as a justification for economic inequalities only when those inequalities improve the circumstances of disadvantaged citizens.
| Alexander W. Cappelen et al. | PhilPapers | n.d.
Examines how much economic inequality liberal societies can justify and considers the effects of wealth inequality on political and social equality.
| Arnaud Blouin et al. | Oxford Economic Papers | 2025
Studies beliefs about merit, luck, and inequality and illuminates a central Rawlsian question about whether morally arbitrary advantages should determine economic rewards.
| Joseph de la Torre Dwyer | Springer | 2019
Develops an alternative theory connecting chance, merit, opportunity, poverty, and economic inequality.
| Michael Gainer | Social Indicators Research | 2013
Empirically investigates whether welfare-state expansion improves life satisfaction particularly for disadvantaged groups, using the Difference Principle as a normative benchmark.
| Mark C. Navin | Springer | 2013
Connects Rawlsian discussions of inequality with social segregation, resentment, democratic participation, and political disengagement.
| Paul Gomberg | PhilPapers | 2010
Critiques aspects of Rawlsian fair opportunity and examines whether incentive-based differences can create inequalities inconsistent with democratic equality.
| Robert van der Veen | Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy | 2019
Examines whether justice as fairness should be understood as requiring substantially less inequality than some conventional interpretations allow.
| Author(s) | Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy | 2011
Argues that the Difference Principle may face difficulties as an action-guiding standard because it can theoretically permit very large inequalities when they maximize the position of the worst-off.
Property-Owning Democracy
| Martin O'Neill | Journal of Social Philosophy / PhilPapers | 2009
Examines property-owning democracy as a Rawlsian institutional model designed to prevent excessive concentrations of wealth and productive capital.
| Martin O'Neill | Journal of Social Philosophy / PhilPapers | 2008
Identifies several Rawlsian arguments for economic democracy based on workplace power, dispersed ownership, and the harmful consequences of large inequalities.
| Martin O'Neill | PhilPapers | 2008
Summarizes Rawlsian routes from justice as fairness toward greater democracy within economic institutions.
| Martin O'Neill | University of Manchester | 2007
Argues that property-owning democracy is best defended through Rawls's concerns about inequality, liberty, and the concentration of economic power.
| Samuel Freeman | Analyse & Kritik | 2013
Explains why Rawls viewed property-owning democracy as particularly well suited to satisfying the Difference Principle.
| Samuel Freeman et al. | Analyse & Kritik | 2013
Contains a symposium examining property-owning democracy, capitalism, markets, inequality, and Rawlsian distributive justice.
| David Schweickart | Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews | 2013
Reviews competing interpretations of Rawls's property-owning democracy and whether welfare-state capitalism might be reformed enough to satisfy the Difference Principle.
| Alan Thomas | PhilPapers | 2016
Presents the argument that widely dispersed ownership of capital provides a better institutional foundation for Rawlsian justice than conventional welfare-state capitalism.
| Michele Loi | Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy | 2023
Explores institutional reforms capable of moving capitalist societies toward Rawlsian property-owning democracy.
| Jens van 't Klooster | Political Theory | 2019
Examines how central banking might operate within a Rawlsian property-owning democracy and how monetary institutions affect distributive justice.
| Hwa Yol Jung | Boston University | n.d.
Compares property-owning democracy with liberal democratic socialism as alternative systems for satisfying Rawlsian principles.
| Martin O'Neill | Cambridge Rawls Lexicon | 2015
Defines Rawlsian property-owning democracy and explains its contrast with welfare-state capitalism.
Welfare-State Capitalism and Economic Systems
| Jeppe von Platz | Political Theory | 2020
Defends aspects of welfare-state capitalism and asks whether suitably egalitarian versions might satisfy Rawlsian democratic equality.
| Justin P. Holt | Critique | 2011
Examines the choice among competing economic systems from within Rawls's original position.
| Justin P. Holt | Critique | 2011
Analyzes Rawls's treatment of socialism, capitalism, property ownership, and economic inequality.
| University of Manchester Global Development Institute | University of Manchester | 2021
Explains why Rawls believed ordinary welfare-state capitalism leaves excessive concentrations of wealth and economic power intact.
| Daniel Chandler | Time | 2024
Applies Rawlsian political philosophy to contemporary American inequality and argues for changing the distribution of economic power before market incomes are generated.
Explains why Rawls's preferred economic arrangements were considerably more egalitarian than conventional welfare capitalism.
Examines liberal socialism as an economic system compatible with Rawlsian liberty and distributive equality.
| Robert S. Taylor | PhilPapers | 2021
Reassesses Rawls's economic philosophy and competing interpretations of liberty and equality in A Theory of Justice.
| Author(s) | Cambridge University Press | 2023
Examines Rawls's principles as an alternative to class conflict and highlights the role property-owning democracy could play in limiting economic domination.
Taxation and Redistribution
| Maxime Desmarais-Tremblay | Journal of Institutional Economics | 2026
Reconstructs Rawls's ideas about taxation, incentives, public finance, and the institutional implementation of the Difference Principle.
| Charles O'Kelley | Seattle University Law Review | 1981
Examines the implications of Rawlsian justice for income taxation and redistribution.
Investigates whether consumption taxation can be reconciled with Rawls's requirements of distributive justice.
| Alex Raskolnikov | Journal of Legal Analysis | 2025
Argues for greater use of predistributive legal rules and connects the approach with Rawls's preference for preventing excessive inequality rather than correcting it solely after the fact.
| Philosophy Now | Philosophy Now | 2012
Surveys ethical arguments concerning taxation, including Rawlsian approaches to economic inequality and redistribution.
| Elena Eggert | LSE Student Journal for Philosophy, Politics and Economics | 2020
Applies Rawls's theory to inheritance taxation and examines whether concentrated inherited business wealth can be reconciled with fair opportunity.
Inheritance and Intergenerational Wealth
| Ander Berrotarán | Economics & Philosophy | 2026
Develops a Rawlsian defense of a regulated right to leave inheritances while requiring inherited inequalities to benefit the worst-off.
| Ander Berrotarán | PhilPapers | 2026
Summarizes the argument that inheritance may be permitted under the Difference Principle when appropriately limited and taxed.
| Jennifer Bird-Pollan | University of Kentucky College of Law | 2013
Examines Rawlsian equality of opportunity and the implications of inherited wealth for estate and wealth-transfer taxation.
Explores inheritance taxation through philosophical theories of equality of opportunity, including Rawls's fair equality of opportunity.
Examines the growing importance of inherited wealth in determining economic position and the resulting decline of equality of opportunity.
Discusses moral objections to inheritance and the idea that unearned wealth conflicts with genuine equality of opportunity.
| Pedro Patrício and Nuno A. M. Araújo | arXiv | 2021
Models how inheritance and social class can generate persistent wealth inequalities across generations.
Explores tensions among inheritance, family advantage, equality of opportunity, and economic inequality.
Incentives and the Rawls-Cohen Debate
| J. Donald Moon | Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy | 2015
Examines G. A. Cohen's criticism that Rawls permits talented individuals to demand unequal rewards simply because their abilities are scarce.
| Paula Casal | Utilitas | 2017
Compares Rawls, Cohen, and Mill on occupational freedom and whether income incentives can morally justify inequality.
| Douglas MacKay | Economics & Philosophy | 2016
Defends aspects of Rawlsian incentive inequality against Cohen's influential egalitarian critique.
Reassesses Cohen's challenge to Rawls and asks whether socialism should be identified with strict economic equality.
| Nigel Pleasants | Social Philosophy and Policy | 2022
Reexamines Cohen's argument that egalitarian principles should govern individual economic behavior as well as basic social institutions.
| Steven Wall | Social Philosophy and Policy | 2012
Critically evaluates Cohen's attempt to make equality more demanding than Rawlsian justice.
| Sharon A. Lloyd | Review of Politics | 2025
Examines incentives, reciprocity, self-interest, and civic virtue within Rawls's theory of justice.
Fair Equality of Opportunity
| Author(s) | Cambridge University Press | 2015
Explains why Rawls requires not merely formal access to jobs and offices but genuinely comparable prospects for similarly talented and motivated citizens.
| Author(s) | Cambridge Rawls Lexicon | 2015
Provides a concise scholarly treatment of Rawls's fair equality of opportunity principle.
| Shlomi Segall | Oxford Academic | 2013
Defends major elements of Rawlsian fair equality of opportunity while questioning its priority over the Difference Principle.
| Lars Lindblom | Philosophical Papers | 2018
Defends Rawlsian fair equality of opportunity and analyzes its relationship with the Difference Principle.
| Stanford University | Stanford University | n.d.
Explains why Rawls believed people with comparable talents and motivation should have comparable life prospects regardless of class background.
| Thomas Pogge | Oxford Academic | 2007
Gives a detailed explanation of Rawls's second principle, including the relationship between fair opportunity and the Difference Principle.
Natural Talent, Luck, and Desert
| Michael Gorr | Springer | n.d.
Examines Rawls's treatment of natural inequality and his claim that natural talents should function as a common social asset rather than as a source of unlimited private entitlement.
| Fred Feldman and Brad Skow | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | n.d.
Reviews philosophical theories of desert and provides background for evaluating Rawls's rejection of natural talent as a sufficient justification for unequal economic rewards.
| Juliana Bidadanure et al. | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | 2025
Surveys egalitarian theories and explains Rawls's attempt to reconcile economic efficiency with protection of the least advantaged.
| Stefan Gosepath | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | 2026
Reviews philosophical theories of equality and the moral burden of justifying unequal social and economic arrangements.
| Andrew Lister | Journal of Politics | 2022
Examines the relationship between economic desert and Rawlsian egalitarianism.
Political Power and Economic Inequality
| Luca Nici | PhilArchive | 2024
Investigates what democratizing financial institutions might require from a broadly Rawlsian conception of justice.
| Jeffrey Edward Green | American Political Science Review | 2013
Explores whether extreme wealth creates forms of political and social power that Rawlsian liberalism has insufficiently addressed.
| Charles Jones | Ethics & Global Politics | 2021
Asks whether human-rights protections alone are sufficient when severe economic inequality and unequal social power persist.
| Pablo Beramendi et al. | Oxford Open Economics | 2024
Reviews how economic inequality can undermine equal political participation and influence.
Reciprocity and Democratic Equality
| Alexander Kaufman | Cambridge University Press | 2018
Develops Rawls's conception of democratic equality and argues that allowable inequalities must genuinely serve the interests of disadvantaged citizens.
| Alexander Kaufman | Cambridge University Press | 2018
Examines the relationship among fair opportunity, economic inequality, and the Difference Principle.
| Alexander Kaufman | Cambridge University Press | 2018
Analyzes competing interpretations of the Difference Principle and disputes over how much inequality it permits.
| Samuel Freeman | Oxford Handbook of Distributive Justice | 2018
Presents the Difference Principle as a principle of reciprocity rather than simply a priority rule favoring poorer individuals.
| David Miller | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | 2017
Surveys theories of justice and explains Rawls's argument that inequalities can be legitimate when they improve the prospects of the least advantaged.
Global Inequality and the Difference Principle
| Joseph Heath | Canadian Journal of Philosophy | 2005
Defends Rawls's refusal to extend the domestic Difference Principle directly to inequalities among nations.
| Oisin Suttle | European Journal of International Law | 2014
Examines whether Rawls's argument from moral equality to domestic distributive justice should also apply to global commerce.
| Mark C. Navin | Springer | 2011
Surveys proposals for extending the Difference Principle to global economic inequality.
Reviews the Difference Principle within debates over international and global distributive justice.
Surveys global egalitarian theories and Rawls's influence on arguments about inequality between nations.
| Chris Armstrong | Ethics & Global Politics | 2013
Examines global justice, positional goods, and the significance of international economic inequalities.
| Shmuel Nili | Ethics & Global Politics | 2010
Discusses Thomas Pogge's attempt to extend Rawlsian ideas toward stronger international duties of distributive justice.
Alternative Measures of Advantage
| Clark Wolf and others | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | n.d.
Explains Amartya Sen's capability critique of Rawls's focus on primary goods and considers whether resources adequately measure disadvantage.
| Mozaffar Qizilbash | Springer | 2022
Reviews Sen's alternative to Rawlsian distributive justice and the shift from primary goods toward capabilities.
| Shlomi Segall | Oxford Handbook of Distributive Justice | 2018
Examines health inequality and the difficulties involved in applying Rawlsian distributive principles to disadvantages not captured by income and wealth.
Applications Beyond Conventional Income Distribution
| Ulrik Franke | Philosophy & Technology | 2024
Examines attempts to translate Rawls's Difference Principle into algorithmic fairness and warns that fairness at the local level may not aggregate into societal fairness.
| Alycia Carey and Xintao Wu | arXiv | 2025
Develops a federated-learning framework capable of implementing a Rawlsian Difference Principle alongside alternative distributive standards.
| Kessia Nepomuceno and Fabio Petrillo | arXiv | 2025
Uses Rawlsian theory to argue that substantive fairness may require corrective policies benefiting historically disadvantaged groups.
| Jian Kang et al. | arXiv | 2022
Applies Rawlsian maximin reasoning to reduce disparities in graph neural-network performance.
| Stanley Simoes, Deepak P and Muiris MacCarthaigh | arXiv | 2022
Develops a method for applying Rawls's Difference Principle to fairness in machine-learning clustering.
Structural Inequality and Critiques of Rawls
| Henry S. Richardson | Cambridge University Press | 2023
Argues that Rawls's emphasis on formal institutions does not sufficiently address informal social power and persistent structural oppression.
| Author(s) | Oxford Academic | 2024
Critiques liberal egalitarianism for treating distribution too individualistically and questions whether improving the worst-off is sufficient when unequal social relationships persist.
| Julian Lamont and Christi Favor | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | n.d.
Compares Rawlsian distributive justice with strict equality, prioritarianism, resource equality, entitlement theory, and other approaches.
Core Rawlsian Reference Material
| Samuel Freeman | Cambridge University Press | 2015
Gives a focused scholarly explanation of the Difference Principle, including its relation to primary goods and the least advantaged.
| Samuel Freeman | Cambridge Rawls Lexicon | 2015
Provides a concise primary reference explaining how Rawls intends economic inequalities to benefit disadvantaged citizens.
| Samuel Freeman | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | n.d.
Gives an extensive account of Rawls's argument for choosing the Difference Principle from the original position.
| Samuel Freeman | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | 2008
Explains why parties behind the veil of ignorance might choose institutions that protect their prospects should they turn out to occupy society's least advantaged position.
| Leif Wenar | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | 2008
Surveys Rawls's complete theory of justice, including liberty, opportunity, wealth, property, reciprocity, and economic institutions.
| Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | n.d.
Provides an accessible overview of Rawls and explains how the Difference Principle regulates inequalities in income and wealth.
| Thomas Pogge | Oxford University Press | 2007
Explains in detail how Rawls's second principle combines fair equality of opportunity with protection of the least advantaged.
| Author(s) | Cambridge University Press | 2025
Reconstructs Rawls's choice situation and explains why parties can accept some economic inequality when all socioeconomic groups gain.
| David A. Reidy | Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy | 2023
Provides an extensive introduction to Rawls's philosophical project and the institutional conception of justice that underlies his treatment of economic inequality.
| National Endowment for the Humanities | National Endowment for the Humanities | 1999
Profiles Rawls and the importance of his contribution to twentieth-century thinking about fairness, institutions, justice, and distributive equality.
