Who Supports Christian Nationalism?
Who Supports Christian Nationalism?
Christian nationalism in the United States draws support from a broad but unevenly distributed portion of the population. National surveys and academic research consistently show that support is concentrated among particular religious, political and demographic groups rather than being evenly spread throughout American society.
The strongest associations appear among white evangelical Protestants, Republicans, Donald Trump supporters, frequent religious attenders, older Americans and people with lower levels of formal education. Hispanic Protestants also show comparatively high levels of Christian nationalist identification in several surveys, demonstrating that Christian nationalism cannot be understood simply as a white evangelical phenomenon.
At the same time, the research emphasizes that Christian nationalism is not synonymous with Christianity, religious devotion, political conservatism or Republican identification. Many Christians strongly reject Christian nationalism, and supporters themselves differ considerably in racial identity, theological outlook, social attitudes and political priorities.
Political Party, Trump and the Republican Coalition
Political identification is one of the strongest predictors of Christian nationalist support.
Public Religion Research Institute surveys repeatedly find much higher levels of Christian nationalism among Republicans than among independents or Democrats. In the 2025 American Values Atlas, 56 percent of Republicans were classified as Christian nationalism Adherents or Sympathizers, compared with approximately one-quarter of independents and less than one-fifth of Democrats.
Christian nationalism is also strongly associated with support for Donald Trump. Studies examining the 2016, 2020 and 2024 elections found that Christian nationalist beliefs independently predicted Trump voting even after researchers accounted for other factors such as party identification, political ideology, economic attitudes and religious characteristics.
Research after the 2024 election similarly found that states with greater concentrations of Christian nationalist supporters tended to give Trump larger shares of the presidential vote.
This relationship does not mean that every Republican or Trump supporter is a Christian nationalist. Rather, Christian nationalism represents an especially influential current within the contemporary Republican coalition.
White Evangelical Protestants
White evangelical Protestants consistently register the highest levels of Christian nationalist support among major American religious groups.
PRRI surveys have frequently found that roughly two-thirds of white evangelical Protestants qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents or Sympathizers. This group is considerably more supportive than mainline Protestants, non-Christian religious Americans and people with no religious affiliation.
White evangelicals are also particularly likely to support greater Christian influence over government, laws and public institutions.
However, Christian nationalism should not be equated with evangelical Christianity as a whole. Significant numbers of evangelical Christians reject Christian nationalism, and Christian organizations, clergy and theologians have organized campaigns opposing the ideology.
Hispanic Protestants and Nonwhite Supporters
Research complicates the common assumption that Christian nationalism is exclusively associated with white Christians.
Hispanic Protestants show some of the highest levels of Christian nationalist identification after white evangelical Protestants. Several recent surveys found that a majority of Hispanic Protestants fell into Christian nationalist Adherent or Sympathizer categories.
Black Christians and other nonwhite Americans can also express Christian nationalist beliefs, although the political and racial implications of those beliefs may differ substantially from those found among white supporters.
Studies comparing white, Black and Hispanic Christian nationalists suggest that similar survey responses can reflect different understandings of nationalism, religious identity, racial solidarity and American belonging.
White Christian nationalists tend to express more restrictive immigration attitudes than Black or Hispanic Christian nationalists, illustrating why researchers caution against treating Christian nationalism as a completely uniform ideology across racial groups.
Religious Attendance and Religious Practice
Frequent religious attendance is strongly associated with Christian nationalist attitudes.
Americans who attend religious services weekly or more frequently are considerably more likely to qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents or Sympathizers than people who rarely or never attend religious services.
This relationship is particularly pronounced within conservative Christian traditions.
Nevertheless, researchers distinguish Christian nationalism from religiosity itself. Religious commitment alone does not necessarily produce Christian nationalism. Many highly religious Americans oppose merging Christianity with national political identity.
Christian nationalism is therefore better understood as a particular way of connecting Christianity, American identity and political power rather than simply as intense religious belief.
Age and Generational Differences
Older Americans generally show higher levels of Christian nationalist support than younger generations.
PRRI data have found comparatively high levels of support among members of the Silent Generation and Baby Boomers, while Millennials tend to show lower levels of Christian nationalist identification.
Generation Z also tends to be less supportive overall than older Americans, although substantial political differences exist within the generation.
Among younger Americans, partisan identification remains important. Young Republicans are considerably more likely to embrace Christian nationalist ideas than young Democrats or independents.
Some evidence also suggests an emerging gender difference among younger Americans, with Gen Z men showing more Christian nationalist support than Gen Z women.
Education and Social Position
Educational attainment is another recurring demographic predictor.
Americans with a high-school education or less are generally more likely to qualify as Christian nationalist supporters than college graduates or people with postgraduate education.
People with postgraduate education are disproportionately represented among Christian nationalism Skeptics and Rejecters.
The relationship between education and Christian nationalism also appears in electoral research. State-level studies have found that the relationship between Christian nationalism and Trump voting is especially strong in places with lower average levels of educational attainment.
Education does not determine Christian nationalist belief, but it consistently appears as one of several demographic characteristics associated with differences in support.
Geography and Regional Patterns
Christian nationalist support varies considerably across states and regions.
Some of the highest levels have been found in portions of the South, Appalachia and parts of the Midwest. States such as Arkansas, Mississippi, West Virginia, Oklahoma and Wyoming have appeared among states with comparatively high levels of Christian nationalist identification.
However, political conservatism alone does not determine Christian nationalist support.
Utah provides an important example. Despite its strongly Republican political history, Christian nationalist support is comparatively limited, reflecting distinctive religious and political traditions associated with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
Colorado similarly shows comparatively low levels of Christian nationalist support relative to many strongly Republican Southern states.
These differences demonstrate that regional religious culture, denominational history and state political traditions matter alongside ordinary partisan identification.
Race, National Identity and Immigration
Christian nationalism is closely connected to competing ideas about American national identity.
Supporters are more likely than opponents to believe that Christianity occupies a special place in defining what it means to be genuinely American.
Among white Christians in particular, research suggests that perceived demographic decline or loss of Christian cultural dominance can increase Christian nationalist attitudes.
Experimental research has found that perceptions of religious demographic change can activate fear, threat and other emotions that increase Christian nationalist identification.
Christian nationalism is also associated with restrictive immigration attitudes. However, these relationships differ across racial groups, and white Christian nationalists tend to express more strongly exclusionary immigration attitudes than Black and Hispanic Christian nationalists.
Perceived Threat and Christian Victimhood
A recurring theme across the research is the belief that Christianity is losing cultural influence or is being threatened by secular institutions, demographic change or political opponents.
Christian nationalist supporters are considerably more likely to believe that traditional Christian culture is being displaced.
Perceptions that Christians are persecuted or losing control of American institutions can strengthen Christian nationalist attitudes.
Some supporters simultaneously endorse general principles of religious freedom while becoming less tolerant of religious pluralism when they believe Christianity is under threat.
This suggests that perceived cultural insecurity can be an important mechanism connecting religious identity with nationalist politics.
Authoritarianism and Democratic Attitudes
A substantial body of research finds associations between Christian nationalism and authoritarian political attitudes.
Christian nationalist Adherents score comparatively high on measures of right-wing authoritarianism in several national surveys.
Experimental studies have found that people with stronger Christian nationalist beliefs are more willing than other Americans to tolerate political leaders violating democratic norms during perceived national emergencies.
These measures have included hypothetical willingness to suspend elections, weaken institutional checks, suppress political opponents or allow executives greater authority during crises.
Research also finds stronger Christian nationalist identification among people who express distrust of elections or support restrictions on voting access.
These findings do not mean that every Christian nationalist rejects democracy. Some research cautions against treating Christian nationalists as psychologically or politically identical. Nevertheless, authoritarian attitudes appear repeatedly as an important correlate of stronger Christian nationalist identification.
Political Violence, Conspiracy Beliefs and Grievance
Christian nationalism alone does not automatically produce support for political violence.
Research suggests that the relationship becomes substantially stronger when Christian nationalism combines with other factors, particularly perceived victimhood, racial identity, conspiracy beliefs and political grievance.
Studies examining attitudes toward the January 6 Capitol attack found especially high support among Christian nationalists who also strongly identified with white identity, believed Christians were being victimized or embraced QAnon-related claims.
Apocalyptic beliefs, perceptions of national collapse and hostility toward perceived social outgroups can further strengthen willingness to justify political violence.
Research therefore portrays political violence as emerging most strongly from combinations of Christian nationalism with grievance, conspiracy thinking and perceived existential threat.
Guns, Masculinity and Gender Roles
Christian nationalism is also associated with particular views of gun ownership and traditional gender roles.
Research has found that Christian nationalism strongly predicts opposition to stricter federal gun-control laws.
More recent work suggests that strong gun-owner identity can amplify the relationship between Christian nationalism and acceptance of political violence.
Some studies also connect Christian nationalist beliefs with traditional masculinity, pronatalism and concerns about declining birth rates or demographic replacement.
Earlier national surveys found Christian nationalist supporters disproportionately likely to embrace patriarchal understandings of gender and family organization.
Media Consumption and Political Networks
Media consumption appears to influence Christian nationalist identification.
Americans who rely heavily on conservative or far-right media sources are substantially more likely to qualify as Christian nationalism supporters than people who rely on mainstream or ideologically mixed news sources.
Media also influences whether Americans recognize the term "Christian nationalism," interpret it positively or negatively and connect it with their own political identity.
Christian nationalist ideas circulate through overlapping networks that can include churches, political organizations, activist groups, social media communities, conservative media outlets and political rallies.
Movements such as Project Blitz and some organizations associated with the New Apostolic Reformation illustrate how religious networks can translate Christian nationalist beliefs into political mobilization.
At the same time, progressive and moderate Christian networks increasingly organize in opposition to Christian nationalism.
Christian Nationalism Is Not a Single Movement
The research consistently warns against treating Christian nationalists as a completely uniform political or religious bloc.
Scholars have identified several ideological and theological varieties, including charismatic dominionist movements, Calvinist nationalist currents and Catholic integralist traditions.
Race also changes how Christian nationalism functions politically. White, Black and Hispanic supporters may share beliefs about Christianity's symbolic importance to the nation while differing significantly on immigration, racial inequality, political parties and social policy.
Some supporters are primarily motivated by religious restoration, others by cultural conservatism, national identity, partisan loyalty, perceived Christian persecution or opposition to demographic and cultural change.
Christian nationalism therefore operates more accurately as a family of related beliefs connecting Christianity with American national identity rather than as a single organization or unified political doctrine.
Who Is Most Likely to Support Christian Nationalism?
Taken together, the research identifies several characteristics that repeatedly correlate with stronger Christian nationalist support:
- Republican Party identification
- Support for Donald Trump or the MAGA movement
- White evangelical Protestant affiliation
- Hispanic Protestant affiliation
- Frequent religious service attendance
- Older age
- Lower levels of formal educational attainment
- Residence in some Southern, Appalachian and strongly conservative states
- Heavy consumption of conservative or far-right media
- Belief that Christianity is losing cultural influence
- Perceptions that Christians are persecuted or threatened
- Restrictive attitudes toward immigration
- Traditional or patriarchal gender attitudes
- Distrust of elections or democratic institutions
- Right-wing authoritarian attitudes
- Conspiracy beliefs or perceptions of political victimhood
No single characteristic defines a Christian nationalist. Instead, support is strongest where several of these religious, political and cultural identities overlap.
Conclusion
Christian nationalism has significant support in the United States, but that support is concentrated rather than universal.
The strongest and most consistent constituency consists of politically conservative Christians—especially white evangelical Protestants—who identify with the Republican Party and support Donald Trump. Hispanic Protestants also display comparatively high support, while Christian nationalist beliefs occur to varying degrees across racial and denominational groups.
Older age, frequent worship attendance, lower educational attainment, conservative media consumption and residence in certain regions further increase the likelihood of Christian nationalist identification.
At a deeper level, research suggests that Christian nationalism is often driven by the belief that Christianity should retain a privileged position within American national identity and public institutions. Perceptions of cultural displacement, demographic change or threats to Christianity can intensify that belief.
Yet Christian nationalism remains internally diverse. Many Christians reject it, and supporters differ substantially by race, theology, political priorities and attitudes toward democracy.
Understanding who supports Christian nationalism therefore requires looking beyond any single demographic category. It is best understood as an overlapping religious, political and national identity that becomes strongest where conservative Christianity, Republican politics, cultural threat perceptions and particular understandings of American identity converge.
131. Who Supports Christian Nationalism?
National Surveys and Demographic Profiles
1. | Chip Rotolo and Gregory A. Smith | Pew Research Center | May 14, 2026
Pew finds sharp partisan and religious divisions over Christianity's place in government. White evangelical Protestants and Republicans are substantially more receptive than most other groups to Christian influence in law and government.
2. | UMass Poll | University of Massachusetts Amherst | April 7, 2026
Detailed demographic crosstabs show Christian nationalist propositions receive substantially greater agreement among Republicans, conservatives, Trump voters, MAGA identifiers, older adults, and some less-educated groups.
3. | Russell Contreras and John Frank | Axios | February 24, 2026
Examines Colorado's relatively low Christian nationalist support while placing the state's numbers within the national partisan and geographic pattern.
4. | Kim Bojórquez and Russell Contreras | Axios Salt Lake City | February 23, 2026
Uses PRRI data to contrast Utah with more supportive Republican states and discusses the divided views of Latter-day Saints.
5. | Russell Contreras | Axios | February 18, 2026
Reports that Christian nationalism is particularly entrenched within today's Republican coalition and strongest in states with greater Republican political strength.
6. | PRRI Staff | Public Religion Research Institute | February 17, 2026
PRRI's 2025 American Values Atlas finds roughly one-third of Americans qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents or Sympathizers. Support is especially high among white evangelical Protestants, Hispanic Protestants, Republicans, frequent religious attenders, older adults, and Americans with lower educational attainment.
7. | PRRI Staff | Public Religion Research Institute | February 17, 2026
The survey finds 56% of Republicans qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents or Sympathizers, compared with 25% of independents and 17% of Democrats, demonstrating one of the strongest demographic divides in Christian nationalist support.
8. | PRRI Staff | Public Religion Research Institute | February 17, 2026
Examines Christian nationalism in Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin, illustrating how partisan and religious differences operate within politically important states.
9. | PRRI Staff | Public Religion Research Institute | February 4, 2025
Finds approximately three in ten Americans were Christian nationalism Adherents or Sympathizers in 2024. White evangelicals and Hispanic Protestants showed particularly high levels of support.
10. | Chip Rotolo, Gregory A. Smith and Jonathan Evans | Pew Research Center | March 15, 2024
Examines which Americans support an official Christian nation, government promotion of Christian values, biblical influence on law, and Christian nationalism.
11. | PRRI Staff | Public Religion Research Institute | February 28, 2024
The first PRRI state-by-state mapping of Christian nationalism examines religion, party, education, race, age, church attendance, geography, and presidential preferences.
12. | PRRI Staff | Public Religion Research Institute | February 28, 2024
Summarizes evidence that Christian nationalism is closely associated with Republican identification, white evangelical Protestantism, church attendance, red-state residence, and support for Donald Trump.
13. | PRRI Staff | Public Religion Research Institute/Brookings Institution | February 8, 2023
A foundational national survey showing nearly two-thirds of white evangelical Protestants and a majority of Republicans fell into PRRI's Christian nationalism Adherent or Sympathizer categories.
14. | PRRI Staff | Public Religion Research Institute | February 8, 2023
Highlights exceptionally high support among white evangelical Protestants and Republicans while examining associations with race, immigration, antisemitism, Islamophobia, and patriarchal gender attitudes.
15. | Pew Research Center | Pew Research Center | October 27, 2022
Finds white evangelical Protestants and Republicans especially likely to say the United States should be a Christian nation, while Democrats and religiously unaffiliated Americans are much less supportive.
Religious Affiliation and Christian Traditions
16. | Religion News Service | Religion News Service | August 21, 2026
Reports research showing some Christian nationalists simultaneously endorse pluralistic principles but become less tolerant when they perceive Christianity to be under threat.
17. | Lauren Horn Griffin, Charles McCrary and Jelani Ince | PRRI | August 3, 2026
Examines Christians who actively reject Christian nationalism, providing a useful comparison between supporters and progressive Christian opponents.
18. | Megan Fowler | Christianity Today | July 30, 2026
Describes debates within Protestant denominations over Christian nationalism, illustrating that significant numbers of Christians actively oppose the ideology even while others embrace it.
19. | Charles McCrary | PRRI | May 15, 2026
Finds awareness and interpretation of the term Christian nationalism vary according to ideology, religious orientation, and media consumption.
20. | Jack Panyard | Christianity Today | May 14, 2026
Reviews Pew findings showing white evangelical Protestants as the religious group most favorable toward Christian nationalism and greater Christian influence in public life.
21. | Paul A. Djupe and colleagues | Politics and Religion | 2026
Finds that Christian nationalist attitudes can coexist with nominal support for religious pluralism, particularly when supporters perceive threats to Christians.
22. | Nilay Saiya | Politics and Religion | May 13, 2025
Argues that Christian nationalists are not a homogeneous bloc and identifies charismatic dominionist, Calvinist nationalist, and Catholic integralist varieties.
23. | Jessica Wai-Fong Wong | Religions | August 29, 2024
Examines why white evangelical theology and political identity can accommodate Christian nationalism and the pursuit of a Christian social order.
24. | Harvest Prude | Christianity Today | March 15, 2024
Discusses white evangelical support for Christian influence in government while distinguishing those attitudes from explicit identification with the term Christian nationalism.
25. | Russell Contreras | Axios | February 29, 2024
Focuses on the comparatively high level of Christian nationalist support among Hispanic Protestants, complicating portrayals of the movement as exclusively white.
26. | PBS NewsHour | PBS | December 2023
Tim Alberta discusses the faction of American evangelicalism that views the United States as an explicitly Christian nation requiring political restoration.
27. | Paul D. Miller | Christianity Today | February 3, 2021
Explains Christian nationalism for an evangelical audience and distinguishes the ideology from ordinary Christianity, patriotism, and political participation.
28. | Andrew L. Whitehead and Samuel L. Perry | Oxford University Press | March 19, 2020
Introduces the influential social-scientific framework defining Christian nationalism as a fusion of Christianity with American civic identity and emphasizes that it cannot be reduced simply to religiosity, conservatism, racism, or authoritarianism alone.
Partisanship, Trump and Electoral Politics
29. | Jesse Smith | Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion | December 26, 2025
Partisan and Racial Sorting of Christian Nationalism, 1996–2022 examines the long-term political sorting of Christian nationalist attitudes. The study finds growing polarization, with Republican and religious-right constituencies increasingly separated from Democratic and secular constituencies.
30. | Allyson Shortle and Michael R. Fisher Jr. | PRRI | August 12, 2025
Examines how Christian nationalist identity interacts with race and voting behavior, showing that the political implications of the ideology vary among white, Black, and Hispanic supporters.
31. | Andrew L. Whitehead and Samuel L. Perry | Nations and Nationalism | June 3, 2025
State-level Christian nationalism significantly predicted Donald Trump's 2024 vote share, particularly in states with lower average educational attainment.
32. | PRRI Staff | PRRI | February 4, 2025
Documents a strong state-level and individual-level relationship between Christian nationalism and voting for Donald Trump in 2024.
33. | Axios Staff | Axios | June 24, 2024
Describes the growing political influence of Christian nationalism and its close alliance with Donald Trump and Republican politics.
34. | Maya Yang | The Guardian | February 9, 2023
Reports national survey findings that most Republicans and roughly two-thirds of white evangelical Protestants were sympathetic to or adherents of Christian nationalism.
35. | Vera Bergengruen | TIME | December 30, 2022
Describes organized Christian opposition to Christian nationalism and its growing appeal among parts of the MAGA movement.
36. | Jonathan Wilson-Hartgrove | TIME | July 28, 2022
Examines Christian nationalism's appeal within sectors of conservative Republican politics and among activists who identify Christianity with national political power.
37. | Samuel L. Perry, Andrew L. Whitehead and Joshua B. Grubbs | Sociological Forum | January 3, 2022
Finds Christian nationalism is associated with greater willingness to restrict voter access and support disenfranchisement.
38. | Andrew L. Whitehead and Samuel L. Perry | TIME | June 1, 2021
Discusses survey research showing that strongly Christian nationalist white Americans tend to support Trump, voter restrictions, and more exclusionary understandings of American identity.
39. | Samuel L. Perry, Andrew L. Whitehead and Joshua B. Grubbs | Politics and Religion | April 21, 2021
Finds Christian nationalism strongly predicted intended support for Trump in the 2020 election and could attract some previous third-party voters and nonvoters.
40. | Joseph O. Baker, Samuel L. Perry and Andrew L. Whitehead | Sociology of Religion | May 14, 2020
Keep America Christian (and White) finds Christian nationalism remained a significant predictor of intended Trump voting in 2020 and was closely intertwined with xenophobia and Islamophobia.
41. | Joseph O. Baker, Samuel L. Perry and Andrew L. Whitehead | Indiana University ScholarWorks | 2020
Repository version of Keep America Christian (and White), documenting the intersection of Christian nationalism, ethnoracial fears, Republican identity, and Trump support.
42. | Andrew L. Whitehead | University of Chicago Religion & Culture Forum | February 8, 2018
Whitehead argues that evangelical support for Trump is concentrated particularly among evangelicals who embrace Christian nationalist beliefs concerning cultural, racial, and political power.
Make America Christian Again finds Christian nationalism independently predicted voting for Donald Trump in 2016 even after accounting for party, ideology, racism, sexism, Islamophobia, immigration attitudes, economics, and religious characteristics.
Race, Ethnicity and National Identity
44. | PRRI Staff | Public Religion Research Institute | July 2026
Connects Christian nationalism with exclusionary beliefs about American identity and immigration while showing substantial internal diversity among supporters.
45. | Christopher H. Seto | Sociology of Religion | May 24, 2026
Finds Christian nationalism is associated with greater distrust of immigrants and explores how political and ethno-racial identities alter that relationship.
46. | PRRI Staff | PRRI | March 30, 2026
Demonstrates that white, Black, and Hispanic Christian nationalists differ substantially in their immigration attitudes despite sharing elements of Christian nationalist ideology.
47. | Allyson Shortle and colleagues | Perspectives on Politics | 2025
Uses oversamples of Black, Latino, and white Christians to show that Christian nationalism can operate as sacralized in-group protection across racial groups, though its policy effects vary by racial context.
48. | Pew Research Center | Pew Research Center | January 28, 2025
Places American Christian nationalism within a global comparison of religious nationalism and shows recurring relationships with religiosity, education, age, and national identity.
49. | William Horne | TIME | October 17, 2024
Places contemporary Christian nationalism within the history of racialized Christian nationalism and white political dominance in the United States.
50. | Michael R. Fisher Jr. | Public Religion Research Institute | July 3, 2024
Demonstrates that Black and white Christian nationalism supporters often interpret nationalism differently and do not necessarily hold identical racial or policy attitudes.
51. | Researchers | Public Opinion Quarterly | 2024
Experimental research finds perceived religious demographic change can increase Christian nationalist sentiment among white Christians, partly through feelings of fear and disgust.
52. | Researchers | Social Science Quarterly | 2023
Investigates whether Christian nationalist identification correlates with antisemitic beliefs and examines interactions with partisanship, worship attendance, perceived Christian persecution, and social dominance orientation.
53. | Samuel Stroope, Heather M. Rackin and Paul Froese | Socius | February 16, 2021
Finds Christian nationalism predicts more negative views of immigrants among both religiously active and religiously inactive Americans.
54. | Rosemary Al-Kire et al. | Group Processes & Intergroup Relations | January 18, 2021
Links Christian nationalism with heightened perceptions of threat and more restrictive attitudes toward immigrants.
55. | PRRI Staff | PRRI | 2026
Examines competing understandings of American identity and includes Christian nationalism as an important dividing line in contemporary definitions of who is considered authentically American.
Age, Education, Gender and Social Position
56. | PRRI Staff | PRRI | February 2024
Detailed demographic tables show support rises with age and declines with educational attainment. Gender differences, by contrast, were small in the 2023 survey.
57. | PRRI Staff | Public Religion Research Institute | 2024
Finds 42% of the Silent Generation qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents or Sympathizers, versus 35% of Baby Boomers, 29% of Gen X, 28% of Gen Z, and 23% of Millennials.
Geography and State Politics
58. | PRRI Staff | PRRI | September 24, 2026
Finds Democrats and independents overwhelmingly more likely than Republicans to reject Christian nationalism and documents substantial geographic variation.
59. | Kimberly H. Conger | Politics and Religion | January 14, 2026
Shows how the institutional Christian Right and Project Blitz translate Christian nationalist preferences into state-level legislative campaigns.
PRRI's research hub aggregates state, religious, partisan, demographic, electoral, and attitudinal findings on Christian nationalist supporters.
61. | PRRI Staff | PRRI/Meanings of Democracy Lab | October 30, 2024
Maps Christian-nationalist resistance and indirectly highlights states and demographic groups where support is strongest.
62. | Kim Bojórquez and Russell Contreras | Axios Salt Lake City | March 11, 2024
Shows Utah as an important exception to the simple assumption that every strongly Republican state has high Christian nationalist support.
Authoritarianism and Democratic Attitudes
63. | John Ishiyama | Politics and Religion | September 15, 2025
International evidence finds Christian nationalists in African survey data tend to be less supportive of democracy and more receptive to authoritarian alternatives.
64. | Samuel L. Perry and Joshua B. Grubbs | Politics and Religion | September 19, 2024
Finds Christian nationalism was a particularly strong predictor of willingness to allow leaders to suspend elections, suppress opponents, or evade checks and balances during national emergencies.
65. | Jesse Smith | Sociological Forum | August 11, 2024
Critically evaluates the relationship between Christian nationalism and authoritarianism and warns against treating all Christian nationalists as psychologically identical.
66. | Laura Barrón-López and Sam Lane | PBS NewsHour | February 1, 2024
Brad Onishi explains the constituencies attracted to Christian nationalism and its connections to evangelical politics, the New Apostolic Reformation, and Trump.
Political Violence, Threat, Conspiracy and Guns
Finds gun ownership and strong gun-owner identity can amplify the association between Christian nationalism and support for political violence.
Finds gun ownership amplifies the relationship between Christian nationalism and support for political violence.
69. | Samuel L. Perry | Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion | March 14, 2026
The Right Kind of Children connects Christian nationalism with masculinity, pronatalism, and concerns about demographic replacement.
70. | Researcher | Defence and Peace Economics | 2026
Finds apocalyptic beliefs and hostility toward social outgroups mediate much of the relationship between white Christian nationalism and support for political violence.
71. | Researchers | Politics and Religion | 2026
Examines whether public exposure to Christian symbols during January 6 generated backlash affecting Americans' religious and partisan identities.
72. | PRRI Staff | PRRI | June 18, 2025
Explores the relationship among Christian nationalism, charismatic prophecy beliefs, Trump, and willingness to justify political violence.
73. | Nilay Saiya | Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion | September 2, 2024
Quantitative study examines whether political empowerment of Christian nationalism corresponds with violence against religious minorities.
74. | Peter Smith | Associated Press/PBS | October 2024
Examines spiritual-warfare rhetoric within Christian nationalist and New Apostolic Reformation circles supporting Trump.
75. | Laura Barrón-López | PBS NewsHour | October 11, 2022
Discusses Republican candidates and voters embracing Christian nationalist positions and survey findings showing substantial Republican support for declaring America a Christian nation.
76. | Michelle R. Smith and Richard Lardner | Associated Press/PBS | October 7, 2022
Describes the ReAwaken America Tour and the audiences attracted by Christian nationalism, election conspiracies, spiritual warfare, and political grievance.
77. | Michelle R. Smith | Associated Press/PBS | September 7, 2022
Investigates Michael Flynn's movement and its mixture of Christian nationalism, conspiracy theories, grievance, election denial, and Trump politics.
78. | Miles T. Armaly, David T. Buckley and Adam M. Enders | Political Behavior | January 4, 2022
Finds Christian nationalism's relationship with support for the January 6 attack becomes especially strong when combined with white identity, perceived victimhood, and QAnon support.
79. | Miles T. Armaly, David T. Buckley and Adam M. Enders | Political Behavior | January 4, 2022
Examines how Christian nationalist ideology combines with perceived grievance and conspiracy belief to increase support for political violence.
80. | Miles T. Armaly, David T. Buckley and Adam M. Enders | Political Behavior | January 4, 2022
Finds Christian nationalist support for the January 6 Capitol attack becomes considerably stronger when combined with perceived victimhood, white identity, and QAnon support.
81. | Andrew L. Whitehead, Landon Schnabel and Samuel L. Perry | Socius | July 23, 2018
Finds Christian nationalism is one of the strongest predictors of opposition to stricter federal gun laws.
Media, Networks and Political Mobilization
82. | Lauren Horn Griffin, Charles McCrary and Jelani Ince | PRRI | August 3, 2026
Studies progressive Christians opposing Christian nationalism and provides a useful contrast between supporters and organized Christian opponents.
83. | Tiffany Stanley | Associated Press/PBS | May 17, 2026
Reports on thousands attending a national prayer gathering combining conservative Christian identity with patriotic symbolism and Trump-aligned politics.
84. | Peter Smith | Associated Press/PBS | May 14, 2026
Profiles evangelical leaders and conservative Christian organizations closely aligned with Trump and Christian-nationalist themes.
85. | Samuel L. Perry | Politics and Religion | October 2, 2024
Shows Christian nationalism and partisan identity jointly shape perceptions of whether political institutions and parties are friendly or hostile toward religion.
86. | Will Weissert | Associated Press/PBS | February 23, 2024
Shows how Trump appeals directly to conservative Christian constituencies using narratives that Christianity is threatened by political opponents.
87. | Abigail Vegter, Andrew R. Lewis and Cammie Jo Bolin | Politics and Religion | January 26, 2023
Examines relationships among Christian nationalism, partisan identity, and competing forms of American civil religion.
